The Media in
U.S.-Japan Relations:
National Media in Transnational Relations
Tadokoro Masayuki

It is self-evident that the news media is an important element in today's domestic politics both in the United States and in Japan. Projecting images to the public and creating a favorable perception in the mind of the public through the media is a crucial part of the political game in any modern democracy. To run a successful election campaign, television and other media images are now such a critical factor that many even lament how little today's election campaigns differ from advertising for merchandise. And those in power pay a high price if they fail to maintain a good press image.

In international politics, however, the importance of the news media may be less clear. Some realists, for example, emphasize contrasts in the political processes between the international and domestic spheres. In the international sphere, they see power relations and strategic considerations as the central factors, not media images or public opinion; they therefore give limited, if any, importance to the media in shaping the relations between nations. Thus, the focus of traditional discussions on the news media's role in international relations has been primarily with respect to its role as a means of statecraft. In other words, the media was viewed as a means of international propaganda and as a subtle communication channel to other governments. A classic example was Otto von Bismarck's manipulation of the press in the nineteenth century. He deliberately doctored and leaked information on the ongoing Prussian-French negotiations to give the impression that the French position was unreasonable, thereby agitating public opinion in Germany and provoking the French into the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 (Taylor 1995, 170). The media has also been viewed as a troublesome obstacle to the implementation of rational diplomacy. For Henry Kissinger, news reports on the Vietnam War, which were feeding bloody and hopeless images of
the war to the American public, while not a negligible factor, were viewed basically as noise rather than as an essential factor in his quest of statecraft.

In contrast to the realist view, Wilsonian idealists have assumed a more important and constructive role of international public opinion. In a democracy, the media is supposed to be more than an object for policymakers to manipulate or an inevitable nuisance in conducting foreign policy. International public opinion, as represented by the media, is assumed to be largely enlightened and harmonious. It also is assumed that international public opinion significantly affects decisions made by foreign policymakers. Thus, the media, in the view of Wilsonian idealists, is an agent for enlightenment, pacifying international relations where there is no central government. By helping to form international public opinion, the media is expected to moderate the behavior of states. Many dissidents in authoritarian regimes rely on support from the international media in their fight against their domestic regimes. The fate of dissidents like Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae Jung would have been very different if there was no international media.

Whether or not the media’s role is as benign as some liberals assume, it is difficult to marginalize the role of the news media in today’s foreign policy, even of an authoritarian country with a highly traditional idea of statecraft. The Tiananmen Square Incident in China is an illustrative example of the impact of international news media in today’s diplomacy. Chinese protesters wisely chose a time when the international media presence was strong because of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing and successfully put pressure on the authorities by fully mobilizing Western public opinion in their favor. The Statue of Liberty in Beijing, which was shown repeatedly by CNN, was highly effective in appealing to American sympathies and also in presenting the protesters as democrats who share basic values with the West (Hachten 1992, 79-80).

Those events also proved that the Chinese authorities could still choose to neglect the public opinions that were created and conveyed by the international media. But the suppression of the protesters, televised live all over the world, entailed a significant cost to China’s international political position. For the following several years, China was diplomatically isolated and it took a great deal of effort for China to get its relations with the United States back on track. Thus, the traditional logic of “reason of states” had to give way to a significant extent to the logic of public opinion formed and conveyed by the news media. To assess the impact of the media, we should ask ourselves what would have occurred if the Tiananmen Square Incident had happened with no TV cameras rolling, as has been the case in Tibet, where more intensive suppression has been going on for much longer.

Given that both the United States and Japan are democracies with governments highly responsive to public opinion (as represented by the domestic media), it is natural to assume that the role of the news media in their bilateral
relations is more significant than would be the case in authoritarian countries. In fact, both are democracies enjoying high levels of free speech and offering the largest media markets in the world. The two countries are major allies and economic partners, which results in information flows between not only the two governments but also the two publics. The governments of both countries always try to work with and react to the media. Thus, information flows across the Pacific are generally intensive in quantity and important in political processes.

At the same time, however, Japanese and American news reporting on one another involves important differences from reporting on domestic events, such as the long-standing disparity in the volume of coverage on each other, as well as completely different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. This chapter tries to analyze the role of media reports in the U.S.-Japan relationship. The first section will briefly discuss the general role of the news media in international politics. We then turn to the structural conditions in which the American and Japanese news media operate. Finally, we will examine how the connections between media reporting and politics have changed over the last several decades, and will touch upon the policy implications of this analysis.

**The News Media in International Politics**

In general, the news media's role is to mediate between sources and audiences. When considering bilateral relationships, four groups can be identified as sources and audiences, namely, the governments and the public in each of the two countries (fig. 1). We therefore can identify four types of interactions between these groups. First, the media serve to mediate information flows between the public and the government in a single country. This is a familiar function of the media in politics. Governments disseminate information and try to gain support from the public, while at the same time they have to react to a variety of voices channeled through the media. For example, when a government launches a policy, it has to sell it to the public while minimizing possible objections to it. The process, therefore, is a two-way flow between the public and the government.

In implementing foreign policy as well, the government tries to project images about international affairs and foreign countries to the public. But unlike domestic policy, that type of perception management is far less likely to be challenged by either foreign governments or public opinion abroad. One can therefore assume that perceptions about foreign countries can be more easily manipulated by the government at home. Being tough against an unreasonable foreign country usually can be an attractive option for a government wanting to gain quick popularity. But at the same time, perceptions created by a government to mobilize public support at home and to exercise pressure abroad can assume a life of their own.
Once public opinion gets too tough, policymakers cannot strike a deal with their foreign counterparts without risking criticism at home. The vilification of foreign countries, therefore, reduces diplomatic maneuverability. For example, while American foreign policymakers needed public support as they fought the cold war with the Soviet Union, the anticommunist hysteria voiced by Senator Joseph McCarthy made the job of U.S. policymakers much more difficult. Similarly, the persistent Japanese territorial claim over the Kuril Islands controlled by Russia used to be a convenient symbol that enabled Tokyo to rally the Japanese public against the Soviet Union. But after the cold war, it turned into an awkward obstacle to improving relations with Russia.

Second, the media can be a supplementary communication channel between the two governments. Foreign relations are formally conducted through official communication channels, typically through diplomatic dispatch. But today's foreign relations are too intensive to rely solely upon these formal routes. Governments use the media extensively as a supplementary source of information to understand and analyze the behavior of their counterparts. In addition, officials sometimes find the media more convenient than the official channels. Comments made by high-ranking government officials to the press are often directed toward their counterparts abroad. This way of sending signals is a well-accepted practice in today's diplomacy, and, in fact, communication through the media has its own advantages. It is subtler, and is a noncommittal way of sending signals, which allows officials to see reactions from their counterparts by launching a "trial balloon." Publishing a journal article or a policy report can also work as a form of intergovernmental communication. It can bypass the cumbersome domestic policy procedures required
before the message translates into an official cable. For example, the concept of the Marshall Plan was first presented at an address given at Harvard University because a negative reaction from the Congress was feared. By making sure of a positive European reaction first through ensuring media coverage of the proposed plan, the administration was able to go ahead and launch the program (Cohen 1986, 73–74). Similarly, low-ranking officials can go to the press as a way to attract the attention of a foreign government or the leader of their own organization. The very advantage of this method, however, can be a disadvantage as well; the subtle message can be misinterpreted or neglected. It may create confusion, misunderstanding, and distrust. Leaking information, therefore, is often a deliberate effort by an opponent within the government to disturb delicate negotiations with foreigners or quiet efforts by the government.1

Third, the media can be an intermediary between the public and the government of different countries. Sending a message to the public abroad in the hopes of creating a favorable international environment is a regular practice in foreign policy. If bilateral relations on an intergovernmental level are hostile, deliberate efforts by a government to foster antigovernment sentiment among the public abroad can be called propaganda or psychological warfare. In fact, during the cold war, the two camps were actively engaged in such propaganda campaigns, and the state media targeted at the other camp, such as Voice of America and Moscow Radio, were important means for these activities. This public diplomacy is not limited to cases between hostile countries. Even between two allies enjoying a peaceful relationship, improving one’s public image abroad is a legitimate and common foreign policy goal. The United States Information Service, the British Council, and the Japan Foundation are major apparatuses through which the respective governments try to reach the public abroad.

For projecting information and views to the public abroad, however, it is more effective to utilize the foreign news media than governmental organizations. Local news media obviously can reach a far broader audience. Moreover, unlike information given directly by foreign governments, the public generally regards information given by an independent media as far more credible. Thus, government officials try to maintain contacts with the foreign press either through foreign correspondents or through embassies abroad.

Finally, the news media reports a great deal of nonpolitical information as well. In this case, both the audience and sources are private citizens rather than public authorities. In today’s international journalism, the most intensive intersocietal information flows involve economic reporting. Business information such as share prices and stock indexes is intensively exchanged across borders. At the same time, social news such as crimes involving foreign nationals and other social phenomena sometimes create negative reactions from another society.
During the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, American television broadcast the scene of a Korean boxing coach punching a referee who penalized a Korean boxer. This drew severe criticism from Koreans, who felt that the U.S. media was unfairly focusing on the negative side of their country (Hachten 1992, 151-152). Intensive exchanges of information can sometimes develop into friction between different nations with different cultures.

