

CHAPTER 4

USCAR Policies 1964-1972

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze administrative policies of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). As a background, the political and organizational settings in which USCAR operated are discussed. This will involve political implications of "residual sovereignty," the High Commissioner's organizational relations with Washington, and the political situation in mid-1964. Then we will analyze USCAR policies between mid-1964 and 1969 in relation to Okinawan internal pressures and Japanese participation in Okinawa. Our main concern here is to analyze how the High Commissioners perceived the situation and what policies he followed. Finally, legacies of the American occupation and its current meanings will be examined.

I. Political and Organizational Setting

1. "Residual sovereignty" and its implications

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff began a new over-all examination of U.S. requirements for post-war overseas military bases in May 1945, a month and a half after landing in Okinawa, it was included in their list of the "primary base" areas.⁽¹⁾ However, the Department of State questioned its underlying assumption that the United States would continue its control over Okinawa indefinitely, considering Okinawa "minor islands" as provided in the Postdam Declaration of July 1945, which should be returned to Japan and be demilitarized. There followed a series of debate between State and Defense over the disposition of Okinawa until Amami Oshima's reversion in 1954.

The first debate occurred in 1946 when the trusteeship of the Pacific Islands was being discussed, the second in 1948, and the third in 1952 and 1953. The first debate ended inconclusively, shelving the matter for the time. In the meantime, Okinawa came to be called "junkyards" of the Pacific and "forgotten islands" until the Cold War set in.

The second debate resulted in the provision on Okinawa in NSC 13/2: "The United States Government should make up its mind at this point that it intends to retain permanently the facilities at Okinawa, and the base there should be developed accordingly. The problem of obtaining international sanction for our permanent strategic control of the islands should be studied at once in the Department of State."⁽²⁾

However, the rationale to "obtain international sanction" was hard to come by. George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, had proposed a rationale after visiting General MacArthur in Tokyo. He argued that Okinawa was suited as an advance base not only because of natural factors (geographical location, size, physical conformation, water supply, etc.) but also because of the inhabitants: "Inhabitants are clearly not fit for independence. . . . They would be utterly incapable, in any circumstances, of providing for their own defense." Therefore, he concluded, the United States had "a clear responsibility to protect them internationally until some suitable permanent arrangement for their protection can be made." Kennan suggested that the United States could claim the islands "as a consequence of military conquest."⁽³⁾

Kennan was supported by General

MacArthur and the military but met opposition from State and other.⁶⁴ Thus the Article 3 of the Peace Treaty provided that:

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations as the sole administratering authority, Nansei Shoto. . . . Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

For John Foster Dulles and others in the State Department who were directly involved in the peace settlement with Japan, the question was more complex, for the continuation of the military occupation would not only run against the principle of "no aggrandizement, territorial or other," but also would create further political and legal complications. In a memorandum addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated June 27, 1950.⁶⁵ Dulles persuasively argued that:

"If Japan renounces sovereignty in favor of no one, this would create a chaotic international situation. . . . It might then be claimed

- a) that sovereignty was vested in the inhabitants, who could hereafter asserts, perhaps with United Nations backing, a right to oust the United States;
- b) that the victors in the war over Japan, including the U.S.S.R., have an inchoate right to sovereignty of these islands renounced by Japan in favor of no one in particular;
- c) that the United Nations is entitled to deal, in its own way, with the islands and their inhabitants;
- d) that the United States has, by a subterfuge, actually acquired the sovereignty."

Thus it was imperative for Dulles to accept some form of Japanese sovereignty over the islands, so that Japan could legally grant the United States continuing control over them. The concept of "residual sovereignty" well served this purpose.

But "residual sovereignty" still left the

problem of the final disposition of Okinawa unsettled. It was to be worked out in a friendly way which would combine the natural desires of the inhabitants with the requirements of international peace and security.

The third debate began with Far Eastern Command's Staff Study report of October 16, 1951 on Okinawa.⁶⁶ It concluded that the protection of the bases in Okinawa could be adequately obtained by arrangements similar to those embodied in the Security Treaty with Japan without involvement in any form of exclusive control by the United States.

The State Department quickly seized the opportunity and initiated discussion with Defense.⁶⁷ The discussion resulted in a NSC decision calling for recommendations by State and Defense to the President concerning the long-term military requirements in the islands.⁶⁸ Consequently, a State-Defense working group was organized, and it was finally agreed to return Amami to Japan while the rest of the Ryukyus would remain under the United States control indefinitely.

In informing of the decision to Ambassador Eikichi Araki, Dulles made it quite clear that unless Japan showed more interest and made more efforts in the security of the area, the United States would not relinquish control over Okinawa and Bonins.⁶⁹ This condition was sufficient to prevent the Japanese government from requesting an early return of the islands.

