Since the end of World War II, North American analysts and policymakers have used "security" in innumerable ways to highlight a range of issues considered important, reflecting different perspectives on what matters and why in international relations. All along, the meaning of security has been contested, but that debate intensified with the end of the cold war. While appearing to offer new concepts of security, the new literature as often betokens a return to pre-cold war ways of thinking about security—including attention to nonmilitary means and the relationship between domestic affairs and national security—as it does a response to a truly new and unprecedented security situation (Baldwin 1995, 122; Kolodziej 1992).

The debate seems new both because one perspective, known as Realism, had largely triumphed for several decades and because some of the threats (notably in the environmental area) truly are unprecedented. Under cold war pressures, a sense of security referring primarily to the prospects for military conflict between states came to dominate both thinking and policy making on security. This approach was based largely

The authors extend their heartfelt thanks to Janelle Kellman for her long hours of assistance with this chapter. We also wish to thank the many people who provided valuable comments on an earlier draft: Geoffrey Dabelko, Allen Hammond, Thomas Homer-Dixon, Michael Renner, Tim Shah, Dennis Stairs, Paul Stares, Richard Ullman, Jane Wales, and the participants in the JCIIE workshop on redefining security, held in Washington, D.C., on March 10–11, 1997.
on various versions of the Realist paradigm. But the victory of Realism was never complete, and the end of the cold war gave the alternatives a new lease on life. At the same time, a growing awareness of the dangers posed by new phenomena, such as climate change and the population explosion, has led to assertions that these new threats should be incorporated into notions of security. And all of this debate is complicated by growing questions about the role of the nation-state and its capacity to provide security.

This is more than an academic debate over the meaning of a term. The Realist dominance of security thinking was reflected in the creation of institutions and the allocation of resources, particularly in the United States. The U.S. National Security Council dealt largely with military issues, and U.S. development assistance was allocated largely with an eye to geopolitical considerations. Because security is so often conflated with "what deserves allocation of the state's time, attention, and money," if Realism does not provide an adequate description of current reality, basing security policy on Realism could decrease security by causing policymakers to pay attention to the wrong things and to allocate resources inappropriately.

Despite massive efforts, agreement on a new definition of security has proven elusive. After the cold war, a wide range of North American think tanks and university centers sponsored projects aimed at rethinking security, many of which led to some kind of publication, but none of which achieved widespread acclaim for new insights into thinking about security. By the mid-1990s, a certain exhaustion and sense of exasperation with the whole "rethinking security" business had set in. As one review commented, "In retrospect, each of these attempts at making sense of the emerging security environment can be seen as having been based on an unrealistic premise: that the contours of the emerging international order could be perceived if not redrawn" (Del Rosso 1995, 192).

In recent years, some writers and groups found themselves narrowing their focus or retracting earlier proposals for a broad redefinition of security. Perhaps the most notable of these is Richard Ullman, whose 1983 article in *International Security* is often cited as the pathbreaking article that first drew the attention of mainstream security analysts to a broadened perspective on security. That article defined a threat to national security as "an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for
the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state” (Ullman 1983, 133).

Because many factors other than military threats from abroad must be considered as security threats, he argued, they deserved—and were not receiving—the attention of policymakers and allocation of resources on a similar scale. These nonmilitary threats to security included resource scarcity caused by population growth and rising living standards, Third World urbanization and the attendant strains on fragile governments, and pressures for migration.

A decade later, however, Ullman was reconsidering his use of terms, noting that if “national security” is used to encompass all serious and urgent threats to a nation state and its citizens, we will eventually find ourselves using a different term when we wish to make clear that our subject is the threats that might be posed by the military forces of other states. The “war problem” is conceptually distinct from, say, problems like environmental degradation or urban violence, which are better categorized as threats to well being. . . . Labeling a set of circumstances as a problem of national security when it has no likelihood of involving as part of the solution a state’s organs of violence accomplishes nothing except obfuscation. (Ullman 1995, 2, 12)

This perspective is echoed by others who have publicly emphasized the importance of nonmilitary problems but question the utility and appropriateness of labeling them security issues (Deudney 1990; Dalby 1992; Conca 1994).

This chapter, divided into seven sections, highlights the major issues that have emerged in the literature in recent years; it is not meant to be a comprehensive review. The first section lays out the assumptions of Realism—the set of beliefs underlying cold war security thinking—and notes the current literature that continues to defend Realist findings and prescriptions with at most minor modifications. The second section reviews the “good news” literature. These writings take issue with the bleak Realist insistence that war and the preparation for it must always and inevitably be the defining condition of international relations. They argue that the likelihood of major war is declining or that new strategies are
available for handling the threats states can pose to one another's security. The third section addresses causes of violent conflict beyond those considered in traditional Realist thinking, ranging from ethno-nationalism to environmental degradation. Section four examines writings on the role of the state, presumed in Realism to be the only actor that matters. These writings question the capacity of state actors to address international threats, or even to maintain basic social cohesion in light of complex new forces. Section five looks at the rapidly growing “human security” literature that calls for a wholesale redefinition of security, focusing on nonmilitary and unintended threats to values and to human well-being. The penultimate section reviews Canadian and U.S. security policy statements and practices. The final section concludes that seeking widely acceptable, new security paradigms and definitions is an elusive goal.

TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF SECURITY

The framework through which most North American scholars and policymakers have viewed security concerns over the past several decades goes by a variety of names: Realism, realpolitik, power politics. Cold war conceptions of what security is and how to go about achieving it are based on the reasoning and assumptions of Realism, and efforts to alter thinking about security generally involve some degree of frontal assault on these assumptions. To set the stage for understanding the literature on rethinking security, therefore, we must begin with a review of the Realist paradigm.