The role of the media in any of the above-mentioned relationships is not limited to a passive interface mediating the sources and audiences. First, the media selects information according to its criteria of relevancy. No matter how important some information may be in terms of foreign policy, unless it has “news value,” it will not be reported. On the other hand, a politically irrelevant incident, such as a nasty but isolated crime committed by one country’s nationals in another country, may require a government to contain its bad public image abroad. Second, the media interprets the information. Although the Western media is based upon the principle of objective reporting, no media can ever be free of some degree of interpretation; whether a report will be presented in a negative or positive manner depends on choices made by the editor and/or journalist. In addition, the media carries opinions. Editorials clearly voice the position of the media, and while op-ed pieces, columns, and letters to the editor can be attributed to the individual authors, the selection of those pieces is completely up to the media.

In industrial democracies like Japan and the United States, the media is subject to commercial competition. This implies that it not only selects, reports, and interprets information and takes a position out of its institutional ideological principles, but it also entertains the audience. In other words, the media has an incentive to conform to rather than challenge existing stereotypes held by the audience in order to create a more sellable product. This can also mean that the media is subject to the danger of sensationalism. There is always a tendency toward simplification in reporting on the increasingly complicated world.

As Amrita Shah, a correspondent at *Imprint* magazine in Bombay who strings for the Time-Life News Service, has commented, stories from Asia that do not directly affect the United States “tend to be one of two kinds: stories that confirm stereotypes—for example, stories of widow burning or stampeding elephants that confirm the Western notion of India as a wild and exotic land are sure sellers, even if they are in actuality extremely rare occurrences. Or stories that indicate conformity to a familiar Western way of life. Stories about India’s privatization programme or of a newly prosperous middle class investing in home appliances fall into this category” (Hess 1996, 77).

Thus, the media can play a variety of roles in international political processes by helping exchanges of messages among different players. Depending upon how something is reported or not reported, the media can be a means for propaganda or
an agent for moderating intergovernmental relations. Even if the media does not take a clear position on a certain issue, the very act of reporting something and the way in which it is reported can have a strong impact on a political game by giving advantages and disadvantages to various actors in the political process. In a democracy, politics is very much a competition for controlling perception. It is therefore not difficult to infer that those with louder voices are better positioned. How, then, do these general assumptions apply to U.S.-Japan relations?

**The Structure of U.S.-Japan Media Interaction**

**Media and the Authorities**

It is often said that the Japanese news media is merely a corrupt government mouthpiece. It forms a cartel, monopolizing access to information and excluding outsiders such as foreign correspondents, while enjoying collusive relations with the government bureaucracy that controls information flows (Hall 1998, chap. 2; Wolferen 1990, 123–127). In fact, some practices of the Japanese political press surprise not only foreign observers but also many Japanese. Major Japanese media institutions assign political reporters to important politicians and those reporters, known as “bankisha,” never conceal their close personal ties to influential political figures and other governmental sources. It is no secret that the bankisha are given special access to the private homes of the politicians, and they compete with each other for the privilege of gaining yet further access to the house’s private zones—the politicians’ living or sleeping quarters instead of just the rooms for receiving guests—to gain firsthand information. This style of news gathering obviously casts doubt on the objectivity of Japanese political reporting.

Such close media-source relationships are even institutionalized in the form of the kisha kurabu, or press clubs. Reporters from the major Japanese media covering government institutions belong to press clubs and, by doing so, can enjoy exclusive privileges, including access to facilities like press rooms, telephone lines, press conferences, and press briefings. Many criticize this practice for several reasons. First, the club handicaps outsiders such as freelancers and foreign correspondents. Second, it makes the press corps lazy by creating a cozy cartel that is assured of always being briefed by the sources. And finally, in exchange for that coziness, the media becomes susceptible to manipulation by its sources, which in the end makes the media merely a mouthpiece for the government.

For many who criticize the Japanese media, the American media has often been portrayed as a model to follow. It has been depicted as a democratic agent, checking the power of the government and contributing to an open and democratic political system. The uncovering of the Watergate scandals, which finally
forced President Richard Nixon to resign, and the candid reporting on the Vietnam War despite the embarrassment to the American government were hailed as critical and heroic challenges to power. Interestingly, however, the credibility of the American media within the United States has significantly deteriorated over the last two decades or so, despite retaining its authority within Japan. According to a survey of public attitudes toward the press released in May 1995, “The news media has a generally positive view of itself in the watchdog role,” but “the outside world strongly faults the news media for its negativism. . . . The public goes so far as to say that the press gets in the way of society solving its problems, an opinion that is even shared by many leaders” (as quoted in Fallows 1996, 46).

Among the reasons generally given in that survey for the media’s declining credibility were its elitism, negativism, and cynicism. Many journalists today are graduates of elite universities, and as the media has become more influential, the average income of journalists has risen far above the national average. In particular, the anchors of the major TV networks or journalists appearing regularly on TV programs are now earning enormous sums of money. In addition, many high-profile “journalists” smoothly move through the revolving door between the political world and journalism. Pat Buchanan, for example, started his career as a journalist before entering politics by going to work for President Nixon. He subsequently shifted between his work as a syndicated columnist and TV talk show host, and his work for various administrations and as a presidential candidate. According to one American journalist, “To the public, journalists have crossed the line from being part of the public to being part of the political class. [We’re seen as being] on the other side of the divide. . . . Increasingly journalists I think are seen as players in the process rather than as chroniclers of the process” (Chandler 1999, 27).

Thus, the relationship of the U.S. press with the authorities may not offer as much of a contrast with Japan as many tend to assume. It is believed that there is a tacit hierarchy among the roughly 15,000 journalists in Washington, D.C. At the top of this hierarchy is the “Inner Circle”—the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the three major TV networks, the Associated Press (AP), and United Press International (UPI)—members of which are given special privileges in accessing information (Sasaki 1992, 32–43; Hess 1981). They are given more opportunities for press briefings and sometimes even exclusive interviews with important sources. Their phone calls to high-ranking officials are more likely to be answered, and they have more chances to receive leaks from government sources. Less important media are classified as the “Middle Circle,” which includes such media institutions as the Baltimore Sun, the Los Angeles Times, and the Chicago Tribune. They have less access to sources, although depending upon the subject they may be chosen as the beneficiary of a leak. The rest, including the foreign press corps, belong to the “Outer Circle” and
have very limited access to sources. While those with press passes for the White House may number 1,500—a very large number when compared to the small number of press club journalists in Japan who have access to the Prime Minister’s Office—their ability to get information from key sources is in fact more limited.

With so many reporters competing with each other, it is inevitable and not surprising that sources are selective in deciding which members of the media will receive their information. While the relationship between the American news media and its sources is often contrasted with that in Japan in terms of its transparency, equality of access, and free competition, such comparisons are not so simple. The media-source relationship is always very complex and cannot be judged simply by a lack of institutionalized practices such as the bunkisha or press clubs. Whether one is in Japan or in the United States, firsthand information cannot be obtained without getting sufficiently close to the source. But getting too close increases the chance of manipulation and even corruption. The source, by controlling access to hot information that is fiercely sought after by the media, can exercise power over the press. Thus, there is a universal dynamism at work that encourages the media to have some symbiotic relationship with the government, whether the relationship is institutionalized or not. In fact, something like Japan’s press clubs can be found in Britain. A group of journalists covering Parliament who are known as “lobby correspondents” enjoy certain privileges and are bound by certain rules in covering members of Parliament that are fairly similar to those of the Japanese press clubs (Tunstall 1970; Seymour-Ure 1991, 171-179; Shim bun Hōdō Kenkyūkl 1995, 171-179).

While one can argue whether the media in the United States or Japan is less independent than the other, as long as perceptions matter in politics, political actors will always have an incentive to manipulate the media in their favor. And as long as the media has to compete for information, it is always vulnerable to being used by its sources. Thus, the media is inevitably involved in a delicate relationship with the government, full of dilemmas as it tries to stay close enough to the sources to win the competition for stories, but distant enough to be credible reporters.

What is important here is that the symbiotic relationship between the media and its sources is naturally formed more easily between the government and media within a country than between actors from different countries. Foreign correspondents posted in Tokyo or Washington, D.C., never belong to the Inner Circles in those capitals. Thus, both American and Japanese media are understandably more susceptible to the information given to them by their own governments than to that received from governments abroad. Although this structure does not make it necessarily pro-government, it is likely that the media is still very much bound by its nationality in its access to information.
Media and Audiences

A sharp contrast can be drawn between the media’s ability to project information to a wide audience in Japan and the United States. In Japan, there is an influential national press, whereas in the United States, with the exceptions of the three national TV networks and CNN, even the most influential news media are local. Japan’s major newspapers boast massive circulation rates. Yomiuri Shimbun’s circulation exceeds ten million, which is ten times larger than that of the New York Times or the Los Angeles Times. In fact, according to a 1999 survey by Editor & Publisher magazine, out of the top ten newspapers worldwide in terms of circulation, five were Japanese newspapers and none were American. The New York Times had a circulation of just over one million, which is smaller than even such local Japanese newspapers as the Shizuoka Shimbun or the Hokkaido Shimbun. This means that Japanese newspapers serve a wide range of audiences ranging from intellectuals to the politically indifferent population. Thus, all of these national papers carry quite extensive international news and analysis, as well as practical and entertainment information. While major papers do take different political positions, they claim that their position is nonpartisan. Their basic attitude is focused less on trying to sway the public toward their position than on educating and enlightening the public. In other words, the major news media organizations in Japan, and particularly the major newspapers, are well-established social institutions that enjoy a fairly high level of respect as credible sources of information.