The United States official statements, however, did not convince the inhabitants of Okinawa of the necessity of the continued American occupation. Nor did U.S. officials believed they had succeeded in persuading the Okinawans. They conceived that the American ability to remain in Okinawa was dependent on three factors: the attitude of the Okinawans, U.S. relationship with Japan, and its world wide international position.¹⁰⁰ It was deemed necessary for USCAR, therefore, to acquire "reasonable acquiescence" of the Okinawan people, not only to maintain the effective use of the bases, but also to avoid the Okinawan problem becoming a disturbing factor in the United States relations with Japan and other Asian countries.

2. Organizational Framework

As in all occupied areas during and after World War II, except in minor Pacific islands, the U.S. Army was given responsibility for the occupation. In Okinawa, the commander of the Okinawa Base Command and later the Ryukyus Command was (except in the early months of the postwar period when the Navy was in charge) an Army officer, who also acted as Deputy Governor. The Military Governor was first the Commander in Chief Pacific (CinCPAC), then became the Commanding General of Philippine-Ryukyus Command in Manila, and finally, the Commander in Chief Far East in Tokyo. Though the name of "Military Government" was changed to "Civil Administration" and "Military Governor" to "Governor" in December 1950, the setup remained unchanged. However, Executive Order 10713 of 1957, "providing for Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," installed a High Commissioner in place of the Governor, and the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) was placed under CinCPAC in Hawaii. Thus the High Commissioner served as CG USARYIS and representative for CinCPAC as well.

In the Executive Order, the President delegated to the Secretary of Defense the power to exercise administrative rights given to the United States under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, and the latter in turn designated the Department of the Army as his executive agent.⁽¹¹⁾ Within the Department of the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations was delegated authority to handle routine matters concerning Okinawa, and the Under Secretary was given the responsibility for international affairs and administration of the Ryukyus. It was not until 1962, however, that the Under Secretary became more directly involved in the matter. He issued instructions covering procedures for handling administration of the Ryukyus, by which all matters involving significant issues of policy, all matters requiring coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and policy directives to the High Commissioner were to be referred to the Under Secretary for approval. Under the procedures, the Deputy Under Secretary made most of the

decisions regarding major changes in the administration of the Ryukyus, and made the recommendations which were approved by the Under Secretary or Secretary of the Army, or even at higher levels such as the Secretary of Defense or the President, if needed.⁽¹²⁾ Since Washington was disinclined to interfere with the High Commissioner, however, he was given rather wide latitude in administering Okinawa within the broadly established framework of policy. Even such high level policies as amending the Executive Order's provision for the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyus (GRI) and the Price Act of 1960, which established the basic policy guideline and the ceiling of Congressional appropriations for Okinawa, were said to have originated in USCAR.

The Executive Order provided that the Secretary of State was "responsible for the conduct of relations with foreign countries and international organizations with respect to the Ryukyu Islands." and the Political Advisor to the High Commissioner and the Civil Administrator were loaned from the State Department. The Army, however, guarded its autonomy from interference of the State Department, for example, in the controversies over the provision of the Japanese Peace Treaty in the 1950s and the Kennedy policy in 1962.

The High Commissioner had firm control over USCAR, his supporting staff. A typical attitude of the High Commissioner to the Civil Administrator, who supervised USCAR, was shown in High Commissioner Paul W. Carraway's testimony before a Congressional hearing that the Civil Administrator "has no authority and no power other than those might be given by the High Commissioner to him for some specific purpose."⁽¹³⁾ Using 1965 as an example, out of seven high officials in the Office of the High Commissioner, only the Political Advisor was a civilian. The military also dominated USCAR: seven out of fifteen top officials of USCAR were civilian, but six of these were in the relatively more technical and lower positions.

3. USCAR policies up to 1964

The stated "mission" of USCAR was "to assure that this strategic area will contribute most effectively to the peace and security of the free world." Its responsibility was to promote "the best interests of the United States and assist in the development of a sound democracy in the Ryukyu Islands." Its "basic operating objectives" were to develop an effective and responsible government based on democratic principles, to achieve a viable economy, and to improve the standards of living of the Okinawans.¹⁴ A semblance of "sound democracy" was necessary to acquire the reasonable acquiescence of the Okinawans and to create a good image of American rule, but developing a sound democracy under alien military rule with little legitimacy was self-contradictory. USCAR made statements to the effect that the Okinawans were accorded responsibilities never dreamed of under Japanese rule and that Okinawa was a "showcase of democracy," but these statements failed to impress the Okinawans and did not match the realities. When the Okinawans demanded more autonomy, USCAR could only say that the Okinawans were not yet ready for "responsible" government.

As successive High Commissioners admitted, the only effective means of acquiring the acquiescence of the Okinawan people was economic. And reasonable acquiescence "can exist only for so long as the people continue to derive substantial economic and social benefits from our presence."¹⁵ This approach was, however, most effective when Japan was still in the process of postwar recovery with American assistance, but it was to lose much of its effectiveness as Japan progressed economically and the gap between Japan and Okinawa in living standards increasingly widened.

Under such circumstances, it was necessary for USCAR to make careful analysis of the local situation and to try to manipulate it; where there was a fear of getting beyond control, concessions to the demands of the Okinawans were necessary. The timing of the concession was of utmost importance, for too late a concession might damage America's freedom to use the bases, the right to maintain the bases, and U.S.-Japan relations as well, while too early

a concession might unnecessarily hasten the reversion.

President Kennedy in March 1962 announced what is known as the "Kennedy policy" in which he recognized the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and looked toward to the day when the security interests of the free world would permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty. In addition to permitting the display of the Japanese flag on public buildings, Kennedy declared that the United States would enter into discussions with the Japanese Government to work out precise arrangements to allow Japanese assistance to Okinawa. Kennedy also amended the Executive Order so that the legislature, not the High Commissioner, could nominate the Chief Executive of the GRI, and further promised an increase in American aid and continuous review of governmental functions in order to broaden autonomy of the Okinawans. The purpose of the policy was to "make some adjustments for the long haul" to the changing of circumstances. The expansion of autonomy and the acceptance of Japanese aid were meant to make both Japan and Okinawa "relatively satisfied" with the *status quo*.¹⁶

The Army and High Commissioner Caraway strongly opposed some important aspects of the policy. The Army was against any new formal statement encouraging Japan's hope of soon regaining Okinawa, for it would invite "renewed or increased pressure for reversion." It opposed the appointment of the Chief Executive by the legislatures on the grounds that "such a procedure would impair Ryukyuan political stability and a principal U.S. means for exercise of ultimate control." It fought against the attempts of the State Department to increase the Japanese Government's influence over Okinawa: such interference would derogate the ultimate authority of the United States.¹⁷

In implementing the Kennedy policy, Caraway discouraged the Japanese Government from raising its level of aid to Okinawa, and did not act on the recommendations of the Kaysen Report for greater autonomy. Instead, by fully using the authority given to USCAR over the GRI, he instituted reform by so-called "direct

rule." He severely criticized the GRI inefficiency and brushed aside the reversion movement and request for autonomy as being "agitation" and an "excuse for avoiding responsibility." Since the GRI was not yet ready to assume the responsibility required of it, he said, it was premature to transfer authority to it.⁽¹⁸⁾ The Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP) split of 1964 was primarily an Okinawan response to Caraway's failure to implement what had been promised by the Kennedy policy.

Suffering from the non-materialization of the total aid request from the United States and the constant charges of the opposition parties against the political stagnation and retrogression of autonomy under the "direct rule" of Caraway, the ruling OLDP was subjected to increasing internal stresses. Reformist antimainstream elements of the OLDP called for a bolder stand toward the United States, increased autonomy through public election of the Chief Executive, and a timetable for reversion, demanding Chief Executive Seisaku Ota's resignation, which was finally tendered in June 1964. The conservative party's split was eventually healed when both factions were reunited in a new party, the Democratic Party (DP), in December 1964, and a new Chief Executive was appointed from the DP. It was, however, the line of policy of the reformist group that prevailed in the new party; it placed more emphasis on the eventual reversion of Okinawa to Japan and the need for expansion of autonomy to provide for a smooth transition in achieving this goal. Thus, by the time High Commissioner Albert Watson assumed his office in August 1964, the Caraway policy had brought changes in the outlook of the pro-American party, and a new line of policy was clearly in order.

Even before the arrival of Watson, however, a step was taken toward meeting some of the demands of the Okinawans. After two years of prolonged negotiations, the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee and the U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus Technical Committee were finally established in April 1974 to consider Japanese aid to Okinawa. Though the terms of reference

were drawn up very carefully to ensure that the committees could do no more than coordinate aid for economic development and welfare of the Okinawans, their establishment showed, for the first time, America's willingness to cooperate formally with the Japanese on the aid program.

II. Albert Watson: Policy of Concession

From 1965 through 1967, the reversion movement in Okinawa received a strong impetus from several outside developments, as well as two events within the islands (the transfer of two court cases to the GRI Court and the twin education bills) which virtually transformed the political climate in Okinawa.

The reversion movement was intensified due to several outside developments. The visit of the Japanese Diet members of the Japan Specialist Party in mid-January 1965 increased activities of the leftist parties and groups. Escalating American involvement in Vietnam increased use of the bases, and all opposition parties and groups protested on the ground that it might lead direct involvement of the Okinawans in the conflict. And Prime Minister Sato's meeting with President Johnson and Sato's subsequent visit to Okinawa in 1965 further stirred up interests in reversion.