Their American counterparts, by contrast, are far smaller in terms of circulation. While major newspapers like the New York Times or the Washington Post may have a strong impact on the politically active elite and those who live in big cities like New York and Washington, D.C., the vast majority of American people read only the local press. These carry a very limited amount of international news compared to the “quality papers” widely read in Washington, D.C., unless a story directly relates to the local economy. Compared with the Japanese, fewer American households subscribe to newspapers and the number of subscribers is declining. Thus, even the local newspapers are having difficulties surviving and many cities that used to have both Republican and Democratic newspapers are now losing one of them.

Generally speaking, the American media outlets that are closely read and watched by the Japanese tend to represent and appeal to a relatively small segment of American public opinion in contrast to the catchall Japanese national press. The local press rarely reports about Japan, or more generally about international affairs, meaning that a great majority of Americans have a very limited chance to be exposed to news from Japan except for sporadic television images. But TV news coverage is shorter and less analytical than print media. In addition to the fact that television is more focused on entertainment than serious and
analytical news, it naturally emphasizes image-oriented reports that are fit for the screen. Sensational images such as wars, famines, and natural disasters are more effectively presented to audiences through a visual medium than through print. Japan is handicapped in that sense because over the last fifty years or so, incidents of street violence or shocking bloodshed have been very rare. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in the Kobe area and the Aum Shinnyo cult’s poison gas attack were widely covered, but everyday life in Japan is largely neglected by the TV camera. Japan, after all, may have become too modernized to be considered “exotic,” and important issues concerning Japan like business and the economy do not lend themselves to powerful presentations through television images.

Some American media outlets have a fairly wide audience in Japan, as well. Many households now have access to CNN. The Wall Street Journal and the International Herald Tribune are read widely in Japanese financial circles and in the foreign policy community. But they are still members of the American media, serving an American audience. Newsweek has a Japanese edition aimed at the Japanese audience, but the editorial decisions are being made by Americans. For example, in 1989 Newsweek had to face a severe dilemma over how it should serve the Japanese audience when it ran a story on Sony Corporation’s controversial purchase of Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. They decided to use different titles on the front pages of the American and Japanese versions. The American version read “Japan Invades Hollywood,” whereas the Japanese version was titled “Sony Advances on Hollywood” (Soni shingeki) (Newsweek 9 October 1989, American edition; 12 October 1989, Japanese edition; the title on the international edition, which appeared on 9 October 1989, was “Japan Moves Into Hollywood”). The American version suggests that the purchase represents an attack by Japan as a country on the United States, whereas the Japanese version implies that it was merely a business transaction by a Japanese company. As this episode illustrates, it is difficult to run a binational press—to say nothing of a truly international press—given that Americans and Japanese are two peoples with different perspectives, cultures, historical backgrounds, and conceptual frameworks that affect how they interpret the world.

Organizational Characteristics of the Media

Japan’s major news organizations are very popular employers for new college graduates, to the same degree as Sony or Honda. This means that media institutions are regarded as major corporations, offering decent and well-paying jobs to the graduates of elite universities. In fact, their recruitment and promotion patterns are typical of the “Japanese” style, which values seniority and hierarchical organizational lines. Most journalists identify more with the news organization they
work for than with their profession of journalism. Once promoted, reporters become editors and, if they are lucky, move up to the editorial staff or to the management sector. It is rare that journalists remain reporters for their entire career. Japanese newspaper and magazine articles rarely carry bylines. This is symbolic of the fact that the editors’ power in setting the tone of the articles is stronger than that of the reporters. There have been a number of publications, for example, that claim the tone of Japanese reporting on the United States is set in the Tokyo headquarters rather than by individual journalists posted in the United States (Fukushima 1992, 113; Andō 1991, 166–168).

The contrast between the U.S. and Japanese news media on these various points is obvious. Whereas Japanese journalists have been considered an elite trying to enlighten readers, in the United States until the mid-1960s, “journalism was essentially a high working-class activity. In big cities the typical reporters would make about as much as the typical cop. Many reporters had not gone to college” (Fallows 1996, 75). It was the Watergate scandal and the leak of the Pentagon Papers—two instances where reporters played a pivotal role in pushing the president into a corner—that promoted the status of journalism, making it an attractive profession for smart and ambitious graduates from elite universities. Most American media organizations are not as big as those in Japan, and journalists tend to identify themselves as journalists rather than as employees of a specific news organization. The career patterns of journalists are far more diverse than in Japan, and while some journalists remain reporters until they retire, others become freelancers or start completely new careers. Bylines are of the utmost importance for individual journalists since they are viewed as a mark of professional achievement. As a result, the pressure or control that media organizations can exercise upon an individual journalist’s professional writing seems to be much weaker in the case of the American media.

This, however, does not mean that individual journalists are completely free to write whatever they believe to be important. Unless their piece is printed (preferably on the front page), their professional performance will not be appreciated. Thus, journalists compete with each other for a larger space on the front page. This involves editorial judgments over the news value of articles. Moreover, with the commercial competition in the American media market getting keener, journalists are under severe pressure to write something that will appeal to the audience in their news market. News value, therefore, involves a sense of what the audience would find enjoyable, appealing, and readable, as well as what is balanced and accurate.

In both countries, the media naturally is not free from the social and commercial contexts in which it operates. In Japan, the institutional and organizational structures within the industry are tightly defined. The content and tone of reporting are strongly constrained by editors and more generally by the policy of the
organization, Japanese media organizations are highly "Japanese" institutions, with senior managers setting the general policy. The major American news media organizations generally give more freedom to individual journalists in the selection and content of what is to be written. But individual journalists are under stronger market pressure to write something appealing. The market, of course, is primarily American for the American media, while the Japanese media almost exclusively serves the Japanese audience. This means that both the American and Japanese media view the world through their respective national context and news values are set by national criteria.

International Reporting and the Media

Undoubtedly, the Japanese media pays much more attention to American news than their American counterparts pay to Japanese news. This is due at least partly to the relative importance of the countries to one another. As the United States is a dominant global power with interests and influence all over the world, it is inevitable that its attention is spread thin, covering many different countries and regions. It is also due to a general lack of interest in international affairs in the American media. As noted above, the American media has a stronger local characteristic than does the Japanese media, meaning that its attention is more focused on local affairs than on national or international affairs.

Even so, American media coverage of Japan has been disproportionately limited given Japan's importance as a security and economic partner. This can be explained by a lack of historical and cultural ties comparable to those with Europe. In addition, Japan may be a difficult place on which to report. First, in postwar Japan there have been few big spectacles like wars, street violence, or serious natural disasters. In Japan, things tend to happen gradually and in a subtle manner. Second, with the exception of those concerned with memories of World War II, most of the contentious stories about Japan have been related to business and the economy. These are somewhat technical and boring subjects when things are going well and become a hot news item only when there are trade disputes involved. Moreover, covering Japan involves special difficulties for foreign journalists. Language is still a big obstacle, although American correspondents with Japanese language capability have increased from the almost pathetic level of the 1960s (table 1). Highly institutionalized Japanese press practices like the press clubs have also been a source of irritation for American journalists covering Japan.

This, however, does not mean that the press club system is an impossible obstacle to overcome. According to interviews conducted by this author, most international correspondents from major media organizations have alternative
Table 1. American Foreign Correspondents’ Language Proficiency, 1992

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<th>Country</th>
<th>High Proficiency (%)</th>
<th>Low Proficiency (%)</th>
<th>Number of Correspondents</th>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>144</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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means to access the information made available to press club members. One Japanese journalist complained that even after they opened the club to foreign journalists, they rarely showed up there, although with only two or three correspondents in Tokyo, they have neither the manpower nor interest in having a journalist hanging around the press club all the time (Tadokoro and Kimura 1998, 151-161). Moreover, journalists from major American media organizations enjoy special privileges in Japan that are totally unavailable to Japanese journalists in Washington. Ishizawa Yasuharu, who worked at the Tokyo bureau of the Washington Post from 1990 to 1994, comments as follows: “Japanese are afraid of the American media because they know that their coverage is influential enough to mobilize the American government. American correspondents consciously know about this awe towards them.” Many Japanese officials and academics, knowing the international predominance of the American news media, welcome their approach. As Ishizawa notes, “I was surprised. If (the American journalists) wanted to, they could simply pass the time by sitting at their desks and waiting. Even still, they could write articles because key people—such as directors or counselors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry—would call of their own accord, and invite them to lunches. It is true that they usually interviewed people voluntarily in Japan.” Some Japanese politicians, by having their comments printed in the New York Times, are able to gain prestige. At the very least, they make efforts to avoid negative coverage by the powerful American media. In sum, Ishizawa concludes, “The media is backed up by the power of the nation it belongs to. The American media is backed up by American power” (Zipangu 1998, 63).

By contrast, the Japanese media is expending far more energy to cover American news. But Japanese journalists also have serious difficulties in operating in Washington. Although institutionalized obstacles are far fewer in the United States, getting access to independent sources in Washington is not an easy task. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Japanese media’s international status is
extremely weak, which means that Washington’s important sources do not find Japanese journalists particularly useful for leaking information or sending messages. They find it easier to provide leaks and hints to the American Inner Circle. It should also be added that, while the Japanese media expends more energy to cover international news in general, its coverage is disproportionately focused upon the United States (Andō 1991). Given the importance of the United States for Japan, this may not be surprising, but it is ironic that the same Japanese media that always criticizes the Japanese government for its “overly obedient” attitude toward the United States is equally preoccupied with American news.

In sum, even today, when exchanges of information across borders are tremendously intensive, the news media institutions in both Japan and the United States are highly national in nature. Because of their symbiotic relationship with sources, the audiences they serve, and their institutional characteristics, the criteria for their information selection and the way in which they interpret it are framed by their respective national perspectives. Although one can still argue that the international reporting by the media of one country is better than that of the other, there is no truly international media organization completely free from national prejudice and national perspectives.

There is also a paradox involved in this structure. While the American media pays limited attention to the world, and particularly to Japan, its international status is predominant. As a result, many third countries in Europe and Asia learn about Japan from American media reports, and thereby through an American conceptual lens. One South Korean scholar has argued that Japan has been misunderstood in South Korea because of the latter’s dependence upon Western media for information about Japan. For example, the Western media in early 1998 criticized and ridiculed Japan for its unwillingness to contribute to overcoming the financial crisis in neighboring countries despite its enormous financial assistance and other initiatives. As a result, the South Korean media reported little about Japanese policy initiatives (which were in fact more sympathetic to the South Korean plight than those of the United States) or the massive financial assistance Japan provided during the crisis (Uhm 1998). As this example illustrates, what is not reported by the American news media has a very limited chance of being reported in third countries. What is worth reporting from Japan to the rest of the world is decided more by the American than the Japanese news media. In this sense, the increasingly inward-looking American media tends to play the role of a rating agency in terms of international news.

Because of the asymmetrical international impact of the media in the two countries, the very limited American media reports on Japan attract keen attention from the Japanese media, and “imported” American media reports, in turn, sometimes have a significant impact on Japanese politics. A classic example was Prime
Minister Tanaka Kakuei's bribery scandal. This scandal was first reported by a Japanese freelance journalist in an article in the monthly Bungei Shunju. This story did not have any serious political impact, however, until it was picked up by the Washington Post, and the fact that the Post had reported on it was in turn reported by major Japanese newspapers. A short time later, in 1974, when Tanaka was invited to the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Tokyo, he was exposed to tough questions on the issue by foreign correspondents there. This triggered a flood of critical articles about the scandals that, in the end, forced him out of office. A similar case was Prime Minister Uno Sosuke's sex scandal in 1989. When a Japanese weekly magazine reported on his relationship with a geisha, it was mostly ignored, but once that story was reported by the Washington Post, it developed into a major political issue that caused his humiliating resignation after only two months in office. These two examples illustrate how the American media can influence Japanese politics by reporting that is aimed at its own domestic audience.

MEDIA INTERACTION AND
U.S.-JAPAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

How have the basic characteristics of American and Japanese media described here affected political relations between the two countries? We will examine that issue by dividing the postwar era into three periods. The first period is a significant stretch of time during the cold war, which may be too long and too diverse to be treated as a single period, but nonetheless provides a useful reference for comparison with the two subsequent periods. The second period is the time when the Japanese economy looked to be outperforming that of the United States. And the third is the period during which America recovered its confidence in its economy, and Japan ceased to look like a major economic challenger.

Peaceful Coexistence of Different Perceptions
(or Different Dreams in the Same Bed)

Japanese media attention toward the United States has been consistently intensive since the end of World War II. This may not be surprising in view of the fact that the United States was occupying Japan and that, even after Japan recovered its sovereignty, the country's relationship with the United States was critically important for Japan given the cold war context. What may be surprising, however, is that while the two governments were maintaining a largely smooth relationship, the Japanese media was highly critical of the United States on almost all issues, ranging from security to economic affairs. For example, the Japanese media was
voicing very critical views of American intervention in Vietnam. While many Americans were also critical of the war, the views carried by the major media organizations in Japan, whose defense against communist countries was largely dependent upon the U.S. presence in the region, showed little sympathy toward the American dilemma. This stance was probably due to the serious division of opinions within Japan. In a sense, Japan had a Berlin Wall of its own. Although in Germany the ideological division between the communist and noncommunist camps was more clearly demarcated by the line between East and West Germany, Japan similarly experienced a clear ideological schism at home. There was always a strong neutralist, pacifist, and anti-American element in the Japanese intellectual realm, and the Left clearly had a strong influence on the Japanese media.

While the Japanese government, ruled by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), stuck to a pro-American foreign policy that did identify Japan as a member of the “free world,” the leading Japanese media organizations were generally sympathetic toward leftist and neutralist views during the long cold war period, and were always critical of Japan’s cooperation with the American cold war strategy. They also tended to portray American demands on international trade and finance as unreasonable pressure. The Japanese media, rather than trying to explain to the public the American arguments behind its behavior, emphasized the unequal and awkward aspects of the alliance between the two states. The reversion of Okinawa and America’s generous help in promoting the Japanese economic recovery in the 1950s and 1960s were not given fair weight, at least in the eyes of a great majority of Americans. Reading Japanese media accounts from this period, it is difficult to believe that the two countries were allies sharing common values and objectives.

For its part, American media coverage of Japan was consistently limited; the contrast between Japanese and American levels of attention to the other was almost staggering until the middle of the 1980s. Even in the early 1970s, the numbers were dramatic. At that time, a total of sixteen Japanese newspapers had bureaus in Washington and had forty correspondents posted there; in addition, fifteen newspapers sent a total of thirty-six correspondents to New York. Almost all of them could at least read English, and some of them (although not many) spoke English well enough to conduct interviews. In contrast, during the 1960s, apart from Oka Takashi, who worked as the Tokyo bureau chief for the New York Times, and Sam Jameson of the Chicago Tribune (later of the Los Angeles Times), there were no correspondents from any of the major American news agencies who could handle interviews in Japanese. And in the early 1970s as well, there were reportedly only three American correspondents who could read and speak Japanese at a professional level. The Associated Press had fourteen professional staff covering Japan, nine of whom were Japanese, but none of the American journalists spoke Japanese. United Press International also had a large
Tokyo bureau with sixteen journalists, but none of the three Americans there could function in the Japanese language either (Packard 1973, 228-231).

Blaming American foreign correspondents may be pointless because the demand for covering Japanese economic and social life was almost nonexistent. If what they had to cover was not Japanese society and daily life but its foreign policy, sources in the Japanese international circle could supply information in English. In fact, the limited media attention toward Japan during the cold war was directed toward Japan's role as a U.S. ally. Except for sporadic coverage of particular events like the Olympic games, royal marriage, or plane crashes, the American media tended to portray Japan as a developing American ally with a non-Western historical background. It was only in the late 1980s that economic issues came to be a central focus of American media attention toward Japan. After all, Japan was a remote country in the exotic Orient that had nothing to do with the day-to-day life of the great majority of Americans once it was defeated in World War II. Primitive stereotypes of geisha, Fujiyama, and hara-kiri were still strong among average Americans. Under such circumstances, the small number of foreign correspondents who were familiar with Japan's economic growth in the 1960s were having a frustrating time trying to convince their editors back home of Japan's potential importance.

Nonetheless, despite the fact that many American journalists came to Japan for only a few years, lived in a largely isolated foreign community in Tokyo, did not speak a word of the local language, and had very limited knowledge about the everyday life of the locals, they were still able to cover Japan because the limited attention of the American news media was focused upon "high politics." Of course, there were trade disputes from time to time and the media covered these aspects of the bilateral relationship as well. But during most of the cold war, the American national consensus gave priority to the global confrontation with the Soviet Union and, given America's economic supremacy, economic problems with Japan were not high on the national agenda. The American media naturally viewed Japan largely from a politico-strategic angle, and, accordingly, news sources were limited to the international circle in Japan, including a small number of key figures at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American Embassy as well as some academics.

The unsympathetic popular perception of U.S. foreign policy and the critical views expressed by the largely left-wing Japanese press were generally swept under the carpet of the cold war. In fact, the U.S. and Japanese governments in many cases cooperated in downplaying the differences of public sentiment to make sure their bilateral relationship remained smooth and stable. In general, the two governments handled issues related to security and the alliance quietly, without mobilizing public opinion at home. This was partly because the positions of the authorities involved in security and foreign affairs were more cooperative
with each other than were those in departments dealing with economic issues. But more importantly, the alliance between the two countries has never been a product of popular support. In Japan, pacifist-leftist antimilitary sentiment has been always an important element of popular opinion and, as a result, following the large-scale popular protests against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the military aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship have been constantly and successfully downplayed by successive Japanese governments.

For the American public, the security relationship with Japan has never been a hot topic affecting their everyday life, but they might have found the Japanese ungrateful for the generous protection the United States offered against the communist threat if they had known of the ambivalent attitude of the Japanese public toward the American military presence. Obviously, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (the “no-war” clause, written originally by the American occupation forces), the so-called sympathy budget (the host-nation support given by the Japanese government to the U.S. military in Japan), Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment, and other complicated regional conditions such as the strong anti-Japan sentiment in South Korea were far less striking than Japanese cars and videocassette recorders. While the Japanese government successfully played down its military contribution to the United States in the domestic context, the U.S. government in the 1980s had to play up Japan’s contribution—particularly to the Congress—to cool down Congressional criticism of Japan’s “free ride” on the U.S. defense commitment.