In the Okinawan legislative election of November 1965, reversion and the public election of the Chief Executive emerged as issue of primary importance. During 1966 and early 1967, there developed two cases which showed the decline of USCAR's influence over the Okinawans and the strength of the reversion groups, particularly of the Okinawa Teachers' Association (OTA).

In June 1966, High Commissioner Watson ordered a transfer of the so-called "mackerel" case and the "Tomori" case from the GRI Court of Appeals to the USCAR Court. In both cases, the GRI Central Circuit Court had ruled earlier that portions of USCAR ordinances were invalid under the terms of the Executive Order. The High Commissioner considered that such decisions by the GRI court challenged "the validity of two ordinances, and by implication, of all ordinances and the basic right of the United States Administration to govern Okinawa."⁽¹⁹⁾ The

transfer order met with immediate and strong protest from all political groups and the news media. The DP joined opposition party legislators in passing a resolution protesting the transfer order and requesting that the two cases be returned to the CRI Court. Many other organizations passed similar resolutions, a "prefectural people's rally" was held, and the Joint Struggle Council for the Retraction of the Court Transfer Order was formed. By the middle of 1966, according to a USCAR report, the issue became "the focal target of criticism. . . with both the government and opposition parties vociferously attacking the court transfer action through the legislature and through the press."⁽²⁰⁾ On December 2, 1968, the USCAR Court handed down its decision favoring Tomari and the GRI while upholding the validity of the ordinances; it validated Tomari's election to the legislature, and in the "mackerel case" ruled that the taxes imposed by ordinance on mackerel were valid, thus conceding to the Okinawans the point of dispute.

In January 1967, after the court cases transfer issue had died down, the two long-standing education bills became the primary issue. The DP, which had lost a legislative by-election and several mayoralty elections in 1966, renewed its resolve to risk its political life in passing the two bills, which would restrict the political activities of the OTA, the driving force of the reversion movement and the major factor in leading the opposition candidates to victory in the elections. When the DP-controlled Education and Social Affairs Committee of the legislature met in the presence of a thousand policemen and passed the two bills, the Joint Struggle Council for the Prevention of Legislation of the Two Education Bills severely protested the DP's unilateral committee action, and, on February 24, demonstrators succeeded in pushing aside the GRI police guarding the legislature building, forcing the Speaker to postpone the plenary session and to sign an agreement to shelve the two bills. After further debate off the legislature floor, the DP finally withdrew the bills on November 22, 1967.⁽²¹⁾

Protest rallies and demonstration parades during FY 1966 "increased in magnitude and

intensity," and in FY 1967 the number of rallies and parades saw "a significant rise" from 140 to 202.⁽²²⁾ Through its successful struggle against USCAR and the DP, the opposition gained both strength and self-confidence. Of more importance was a considerable change in the DP's attitudes toward reversion. The Party's "essential policies for 1967," which were set up in December 1966, called for "functional reversion," the popular election of the Chief Executive, etc., which were all possible under the United States Administration. On Reversion Day (April 28) of 1967, however, a resolution was passed by unanimous vote. "The most distinctive point of the resolution" was "its request that a specific timetable for the return of the Ryukyus be established."⁽²³⁾

By the middle of 1967, the issue was no longer reversion itself but its timing and conditions, with the DP supporting reversion at the mainland level (hondonami). The Japanese press also changed its position "dramatically" in 1967. "By mid-1967 the press had begun to discuss concrete plans for Okinawa's return."⁽²⁴⁾

High Commissioner Albert Watson [August 1, 1964- October 2, 1966] did not consider the political situation a critical one. In a Congressional hearing in March 1966, he fully concurred with the statement that "we [the United States] are quite conscious of political conditions in Japan (particularly with reference to 1970), and are coordinating our policies and programs as far as the Ryukyus are concerned."⁽²⁵⁾ He hoped, however, that he could keep the reversion movement at a manageable level by removing the irritants and effecting material improvements in the sectors that lagged behind mainland Japan. He reportedly stated that "It is clear that the Ryukyans would rather be ruled by other Japanese than by Americans. . . . You cannot avoid criticism and charges of 'colonialism' but you can do your best to reduce friction."⁽²⁶⁾