In short, while the perceptions held by the two publics are extremely different, the two governments actually took advantage of the American media indifference toward Japanese popular perceptions during this period. This enabled the two different views of foreign affairs to coexist without rocking the boat of the bilateral alliance against the communist bloc. Because the American media’s focus was framed and constrained by the cold war agenda, there was no significant public interaction through the media of the two countries. If there had been keener and continuous attention on the part of the United States to reports by the Japanese media on the United States, there might have been a more negative reaction toward Japan among the U.S. public. This would have presented a serious challenge for the two governments in maintaining smooth bilateral relations.

The Rise of Japan as a Challenger to the U.S. from the Mid-1980s

The situation described above changed dramatically from the mid-1980s on. As the Japanese economy looked to be outperforming that of the United States in every respect, Japan started to be viewed by Americans as both an object of admiration
and an economic threat. This led to a significant increase in the news value of Japan-related stories. In 1965, the number of articles classified under the heading “Japan” in the *New York Times* index was only 252 for the year. That number gradually increased over the next decades, climbing to 432 in 1975 and to 495 in 1985. From that point on however, it jumped dramatically, reaching 772 in 1990 and 938 in 1992 (Fujita 1994, 38). The 1980s also witnessed a significant increase in the number of American journalists who could speak Japanese.7

In fact, the sudden rise in the attention paid to Japan by the U.S. media was not only due to a newfound interest in Japan. At a time when the United States perceived itself to be experiencing an economic downturn, Japan seemed to represent a mirror in which the United States could view itself, often finding a not-so-flattering reflection. Japan looked as if it were free from many of the problems Americans were facing at the time. The Japanese school system seemed to be working better and at least seemed to be successful in creating higher literacy rates than in the United States. Japanese family values looked stronger and Tokyo seemed to be almost crime-free compared to America’s large cities. More importantly, Japan’s economic competitiveness looked almost unbeatable as Japanese cars, Japanese investments, and Japanese businessmen became increasingly visible in the United States.

Thus, the American media were not preoccupied with bashing Japan, as the Japanese media so often claimed during that time. Rather, the American media was projecting the country’s frustrations with its own problems onto its reporting on and portrayal of Japan. This resulted in exaggerated images—either Japan was portrayed as wonderfully free from American problems or as an enigmatic threat to the American lifestyle. When one sees something better abroad, one can try to learn from it and copy it. In fact, some so-called Japanese business practices like the just-in-time system or quality control methods were seriously studied and successfully implemented by American manufacturers. But when one sees factors that one can never learn or copy, such as the alleged Japanese high savings rates, strong loyalty toward employers, or low crime rates, one is tempted to say that the other country is so fundamentally different that fair competition is impossible.

More importantly, whether it was bashing or admiring Japan, the American media clearly stressed the contrast between the two countries rather than the commonalities. Caricaturized images of workaholic Japanese businessmen, conformist practices, and hard-working children preparing for highly competitive university entrance exams were played up to emphasize the uniqueness and “otherness” of the Japanese. This is the background for the rising influence within American journalism of the so-called revisionist school on Japan.

In addition to Japan’s perceived economic success, there was another important change: the end of the cold war had brought a fundamental shift in national pri-
orities in the United States. Now that the global confrontation with the Soviet Union was over, the maintenance of Western alliances ceased to be an unquestionable top priority for Americans. Although the United States had clearly won the cold war, it found it difficult to completely savor the victory. Americans felt that the cold war preoccupation with a possible military confrontation had led to the country’s poor economic performance, allowing Japan to surpass the United States. As a result, economic issues with Japan naturally increased in priority and salience. True, trade disputes over various products had been going on ever since the 1970s, and they had become almost a regular ritual between the two governments by the end of the 1980s. But now, the keener and broader American public focus on economic relations with Japan could no longer be checked or balanced by Japan’s image as a cold war ally.

As public pressure on successive administrations to get tough with Japan became stronger, the U.S. government had less motivation to control specific domestic interest groups. While there was no serious attempt to terminate the U.S.-Japan security alliance, there was a clear shift in the national agenda away from security and toward the economy, which caused Americans to view Japan as an economic rival. This increased public attention to bilateral economic disputes made American foreign policy toward Japan far more sensitive to U.S. public opinion. U.S.-Japan economic issues could no longer be managed by a relatively small circle of interested parties but became a national issue, at times forcing American governments to react to, and sometimes manipulate, public opinion on U.S.-Japan trade issues in order to turn it to their political advantage.

During this period, Japan’s media continued to pay keen attention to what was reported about Japan by its American major counterparts. Perhaps because of the expanded presence of the Japanese media in Washington, D.C., and its continued practice of emphasizing American pressure and “Japan bashing” in the United States, the sensitivity to negative reports on Japan seemed to be heightened. So-called revisionist literature, such as publications by James Fallows (1989) and Karel van Wolferen (1990), attracted more attention (and perhaps even sold more copies) in Japan than in the United States. This may not be surprising because their theses were largely made in Japan. The gist of the revisionist argument is basically the Japanese modernist argument that, despite Japan’s modern surface, the country is basically a backward, pre-modern state in its essence. For example, Wolferen’s thesis that Japan is a stateless country with nobody ruling responsibly fits very well with Maruyama Masao’s (1964) lament about a lack of civil society in Japan in his analysis of Japanese politics as a system of irresponsibility. Similarly, a 1991 book titled The Coming War with Japan, written by two obscure authors, did not attract much serious attention by Americans, although James Fallows did write a review of it in the New York Review of Books (Friedman and LeBard
1991; Fallows 1991). The Japanese translation of the book, on the other hand, was quickly published and became a bestseller. The two authors were even invited to Japan to promote the book and enjoyed extensive media exposure there (Fukushima 1992, 103–106).

The Japanese mass media obviously overreacted as usual, but this time Americans were also overreacting to Japan rather than ignoring it. Under such conditions, the mutual reactions of the media in the United States and Japan often amplified negative messages between the two countries. A good example was the report of Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi’s alleged remarks on American work ethics in February 1992. Miyazawa was reported by the AP to have said in a Diet session, “I have long felt that (Americans) lack a work ethic.” This story made the front page of major newspapers all over the United States, including the New York Times, which reported that Miyazawa had said that Americans “may lack a work ethic,” and that some of the country’s ills came about because too many American college graduates headed to Wall Street in the 1980s rather than “producing things of value” (New York Times 4 February 1992). One headline in a U.S. paper said, “It’s Time to Say, Knock it Off, Japan.” And a “buy American” campaign kicked into high gear. Anti-Japanese feeling shot up in the opinion polls (Buress 1998, 41–42). In fact, Miyazawa did not say anything to that effect and he had not even referred to “American workers.” What he actually said was that ethics are lacking in the so-called money-game sector of both countries, and particularly in that context he was referring to the bubble economy in Japan. Interestingly, a few days later, the New York Times printed a full translation of Miyazawa’s remarks at the bottom of the op-ed section (alongside an op-ed piece by Ezra Vogel arguing that Japan is a rival, but not an enemy). The text of those remarks is as follows:

Looking at what things have come to over the past 10 years, we might say that the interpretation of producing things or creating value has become very loose; it’s that no one doubts that value can be created in the money market. Creating things by the sweat of our brows, a kind of work ethic, is related to various things. There is probably even a connection with computers. People graduating from universities are going to Wall Street for high salaries. As a result, the number of engineers, who actually make things, is shrinking, something Representative [Kabun] Muto and I both see.

While we were debating whether this situation was all right or not, the money market advanced and junk bonds appeared—junk bonds, just as their name implies, are very dangerous. We have these leveraged buyouts where those without their own money can buy up things, and then, unable to pay the interest on their debts, [the companies] fall into bankruptcy. It should be
obvious to anyone that such a situation could not continue long.

Yet, over the past 10 years, this very situation has continued. I have long felt that this might involve something like a lack of a work ethic. I think what you are worrying about is related to this situation. In one sense, there are many of these same elements present in what has been called Japan’s bubble economy. After this bubble [burst], both [countries] now have a lot to clean up in the aftermath, and all of our people learned a lot from this. It is very important to build things of value with the sweat of our brows. This may sound like a sermon, but what I have said is what I feel. When President Bush talks about education, I believe he is trying to reiterate the above kind of message (New York Times 8 February 1992).

It is surprising how such completely nonprovocative comments could create such strong reactions from the United States. But even though the reported remarks were sheer misrepresentation and were later corrected, once it was reported by the U.S. media it ignited anti-Japanese reactions, which were then reported back to Japan by the Japanese media. Despite the lack of validity of the report, Miyazawa had to pay a significant political cost for the worsening of bilateral relations.

The classic distortion and sensationalizing of the Miyazawa remarks took place in this context when the American media was (like its Japanese counterpart) hypersensitive, and was busy looking for anti-American remarks by Japanese. Less than a month after President George Bush’s unfortunate visit to Tokyo (where, to the embarrassment of the Americans, he threw up on Miyazawa’s lap), Sakurachichi Yoshio, the speaker of the House of Representatives, stated that “about 30 percent of American workers are not even literate” (Asahi Shimbun 21 January 1992). Sakurachichi’s remarks were indeed insulting, but no American newspaper would have cared about a Japanese politician’s assessment of the American workforce before Japan looked like an economic challenger. In the context of that time, however, the impact of the remark was magnified, touching off some nasty exchanges between the countries. Several months later, while addressing employees at a factory in his home state of South Carolina, Senator Ernest Hollings fired back by saying, “You should draw a mushroom cloud and put underneath it, ‘Made in America by lazy and illiterate Americans and tested in Japan’”—a comment that drew applause from the crowd (New York Times 4 March 1992).

Another victim of this transnational media process was an American sumo wrestler who used the professional name Konishiki. He was quoted by the U.S. media as saying that the reason he was not promoted to yokozuna (the top rank of wrestlers) was racism on the part of the Sumo Association. This story was carried in the major U.S. newspapers, including the New York Times, as a symbol of the closed Japanese society, which was again reported back to Japan through
the Japanese media.” This put Konishiki in a difficult position with the Sumo Association. Although Konishiki claimed he never made the comment, and it seemed that it had been his assistant who had answered the telephone call from the American media, the leaders of the association took a serious view of the damage done to the international image of their organization. Interestingly, as of the fall of 1999, two out of the five current yokozuna are Americans—Akebono and Musashimaru—and they enjoy the same levels of popularity as their Japanese counterparts. But while some local press in the United States reported on this fact positively, the tone of both the New York Times and Washington Post accounts was somewhat satirical; when Akebono was promoted to yokozuna, they reported that the Japanese fears had become a reality, or that the sacred barrier was finally destroyed (Kondō 1994, 35).

The media-politics interaction at the international level is not limited to accidental damage done to the intergovernmental relationship by exaggerated reporting. In politics, trying to influence public opinion has always been an important part of the game. Heated exchanges between the people of two countries can be triggered as a result of deliberate efforts by a government to gain support from its domestic public. Government officials in both the United States and Japan claim that reporting by the news media of the other country distorts reality and that the media in the other country is being manipulated by their counterparts. The American news media, according to a Japanese diplomat who served in the Japanese embassy in Washington, repeatedly alleged that the Japanese market was closed and that Japanese trade practices were “unfair” without doing justice to the Japanese position on the point. The widely held assumption in the United States that Japan is closed, unfair, and cunning has been exploited by the U.S. government when it manipulates the media in order to impress the American public with its tough attitude toward Japan and to exaggerate the fruits of negotiations (Kondō 1997, 142–150). These tactics result in the perception that pressuring Japan always brings about the results Americans want. Even when the United States yields to Japan’s position, it tends to further strengthen the perception in American minds that Japan is unfair or cunning—a perception that has been fostered through the cumulative effect of media manipulation. In fact, putting the desired spin on the news is part of the regular power game in Washington, and Japan, whose representation in the American media is obviously handicapped for a variety of reasons, can become an easy victim once it is targeted as the “villain” in the perception game.

Conversely, American trade negotiators make almost the identical observation about the Japanese media. Since the media and government officials have such a close relationship, when it comes to international negotiations, the media in Japan behaves like a cheering section for the government. This makes the
Americans feel as if they were, as Glen Fukushima has expressed it, "negotiating not only with Japanese trade officials but also with the Japanese media and public as well." The Japanese media, according to this view, usually portrays the United States as bullying Japan and rarely does justice to American claims. In many cases, when faced with a painful policy decision, the Japanese media and bureaucracy have encouraged the U.S. government to put outside pressure (gaiatsu) on Japan so that they could then place all the blame on the Americans. In a sense, the United States has been used as a scapegoat in order to preserve harmony among the Japanese. This may be a convenient way to make a decision in the short run, but in the long run it will distort mutual perceptions (Fukushima 1992, 180–181).

Given Japan's sensitivity to U.S. reporting, one might expect that the American government would have some advantage in terms of being able to influence Japan through the American media. In fact, such public diplomacy is not as easy as it may look. First, perception games in Washington, D.C., and in Tokyo are predominantly for domestic consumption. Being tough toward an unfair Japan might make the U.S. government popular with its domestic audience. Likewise, resisting unreasonable American demands can have the same effect for the Japanese government. However, if anti-Japan or anti-U.S. sentiment is allowed to get out of hand, it can actually constrain the government's negotiating position, since it can become difficult for either government to back down without losing face. Second, American efforts to mobilize public opinion at home to put pressure on Japan can be counterproductive by creating an anti-American reaction in Japan. This makes the attainment of U.S. objectives more difficult than would otherwise be the case by putting the Japanese government under stronger public pressure. Particularly tough and confrontational messages are more easily conveyed through the media than are moderate messages. However, in today's world, it is increasingly difficult to conveniently differentiate between messages for domestic and foreign audiences. Therefore, the mobilization of tough public opinion against foreigners can often make those foreigners equally or even more tough. Again, this may make the settlement of disputes more difficult.

American negotiators were caught in this trap when they tried to force the Japanese to commit to importing a certain number of American cars and auto parts. Mickey Kantor, the U.S. trade representative, with his aggressive media politics, kept pressing Japan with his tough attitude and tried to impress upon the American public that the Clinton administration was different from the previous administrations in its active and forceful efforts to defend American jobs. His media tactics may have been completely natural and legitimate according to what is common sense in Washington, D.C., but his aggressive approach and the American demand for a numerical commitment united the Japanese against the
U.S. demands. In particular, the cabinet of Hosokawa Morihiro, which had relied upon populist support in its defeat of the LDP regime, found it impossible to come to terms with such an agreement that obviously contradicted its proclaimed reform posture of liberalization and deregulation. The Clinton-Hosokawa summit in April 1994 ended with an explicit breakdown of the trade talks for the first time in postwar U.S.-Japan relations, which actually boosted Hosokawa’s popularity at home.

Being tough with Japan on trade certainly was a popular policy in the United States, but the united objections of the Japanese to the American demands, as well as criticism at home over the approach, put Clinton’s trade negotiating team in a difficult position. Because they had oversold their new aggressive, results-oriented trade policy to the public and had played up the tension by making that policy the focus of the summit meeting, they found it very awkward to back down without losing face.

After the Bubble in Japan

The heightened American media focus on Japan did not last long. While the American economy began to enjoy an extended boom from the early 1990s, the Japanese economy started to slow around the same time. The American economic revival and Japanese decline dramatically changed the public agenda in the United States. Japan ceased to be either a threat or a model. In fact, the notion of an economic threat from Japan practically evaporated. Ironically, by around 1997–1998, the same American media that had portrayed Japan as a cunning competitor was busy ridiculing and insulting the Japanese as incompetent in running their own economy. This was particularly true in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, when Japan was viewed as incapable of acting in its own interest by failing to revitalize its own economy. Stories about Japanese internal political confusion or its ailing economy became too dull and unexciting for the American news media to sell to its audience.

On the other hand, the end of the exaggerated images of Japan does not mean a simple return to the virtual neglect of the Cold War era. True, with no visible and imminent challenge from abroad, be it a military threat from the Soviet Union or an economic one from Japan, foreign affairs has generally become less central to the public agenda of the American news media. Instead, sociological issues such as medical services, family values, crime, and homelessness have gained increased salience. Given that Japan is now viewed not as a marginal, exotic, oriental country, but as a super-modern society with very different historical traditions and sociological conditions from those of the United States, stories about Japanese society can now offer an interesting reference to and
comparison with the new American public agenda. The limited American media attention toward Japan, therefore, has been devoted more to social and cultural aspects of the country.

One example of this can be seen in the coverage of security issues. Following the end of the cold war, there have been intensive and serious public discussions on national security in Japan, and the Japanese government has taken several significant steps such as sending mine sweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991 despite strong objections from the progressives at home and sanctioning the participation of Japanese military personnel in the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in 1992. The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, agreed upon by the two governments in 1997, has been a hot subject of public debate in Japan. In contrast to the extensive coverage of these issues by the Japanese press, however, the American media has paid scant attention to these discussions or to the new policies that were implemented. It certainly was not as hot and exciting a subject for media coverage as Japanese direct investment in the United States was less than a decade earlier.

Instead, “soft news” stories focusing on Japanese social issues like crime, homelessness, and the social status of women have gained salience in the American news media. For example, according to a study of New York Times articles on Japan, published in 1995 by a group of Japanese freelance journalists called Zipangu, many of the pieces covered Japanese social and cultural aspects and portrayed Japan, often in an insulting tone, as a strange country (Zipangu 1998). The articles were on Japanese comics for women full of rape stories, loveless Japanese marriages, superstitions, and the widespread practice of abortion in Japan. There was also a bizarre article that claimed Japanese women are forced to speak in high-pitched voices. The tone of these articles tends to play up minor but exotic and entertaining aspects of Japan for American audiences. They certainly do not demonstrate respect for the culture or customs of people with a different historical and sociological background. Even if they are not insulting, they emphasize the singularity and “otherness” of people in Japan. The recurring implicit assumption of these articles is that Japan may be super-modern on the surface but it is still full of closed, pre-modern, and undemocratic elements that are funny if not evil.

What are the possible implications of this trend for intergovernmental relationships? First, as the security alliance between the two countries began to receive shallower—although perhaps broader—support from the public, its function as the anchor of the relationship between the two countries became weaker. A relatively isolated issue now might develop into a major political issue. An illustrative example was the rape of a young girl in Okinawa by three American servicemen in 1995. Rape obviously is a serious crime and this case was all the
more serious because the victim was only fourteen years old. Nevertheless, the crime was an isolated incident and the U.S. military authorities cooperated closely with the Japanese police in arresting and detaining the three servicemen. Under different circumstances, it could have been handled routinely as a regular crime without political implications. Indeed, it was not the first serious crime committed by American servicemen in Okinawa. Since Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972, more than 4,500 crimes, including twelve murders of Okinawans, were committed by American servicemen (Masuda and Kimura 1995). But these previous crimes did not develop into a major public issue.