Watson took several measures to expand local autonomy. A legislative Screening Committee was established in December 1964 to coordinate and facilitate prior action on proposed GRI Executive Branch bills and to review bills passed by the GRI legislature. USCAR no longer stepped in to block legislation

unless it hampered the U.S. military mission. The Chief Executive sent one bill out of 62 in 1965, and three out of 129 in 1966, to the legislature without clearance from the Committee. In order to lessen the resentment of the Okinawans against the enactment of legislation by means of USCAR ordinances, Watson made it his policy to reduce the number of ordinances. Thus, the number was reduced from 145 to 89 by the end of 1966. He permitted the Chief Executive to appoint directors of the various GRI departments without his approval. Furthermore, in his annual address to the legislature on February 1, 1966, Watson stated, as a further step in the development of autonomy, that it would no longer be his policy to "make detailed report on the economic and political situation, or to request specific legislation, or even to describe in detail the situations requiring legislation."⁽²⁷⁾ USCAR finally granted Senaga Kemejiro of the Okinawa People's Party permission to travel to Japan in October 1967. This signified the loosening of the severe travel restrictions which had been put into effect to prevent leftist activities in Okinawa. More important, the Executive Order was further amended, and the legislature was given the power to elect the Chief Executive, subject to the High Commissioner's approval.⁽²⁸⁾

The measures Watson emphasized most were economic. In the testimony cited above, he stated that "Vocal elements in the Ryukyus and Japan maintain that reversion of the islands to Japan is the only way in which the Ryukyuan can secure benefits obtaining in comparable areas of Japan. We, in cooperation with the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and the Government of Japan, hope to attain such a level within the existing administrative arrangements for the Ryukyus."⁽²⁹⁾ When he arrived in Okinawa, he set to work on a long-range plan to ensure that "the level of public health, educational and welfare services advance toward levels obtained in comparable areas of Japan and reach them, to the extent possible, by the end of the fiscal year 1971."⁽³⁰⁾ The plan established relative priorities among programs to provide optimum application of available resources, and became the basis of justification of USCAR's

budget request and also the standard for accepting Japanese aid.

The United States Congress, however, failed to meet USCAR's budget request. The direct appropriation was increased to \$14,360 million in FY 1965 from \$9,996 million of the previous year, but then remained at this level for the next three crucial years. It was only the 1969 appropriation that reached the \$20,000 million level. USCAR faced a dilemma. Public health, education and welfare services were the most neglected sector in Okinawa, and the fact that Okinawa was far behind comparable areas in Japan in these sectors was a source of constant dissatisfaction to the Okinawans. Failing to obtain Congressional approval, USCAR had to turn to the Japanese government for needed financial assistance, but such aid would undermine USCAR's authority as had been feared by Caraway.

As was already pointed out, the establishment of the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee and the U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus Technical Committee indicated USCAR's willingness to receive Japanese aid. In the Consultative Committee the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo communicated to the Japanese delegation the areas in which Japanese aid was desired, and in the Technical Committee details were worked out and specific proposals prepared. USCAR, fearful of the political implications of Japanese aid, put four conditions on accepting the Japanese aid: 1) that it contribute to the welfare and well-being of the Ryukyuan people; 2) that it be absorbable during the period available; 3) that it not interfere with the administrative rights of the United States; and 4) that it not work against the mission of the United States to defend this area.⁽³¹⁾ By accepting Japanese aid according to a longrange plan to ensure that only USCAR could determine in which fieldsaid was to be administered, and by limiting it to about one-third of what the United States contributed, it was hoped that the Japanese influence might be limited to a manageable level. Thus, an increase in U.S. appropriation was the most important condition of accepting an increase in Japanese aid.

Failing to increase U.S. appropriation, USCAR limited Japanese aid to a lower level. At

a meeting of the Consulative Committee on September 20, 1965, the Japanese Government was invited to assist in raising the levels of aid in public health, education and welfare to those prevailing in comparable areas of Japan by the end of FR 1971, and to continue to contribute to the economic development of the islands.⁽³²⁾ Japanese aid, however, increased by only \$2.8 million in FY 1967.

USCAR carefully checked the increase in Japanese influence over Okinawa in other areas as well. On February 2, 1965, less than a year after it had been established, the Consultative Committee had its functions broadened to include consultation not merely on Japanese aid but also on other matters which Japan and the United States could "cooperate in continuing to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of the islands." According to Emmerson, "the American representative was scrupulous in rejecting any agenda item which, regardless of how pertinent it was to the conditions in Okinawa, did not directly relate or technical assistance."⁽³³⁾

It must be noted, however, that Watson was much less worried about the Japanese influence in Okinawa than Caraway. While he attempted to control the Japanese influence, he also invited Prime Minister Sato to Okinawa. And it was under his administration that Okinawa was for the first time connected into the Japanese microwave television network, thereby subjecting the Okinawans to stronger Japanese influence.