The 1995 incident, however, ignited a whole range of issues concerning the American military in Okinawa and even called into question the very rationale for the American military presence in Japan, which in the end could have entailed the breakdown of the alliance itself. This evidently has much to do with the decreasing weight of the alliance as an anchor for the relationship between the two countries. Now that the cold war is over, both the American and Japanese public have difficulty in understanding the rationale for the alliance, and, accordingly, another rape incident or a crash of a U.S. military aircraft killing Japanese civilians could develop into a major challenge to maintaining the alliance.

The American media played an important role in the 1995 process as well. The rape incident was first reported on September 9 by a local Okinawan newspaper, Ryūkyū Shimpō, as a relatively small piece on page 29 in the society section. Although the coverage by the Okinawan press expanded as Governor Ōta Masahide took a strong stance against the rape, the major national presses were slow to react. Once this case was reported in the Washington Post on September 20, however, and then in a newspaper in South Korea (which also hosts American military bases), the major Japanese media outlets quickly reacted and started to pay close attention to the incident (Masuda and Kimura 1995, 108–109; Asahi Shimbun 22 September 1995).

Neither Tokyo nor Washington wasted any time in reacting to manage the strong reactions by Okinawans. They shared a strong concern about the possible damage to security ties and tried to alleviate the negative popular image that had been created in Japan. U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale quickly expressed his deep regret over the crime (Asahi Shimbun 19 September 1995), and President Clinton also expressed his regret and his willingness to take measures to stop such a crime from recurring. In response to Clinton’s remarks, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu raised the issue of reviewing the existing Status of Forces Agreement. Both governments worked hard to manage the anti-base movement in Okinawa without damaging the existing U.S.-Japan security relationship.

Meanwhile, the U.S. base authorities also made prompt and strong efforts to
alleviate anti-American feelings in Okinawa. The press officer for the Marines held press conferences, repeatedly met independently with Japanese reporters, and successfully sent the message that the U.S. authorities were taking a strong stance against the crime and that the great majority of American military personnel were good neighbors to the local people. The day of reflection that was set to educate all Marines in Okinawa was widely publicized. Even the base prison where the three soldiers were held was opened to the media to show that the three accused servicemen were not having a comfortable life there. When Admiral Richard Macke, commander-in-chief of the U.S. forces in the Pacific, made a comment in Washington to the effect that the three servicemen could have paid for a prostitute for what they spent to rent the car in which they committed the crime, the U.S. government did not waste any time in accepting his resignation (Asahi Shimbun 18 November 1995).

The second implication of the recent trend in reporting is perhaps less clear, but could be more important in the long run. As the alliance between the two countries is becoming based less on a common military threat than on a shared interest in regional order and stability, the importance of shared values and shared vision may increase as a bond in the bilateral relationship. Since the end of the cold war, the American military commitment, for example, has been increasingly influenced by media images and the public opinions behind the media. Both the involvement in and withdrawal from Somalia, the intervention in Bosnia, and the decision to launch air strikes in Kosovo were all significantly influenced by media coverage. But the media process of Japan and the United States, by focusing upon confrontation and differences of basic national values and lifestyles, might be gradually undermining the transnational ties between the two peoples. If Americans and Japanese feel that they have completely inconsistent values and worldviews, it is obviously difficult for policymakers in both countries to justify the alliance.

True, the political relations between the two nations may not be directly influenced by public images. In fact, the United States and Japan have been close allies for more than half a century despite their former status as enemies with worldviews, values, and lifestyles that were much more different in the past than today. But as the common and visible military threat disappears, what might have been regarded as minor differences in the past can now be played up by the media and become a hot issue between the two countries.

In fact, while both countries are industrial democracies sharing many basic values as well as problems, there are issues on which the two peoples sharply differ and even get emotional. A good example is the interpretation of the history of the Pacific War. The United States and Japan, while important allies for nearly a half-century, do not share any memory of fighting together against a common
enemy to defend common values. Rather, their shared memory on a battlefield is not one as allies but as enemies. These awkward facts were covered up by the cold war, but now that the cold war is over, the negative side of Japan’s past has gained salience in the American press.

On the American side, the Pacific War, unlike the Vietnam War, is seen as an unquestionably just war started by the unprovoked Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The image of “sneaky Japan”—a major element of the negative Japan image in the mind of Americans—is still connected with this collective view of American national history. The American media tend to portray Japanese attitudes toward their country’s past as largely unrepentant. The comparison with Germany is repeatedly made and a sharp contrast is worked out where Germans squarely face history while the Japanese are hushing it up. Issues such as the “comfort women,” the Nanking Massacre, and other war crimes committed by the Japanese military during the war are reported from time to time, which gives the American audience the impression that an unbridgeable gap exists between the two peoples.

In fact, the American view on Japanese attitudes toward history has significant support within Japan. Progressives and liberals, who were largely critical of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and who called for a more pacifist and neutralist policy, take an even more critical position than the American media does on this issue. At the same time, there are a few truly unrepentant right-wingers and conservatives who believe that the liberal views are too one-sidedly critical of Japan’s past. Thus, there is a whole range of viewpoints in Japan about World War II and Japan’s responsibility. The American media, however, generally fails to give a balanced image of discussions within Japan. Instead, stories are usually framed by the existing American national consensus on history that Japan was the villain in World War II.

More importantly, however, historical issues started to be more hotly debated in Japan recently, at a time when the great majority of Japanese belong to generations with no personal experience of the war. Likewise, the American media started to portray Japan from the perspective of its history more than fifty years ago, rather than focusing on the peaceful and democratic postwar Japan. While it would be an overstatement to say that this trend represents the fact that the United States and Japan have started identifying each other as former enemies rather than as present allies, there is obviously a shift in the conceptual framework away from the cold war alliance and toward a more complex one. Thorny past experiences between the two countries can no longer be easily covered over by an obvious common threat.

The American decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan, killing tens of thousands of civilians, is also a potential dynamite issue that could explode. Opinion polls show Japanese and American public opinion differ sharply on the morality
of the act (see table 2) (Kondo 1997, 169). The moral judgment of the American nuclear attack is particularly troublesome because this is one of the few issues that unite both nationalist conservatives and pacifist progressives on an anti-American basis.

The strong American sentiment that the use of the atomic bomb was justified was amply shown by the heated argument in 1994 over the planned exhibition by the Smithsonian Institution of the Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The exhibition was cancelled in the end because of strong protests from veterans associations, who viewed the exhibit as being overly sympathetic to the Japanese. The Senate supported the veterans' claim by passing a resolution which stated that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima "was momentous in helping to bring World War II to a merciful end, which resulted in saving the lives of Americans and Japanese" (Senate Resolution on the Enola Gay Exhibit, Congressional Record 22 September 1994, S11315-16). In December 1994, around the same time that the Enola Gay issue was being hotly debated, a plan was announced by the U.S. Postal Service to print a stamp showing a mushroom cloud with a caption saying, "the atomic bomb hastened the end of the war." The White House reacted very carefully to Tokyo's warning that this would offend the Japanese people. On the other hand, there were powerful groups like the war veterans that would be infuriated if the U.S. government accepted the view that the atomic bomb was wrong. The Clinton administration, while carefully avoiding a value judgement about the bombing, decided to change the design of the stamp in a quiet manner. Since the Americans reacted swiftly to possible Japanese public reaction, this issue was closed without causing any significant acrimonious exchanges between the two publics.

The course of events might have been very different, however, if the two governments had mishandled the issue. If either of the two governments had carelessly played up the issue, there could have been an open, emotional confrontation between the two publics across the Pacific. This was a real danger since the media in both countries tends to jump on such an open confrontation and, in the process of reporting, can fuel public tensions. One American political analyst commented that if leading conservatives like Pat Buchanan had taken up the issue, or if Rush Limbaugh had agitated Americans through his radio program, the mood might have changed overnight (Kondo 1997, 185). As noted above, many Americans believe that since the war was started by Japan, which committed many

| United States | 34 | 58 | 68 | 25 |
| Japan         | 89 | 11 | 27 | 66 |

war crimes, nuclear attacks intended to accelerate the end of the war with fewer American causalities were justifiable. This view is rarely accepted in Japan, even by those who are highly critical of Japanese conduct during the war. The polarizing potential of the nuclear morality issue is perhaps a greater danger to U.S.-Japan relations than any other historical issue.

The acrimonious exchanges that could have ensued would probably have overshadowed the significant number of voices within the United States that were sympathetic to Japan's sentiment. Even among war veterans, there were those who felt that, while the dropping of the atomic bombs was justifiable, the design of the stamp was provocative and distasteful and that the message commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of the war should be one of goodwill and peace rather than the devastation symbolized by the atomic bomb. But voices for reconciliation and moderation are less likely to be covered and amplified through the process of U.S.-Japan media coverage. On the contrary, sharp differences and open confrontation are far easier to be exacerbated unless efforts for moderation are made by the two governments and opinion leaders in both countries.

In retrospect, it is surprising how the news media both in the United States and in Japan overreacted to Japan's perceived economic rise. With the subsequent boom of the American economy and contrasting poor economic performance in Japan, economic issues have ceased to be a front-page, if not business-page, story for major American newspapers. After the end of the cold war, stories related to bilateral security issues or other political issues were not highly marketable in American journalism either. As noted above, the limited interest in Japan is now primarily devoted to social and cultural issues. The American reports on Japanese society and culture emphasize the otherness and singularities of Japanese life, rather than promoting a better understanding of a society with a vastly different history and tradition. This does not foster strong bonds between the two peoples based upon a commitment to shared values and sympathy for common problems. While the negative reports may not result in immediate tangible damage to the bilateral political relationship, the negative images built up in the minds of the two peoples may undermine close political relations between the two countries in an age when public images and shared visions, as well as geopolitics, matter more in international relations.

**CONCLUSION: A CASE FOR STRONGER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY**

In today's policy-making process, it is simply impossible to ignore public opinion. The media plays a critical role in shaping opinion by selecting, interpreting, and
contextualizing the information the public receives. In international relations as well, politics is not conducted only by bullets and money. Particularly when it comes to relations between two allies like the United States and Japan, both with democratic political systems, foreign policy is also strongly influenced by public opinion and the media reports that reflect and shape those opinions. In this way, the media must be recognized as an important player in international relations, wielding its own power.

The American media is particularly powerful in its ability to project messages. Its reports are taken seriously not only within the United States but also around the world, including Japan. It therefore can set the international public agenda and can put governments both at home and abroad in a difficult position by projecting negative messages concerning them. But the American media, despite its international role, is still American in its perspective and conceptual framework. While this does not mean that it is necessarily pro-government, it is primarily serving an American audience, operating in an American market, and interpreting foreign affairs based upon American political, historical, and cultural assumptions and values. The international impact of the Japanese media, on the other hand, is evidently very limited. In addition, the Japanese media is extremely sensitive to American media coverage of Japan. These structural conditions have shaped the pattern of interaction among the news media and the governments in the United States and Japan.

Reflecting the changing American public agenda, the conceptual framework through which the American media views Japan has shifted over time from an ally fighting the cold war, to an economic challenger to the United States, and then to a society with a strange mixture of super- and pre-modern social practices. On the other hand, the Japanese media has constantly been devoting far keener attention to the United States, and it has always been highly sensitive to American perceptions of Japan. Reflecting the Japanese frustration with a constant dependence upon the United States for so many aspects of Japanese life, the Japanese media makes it a habit to criticize the Japanese government for being "too focused on U.S.-Japan relations" (tailbet ippentō). But in fact, the Japanese media is even more obsessed with the United States, devoting enormous attention to that country and reacting to the public agenda set by the United States. It also tends to see U.S.-Japan relations largely from a bilateral context, forgetting that the United States, as a global power, has many other countries and many other issues to worry about besides Japan. By doing so, the Japanese media has unwittingly exaggerated American pressure on, and American attention to, Japan.

After the overreaction by the U.S. media to Japan's economic rise in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the heated verbal exchanges amplified by mutual negative reporting have subsided. But the combination of the American and Japanese
media described above means any issue with strong media exposure in the United States could quickly lead to exaggerated reactions by the Japanese media, which then could attract the public attention of the two peoples. Now that Japanese domestic social practices attract more American media attention than other issues, the potential public agenda between the two countries can be enormously varied and difficult to predict. Crime, trade, and even interpretations of history, which in the past rarely became political issues, now have the potential to escalate into political crises that might even destabilize the bilateral relationship.

This may imply that the role of the leaders of both countries is becoming even more important in managing public sentiment in order to avoid an explosive public confrontation generated by the media. While a free media is an indispensable social institution in a democratic society, it is highly national in nature and tends to exaggerate the otherness between Japanese and Americans, focusing upon the negative side of events and the confrontational aspects of bilateral relations. Moreover, the media's attention is often too short-term, neglecting historical and cultural contexts as well as long-term implications of less conspicuous trends. Thus, for fostering long-lasting bonds between the Japanese and American people, the media is far from an ideal institution. There is no guarantee that constructive dialogue between the people of the two countries can take place within the context of freely competing traders of information.

The policy implication to be drawn from this analysis is that, in the aftermath of the cold war, more public diplomacy is needed to stabilize the bilateral relationship. For today's politics—and particularly in Washington, D.C.—media images are critically important and manipulating the media is obviously a part of the regular political game. When politicians and government officials try to influence public images through the news media, their efforts are still predominantly focused on the domestic audience—the voters to whom politicians are accountable—but the foreign media is quick to pick up on any comment that might cause a strong reaction among its readers. Politicians in the United States and Japan must therefore bear in mind that the foreign media today is constantly looking for provocative quotes from high-ranking officials. Those in responsible positions in the government can provoke unexpected reactions from abroad if they fail to consider the international implications of their messages.

In addition to avoiding unexpected negative reactions from abroad, positive messages should be continuously projected toward each other through the media to gain the support of the two publics for the close bilateral relationship. While tough American messages toward Japan often just unite and harden the Japanese reaction, there has been one good example of successful public diplomacy: the
Structural Impediment Initiative (SII) negotiations conducted in 1990. SII covered a wide range of issues, including Japan's land prices, savings and investment patterns, and "exclusive" business practices. The talks officially dealt with Japanese demands toward the United States as well, but the focus was obviously on Japan's domestic business practices and institutions, which are usually viewed as purely domestic matters. The American demands could have infuriated the Japanese as an infringement on Japan's sovereignty. Given Japan's frustration with an omnipresent and vocal America, the talks could have easily become a target of Japan's popular anger. However, American trade negotiators headed by Carla Hills wisely adopted a strategy that emphasized the interests of consumers in Japan rather than the regular finger-pointing at Japan's unfair trade practices. As a result, the Japanese media very warmly received these American messages. The American government was even viewed by some as Japan's only constructive opposition party, which reflected the underrepresented voices of those in Japan that are not tightly organized. The SII talks thus successfully transformed the Large Scale Retail Store Law in a way that was favorable for new participants in the market, including American chain stores such as Toys "R" Us.

Nevertheless, this episode is the exception rather than the rule. Both the American and Japanese governments have been preoccupied with the management of domestic public opinion rather than appealing to the public abroad. Despite an enormous amount of cooperative diplomatic, economic, and social exchanges going on between the two countries, if one were to only read newspapers and watch television, it would be hard to believe that the people of these two nations across the Pacific are close allies, united by shared values and a shared vision.

It is true that the news media alone does not create public opinion in either country and that successive opinion polls conducted in both the United States and Japan have shown that the people of the two countries seem to have more positive feelings toward each other than media coverage suggests. It is also true that the media of both countries report positive images as well. Nonetheless, given the structure of the media politics of the two countries as described above, there is a constant and real possibility that a relatively minor issue can be blown out of proportion and disrupt the bilateral relationship through the process of international media reporting. While a sophisticated argument on regional security or mutual economic benefits alone does not seem to be a sufficient link between the two peoples after the cold war, the sense of shared values will be increasingly important to ensure the relationship between the two countries can be managed smoothly. If the U.S.-Japan tie indeed remains "the most important bilateral relationship," the two governments and their leaders need to step up their efforts to appeal to the public not only in their own country but in the other country as
well. International exchanges of perceptions and images are much too important to be left to the news media of the two countries.

NOTES

1. According to Yoel Cohen (1986, 72), leaks can take place when low-ranking officials try to attract the attention of ministers, when particular officials or ministers favor a policy that lacks the support of others, when individual ministers cannot openly disagree with a decision, or when officials, in order to gauge public reaction, want to create the impression that the government has made a decision when it in fact has not.

2. Watanabe Tsuneo, an old-time political reporter and later the president of Yomiuri Shim bun, proudly mentions his close relationship with Ōno Banboku (an important LDP politician in the 1960s) and his deep involvement in politics (1999, 102-108). Tase Yasuhiro, a younger-generation political journalist for the Nikkei Shim bun, also describes his experiences with politicians, but he sees such relations in a more critical manner (1994, 32-43).

3. In 1965, Sam Jameson, then a Tokyo correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, was refused admittance to a press conference at the local police office by the press club following the stabbing of Ambassador Edwin Reischauer by a Japanese boy. The local police office, however, granted him a separate briefing (Jameson 1997, 179-180).

4. See the website <www.medialink.com/ephhome/research/research.htm/world100.html>.

5. According to a 1982 survey of international news reports in Japanese newspapers conducted by the Japanese Newspapers Association and the East-West Center, 44.1 percent are related to the United States. The comparable figures were 32 percent for South Korean newspapers, 28.9 percent for those in Singapore, and 34.3 percent for British papers (Fujita 1994, 35).

6. In 1985, Ambassador Reischauer, for example, complained openly that the Japanese media was biased its reporting on the Vietnam War, and that it was obviously treating Hanoi with undue favor in contrast to Saigon (see Masuda and Kimura 1995, 168-169).

7. This is based on a comment made by journalist Sam Jameson at a symposium held at the International House of Japan on March 31, 1991 (International House 1991, 39).

8. For the original Japanese remarks by Miyazawa and the misrepresentation of Japanese remarks by the American media, see the AERA article, "Hannichi aoru be no waikyoku hōsetsu" (1992).


10. For example, an extensive interview was printed in Asahi Shim bun on 5 October 1995.

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