III. Ferdinand T. Unger (11.2.66-1.17.69) and James B. Lampart (1.28.69-5.14.72): Maintaining the Bases after Reversion

Within the first seven months of his administration, Unger went much further than Watson in expanding autonomy and increasing Japanese aid. As with Watson, Unger recognized the legitimate demand of the Okinawans for reversion: "After 21 years of our administration, the people of the Ryukyu Islands look forward to becoming an integral part of the Japanese nation once again."⁽³⁴⁾ But, he went further when he stated to the legislature that "we are both looking forward to the earliest possible date

when circumstances will permit reunification with Japan. In this context, you and I are striving for the same objectives."⁽³⁵⁾ *USCAR's Standard Response Guide* (October 15, 1967) thus stated that "the Civil Administration is doing all it can to minimize the stresses which will accompany reversion." In the middle of 1967, all Ryukyuan ships were allowed to fly the Japanese flag with a special pennant, and representatives of the Japanese Government and USCAR reached agreement on procedures and details relating to the transfer to the Japanese Government of the authority to issue passports and identity papers to Okinawans travelling outside the islands.

In the field of the expansion of autonomy, Unger announced in June 1967 that he had drawn up a list of 29 additional laws and regulations enacted by USCAR which would be rescinded when the GRI produced substitute legislation more in keeping with Japanese practices. The *Guide* stated that "as more and more laws are enacted, and take the place of ordinances, we will have here a body of law similar in most respects to that existing in Japan proper."

By October 1966 the United States was proposing to the Japanese Government an aid increase of over \$30 million annually. Unger, in his first press conference in November 1966, stated that he welcome any Japanese economic aid as long as it would contribute to the welfare of the Okinawan people. Japanese aid to Okinawa exceeded that of the United States in FY 1968 due to an increase in Japanese aid.

As the Sato-Johnson summit meeting for November 14, 1967 approached, the legislature presented a reversion solution, and a delegation of legislators carried the document to Tokyo and presented it to the Prime Minister. However, deeply disappointed with the failure of the joint communique issued after the summit meeting to set any sort of time-table for the reversion, the opposition parties and groups, with a great deal of support from activities from Japan, launched a series of demonstration marches which culminated in an overwhelming show of strength at the April 28 Reversion Day rally. After the rally, political activities were centered around

the forthcoming election of the Chief Executive in November 1968, which had been announced by High Commissioner Unger in February of the same year.

Reversion was hotly debated during the pre-election period. While USCAR kept relative neutrality, Japanese political parties actively participated to a degree never known in an Okinawan election. The conservatives recommended a gradual transition over a period of years of insure economic stability and adjustment to the laws and organization of the Japanese Government, while the reformists called for "immediate, unconditional and complete reversion." The opposition coalition candidate, Yara Chobyō, won the election by a 30,000 vote margin out of a total of 450,000 votes cast. Even though the conservative party retained the control of the legislature in elections held concurrently, the election of Yara was clearly a political setback for USCAR.

Several days after the election, a B-52 bomber aborted at take off and exploded at the end of the runway. All political elements immediately voiced criticism of the accident; the Joint Struggle Council to Protect Human Lives was formed, and the largest protest rally in Okinawa during the 23 years of American rule was held. A general strike was planned, to which all reversionist and labor organizations, including the All Military Base Workers' Union (*Zengunro*), decided to join.

The strike itself was averted, only with the intervention of the Japanese Government and the cooperation of Chief Executive Yara. But the cancellation of the general strike caused considerable frustration within the reversion movement, and extremists' view began to dominate. The Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council (*Fukkikyo*) added to its "essential policies for 1969" two new policies: removal of American bases from Okinawa and abolition of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. June 23, the day the battle of Okinawa came to an end, was named "Anti-War and Peace Day." In coordination with a twenty-four hour strike of the *Zengunro*, which had been engaged in a struggle for higher wages and in protest of the mass dismissals of Okinawa base workers, in

open violation of an ordinance, *Fukkikyo* and the Okinawa Prefecture Labor Unions Council (*Kenryokyo*) staged a mass rally. At one point in the demonstrations, military police moved forward with fixed bayonets to push back the demonstrations, and in the process injured ten Okinawans including the chairman of the Socialist Masses Party. This incident inevitably aroused outrage in both mainland Japan and Okinawa.

Participants in demonstrations and rallies in FY1969 and FY 1969 were 236 and 198, respectively, as compared with 202 in FY 1967. USCAR found itself increasingly losing control over demonstrators; by the beginning of 1969 it could not prevent serious political disturbances without the cooperation of the Japanese Government. The political condition in Okinawa had deteriorated to such an extent that, as shown in the bayonet incident, USCAR might find itself in the position of having to maintain its rule through coercive means. The seriousness of the situation on Okinawa was fully recognized by High Commissioners Unger and Lampart. In March, 1968, Unger testified before a Congressional Committee that "no. 1 subject in the islands is reversion. . . . I can honestly say that great deal of it stems from emotion. But after all, emotion is part of the human motivation and human mechanism. . . ." He readily concurred with the statement made by Under Secretary of the Army James V. Siena that "the longer we administer the islands, the longer frustration and the greater their desire to return."³⁶ Likewise, High Commissioner Lampart in April 1969:³⁷

I believe that the majority of Ryukyans desire early reversion. . . . Over the past year, pressures in the Ryukyus for reversion have grown. I underst and this is also true in Japan. . . . It is true that the people of the Ryukyus expect some progress on the reversion issue this year. Without evidence of such progress, I believe we may face an ever-greater demand both in Okinawa and Japan for reversion with a good possibility of increasingly more aggressive overt acts and demonstrations.

"Two overriding issues confronting United States in the Ryukyus," testified Lampart, were the return of governmental administrative rights to Japan and its timing, and the status of U.S. military bases after reversion. After the summit meeting of November 1967, USCAR clearly differentiated reversion of administrative rights from the retention of the bases.⁽³⁸⁾ Lampart was "convinced that the majority of the Ryukyans, while desiring the return of governmental control to Japan, took it for granted that the United States bases on Okinawa will remain for number of years to come."⁽³⁹⁾ He did not expect the radical movement in Japan and Okinawa would become more serious than it was at the end of 1969. Since radical activity in Okinawa was largely inspired from Tokyo, he reasoned, "if they get over the 10th anniversary of the [mutual security] treaty, things would quiet down."⁽⁴⁰⁾

Lampart considered his primary job to be "to assure that our military bases continue to be operable and that they are operating," and he made "extensive and very careful preparations to be sure that I [Lampart] can carry out this mission, no matter what kind of political circumstances I might be confronted with."⁽⁴¹⁾ Thus USCAR policy under Unger and Lampart was to make every effort to maintain effective use of the bases, while giving in to the Okinawans and the Japanese Government in the field of administration to avoid further troubles.

USCAR offices were moved from the center of Naha to an American base in the outskirts of the city in November 1967. Lampart testified in April that his purpose was to "interfere as little as possible with the day to day operations of the local government unless the security of the military base is involved."⁽⁴²⁾ During 1968 and 1969, basic though informal changes were taking place in USCAR control over the internal administration of the GRI. USCAR's checks on GRI bills and budget drafts were much less rigid. In FY 1969, for example, 49 bills out of 122 were signed into law by the Chief Executive without clearing USCAR. Simultaneously, Japanese influence on GRI and politics in general continued to increase.

By the joint communique issued after the summit conference of November 1967, it was

agreed to establish an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner to take measures to minimize the stresses which would arise when administrative rights were restored to Japan. Furthermore, it was agreed that functions of the Japanese Government Liaison Office in Naha would be expanded to permit consultation with the High Commissioner on matters of mutual interest.

When Advisory Committee began its operation in March 1968, Unger emphasized that matters concerning the military uses of Okinawa by U.S. forces, such as the stationing of B-52 bombers, the calls made by nuclear powered submarines to Okinawan ports, and the control of radioactive contamination, were outside the jurisdiction of the Committee. In the field of administration, however, considerable progress was made toward integrating Okinawa with mainland Japan. The first recommendation of the Committee to the High Commissioner was to invite the Japanese Government to send a survey team as an initial step toward the promotion of integration. The survey team, after visiting Okinawa, formulated a three-year plan for integration, which became the basis for discussion and recommendation of the Advisory Committee. After 1968, the Japanese Government could formulate her own aid program to Okinawa.

IV. Conclusions

It is quite clear from the above analyses of USCAR policies since 1964 that Okinawa reversion was a very carefully calculated move. High Commissioners' analysis of the local situations proved to be surprisingly correct. They understood that the reversion movement was in fact a nationalist movement, and carefully made a piece-by-piece concession (a salami tactics) to save time for the progress of Tokyo-Washington negotiations. USCAR's policies were carefully coordinated with pro-reversion forces in Washington. In view of the careful analysis of, and quick learning from the local developments, we can characterize the Okinawa decision as an "analytic" decision making (Steinbrunner).

Okinawa reversion was "rational" for the United States in security, political, and economic

terms: it increased Japan's security interest in the area, and the military functions were largely kept intact; it solved the problem of colonialism; and it could reduce the expenses in maintaining the military bases. Above all, it saved the security relations with Japan from near collapse.

For the Okinawan people, public opinion polls show that an increasing number of them think that they are better off economically after the reversion. After the reversion, the tourism industry has rapidly expanded, accounting for 10% of GPP in 1988 (4% in 1977); while the U.S. military base incomes are diminishing as a source of foreign exchange earnings (5% in 1988 and 16% in 1977).

When it comes to evaluating the American occupation itself, there is more or less a philosophical question. An U.S. Army historian, concluded his official account of the occupation:⁴⁵⁾

On balance, the five years of military government must be judged a qualified success. Under military tutelage the Ryukyans progressively moved toward local self-government and began to enjoy one of Asia's highest standards. . . .

Before that reversion, American policies, especially those developed after 1948, had transformed Okinawan society from one centered on agriculture to a service economy dependent to a considerable extent on the American military establishment. It was a remarkable transformation, a socio-economic lead of perhaps a century or more, yet one accomplished in the span of a few short years. At the same time, for many Okinawans, this transformation meant shattered hopes for land ownership or radically altered social status. These effects, however unintended on the part of military government officers, became realities that could not be reversed or erased by the act of reversion

Footnotes

(This is a revised version of my article of the same title in *The Political Process of Okinawa Reversion*, (in Japanese) The Japan Association of

International Relations, 19--).

- (1) JCS 570, Over-All Examination of the Requirements for the Post-war Military Bases, Memo by Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 5.4.45, NA RG 218). Arnold G. Fischer, Jr., *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-50*, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C. 1988 p.70.
- (2) FR, 692.
- (3) "Summary" attached to PPS 28.
- (4) The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Charles E. Saltzman), for example, commented that "The fact that they (the Okinawans) are utterly incapable of their own defense does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that we should volunteer it." Ibid. 727-736.
- (5) FR, 51, VI, 1152-53, p.1152.
- (6) "United States Long Term Objectives with Respect to the Ryukyu Islands," *ibid.*, p.1117.
- (7) *ibid.* Seabold to the SD, 1.17.52 (page). The proposal was rejected by the JCS, 1.21.52, p.1321. The report was transmitted to State, 1.25.52, pp.1116-1120.
- (8) NSC 125/2 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Japan, *ibid.*, p.1302. President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message of January 7, 1954: The United States "shall maintain indefinitely our bases in Okinawa."
- (9) FR, 52-54, VI, Memo Conv. 8.13.53, p.1482.
- (10) U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Consideration of H.R. 10937, To Amend the Act Providing for the Economic and Social Development of the Ryukyu Islands*, March 9, 1961, p.5223.
- (11) Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, "Delegation of Authority for Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," June 17, 1957.
- (12) Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, "Procedures on Matters Pertaining to the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," January 2, 1962, and a letter to the author from Edward E. Freimuth, Special Assignment to Under Secretary of the Army, dated November 6, 1974.
- (13) U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Consideration of H.R. 10937*, p.5254.
- (14) USCAR, *Ryukyu Islands Facts Book*, October 1968 Edition, p.3-1.
- (15) Albert Watson's testimony, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966*, 89th Cong., 1st sess. 1965, p.68.
- (16) *Hearings, Consideration of H.R. 10937*, op. cit., pp.5216-7, 5228 and 5225-6).

- (17) A letter from Howard E. Haguard, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army to Lawrence Speiser of the American Civil Liberties Union, dated July 31, 1961. See also *Chicago Sun-Times*, June 19, 1961, p.12, and John K. Emmerson, *Arms, Yen & Power*, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1972, p.165.
- (18) *Chicago Tribune*, June 4, 1969 and Emmerson, op. cit., pp.165-7.
- (19) *Press Release* (USCAR), 66-257, July 30 1966.
- (20) USCAR, *Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands*, Vol. XV (1967), pp.13-4.
- (21) *Ibid.*, pp.4-8.
- (22) *Ibid.*, pp.32-3.
- (23) *Ibid.*, p.8.
- (24) Johannes A. Binnendijk, "The Dynamics of Okinawan Reversion, 1945-1969," in Gregory Henderson, ed., *Public Diplomacy and Political Change*, New York: Praeger, 1973, p.116.
- (25) U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1967*, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, p.7.
- (26) *New York Times*, March 21, 1965, p.27.
- (27) USCAR, *Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands*, Vol. XIV (1966), p.227.
- (28) Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 54 (January 10, 1966), p.66.
- (29) *House hearings, 1967*, op. cit., pp.5 and 8.
- (30) *Ibid.*, p.8.
- (31) High Commissioner Albert Watson's Press Conference, September 9, 1965 (mimeographed).
- (32) *House hearings, 1967*, op. cit., pp.8-9.
- (33) Emmerson, op. cit., p.167.
- (34) U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p.82.
- (35) USCAR, *Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands*, Vol. XV (1967), p.310.
- (36) *Ibid.*, pp.21, 78, 83-4, and 99.
- (37) U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970*, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp.165 and 239.
- (38) *Ibid.*, p.165.
- (39) *House hearings, 1970*, p.239.
- (40) U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1970*, 91st Cong., 1st. sess., 1969, pp.467-8.
- (41) *House hearings, 1970*, p.253.
- (42) U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1969*, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, p.100.
- (43) Arnod G. Fisch, Jr., op. cit., pp.183-4.