In the Realist perspective, states are the actors that matter, and war, or the prospect of war, defines how states behave. Because the world lacks any overarching sovereign that can impose order and enforce adherence to agreements between states, each state can at least potentially threaten other states, and each state has no recourse but its own self-defense. States may attack each other for a variety of reasons, according to different variants of Realist thinking: preemptively, to prevent a neighbor from growing too strong; to acquire resources; out of an innate aggressive drive common to all humans; or because a neighbor’s defensive preparations are misconstrued as threatening. The last, known as the security dilemma, is particularly troubling because it renders war a constant possibility for all states (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978). Even a state that has no desire
to engage in war may be seen as a threat and thus attacked, making it necessary for all states to prepare to defend themselves—and thus increasing the chance that they will be seen as threats.

This is a world in which what matters is military power. Economics matter, too, but only because wealthy states are more militarily capable than poor ones, not because states wish to make their citizens better off. The defining characteristic of security for Realists is how power is distributed among states. In the academically dominant variant of Realism known as structural Realism or neo-realism, security is about war between states, and all states are alike in that they all fulfill the same functions and behave the same way vis-à-vis one another (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1990a). These Realists dismiss considerations of the domestic character of different countries. Democracies and dictatorships are equally likely to go to war, and there is no need to look within a state to understand its behavior. Culture and history do not matter in understanding war and peace. Because the competition between states is eternal and universal, the nature of international politics can never change, even though individual states rise and fall.

This description of the nature of international politics leads to a clear set of policy recommendations: Maintain or increase your military power relative to that of other states, no matter their apparent intentions toward you. Today’s friends and allies can be tomorrow’s enemies. Your interests lie in your ability to protect your territory from others, and you have no reason to care about how other states treat their citizens, their environment, or their economies so long as they do not directly threaten you.

In sum, from a Realist perspective security is defined in terms of protection of a state’s sovereignty, threats to security come from other states, the problem of security is war between states, and the means to achieving security are military ones.

Realist beliefs underlay much of the North American thinking about security during the cold war, particularly in the United States and most evidently during the Nixon-Kissinger years. Many North American analysts and policymakers hold fast to these tenets, arguing that they represent fundamental verities of international relations that remain unchanged by the end of the cold war or by the trends described above. In one well-known example, John Mearsheimer predicted a return to war among European countries once the unifying effect of the Soviet threat dissipated (1990a). Another scholar, extolling the “renaissance of security
studies,” described security studies as focused on the phenomenon of war between states, based on the assumptions “that conflict between states is always a possibility and that the use of military force has far-reaching effects on states and societies” (Waltz 1991, 212).

Realism has never held exclusive sway over all scholars and policymakers. Even during the cold war, many analysts focused on the security implications of economic issues and the impact of transnational forces on national security, particularly after the energy crisis of the early 1970s revealed unexpected Western vulnerabilities (Romm 1993). Certainly, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights around the globe did not reflect Realist thinking, and the strong Canadian emphasis on multilateral cooperation and peacekeeping refused the Realist assertions on the nature of state interests and the primacy of self-help. Yet the Realist emphasis on security as meaning military responses to military threats from other states largely dominated both policy making and academic work on security.

A few of the “new” security threats find a ready home in the “old” security paradigm. Some analysts have pointed out that it is nothing new to think about natural resources being at the center of conflicts between countries (Ullman 1995, 10–11). Oil was of course a key reason for international involvement as recently as the 1991 Gulf War, and it is widely agreed that water disputes can generate conflict between states (Mathews 1989; Postel 1992; Gleick 1993). Along similar lines, some of the economics and security literature simply asserts the need for attention to the economic instruments of national power. Theodore Moran, for example, “focuses on three threats to America’s ability to lead or influence others, in accord with its own values, and to behave autonomously: (1) fundamental and cumulative economic decline; (2) loss of specific economic and technological capabilities; and (3) dependence on external suppliers” (1993, 2).

**PROSPECTS FOR WAR AND CONFLICT**

A large chunk of the new literature on security retains the traditional emphasis on security as dealing with prospects for war between states, but discards one or another of the pure Realist assumptions. This section deals with three general categories. The first addresses the various arguments that interstate war has become less likely due to ideological and
normative changes. The second looks at the discussion of the declining economic utility of war. The third considers new strategies for addressing traditional threats, particularly the security dilemma.

_Ideologies, Norms, and War_

One set of writings puts forward various normative and ideological reasons for expecting a decrease in the incidence of war. These include the literature on the democratic peace, the arguments around the "end of history," and the claim of the "obsolescence of major war."

**THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE**  No other body of scholarly work has had so strong an impact on policymakers as the literature on the democratic peace, which refutes the Realist assertion that a world of nation-states is inherently conflict-ridden. Drawing on Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*, Princeton professor Michael Doyle argued in 1983 that liberal states, though prone to use force against nonliberal states, have created a "peaceful union" among themselves. They refrain from fighting one another for three reasons: (1) they are not run by dictators who can resort to war on a whim; (2) their mutual benefit from trade makes them more willing to try to accommodate one another; and (3) their publics mutually recognize one another as morally just and therefore deserving of accommodation rather than hostility in the event of a conflict of interest. Thus, wars against other liberal states will not enjoy the popular support necessary to conduct wars in a constitutional state (Doyle 1983). Doyle’s articles spawned a cottage industry debating both the empirical reality and the theoretical basis for believing that democracies have not and will not go to war against one another (Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller 1995). And, as described in the “Policy” section, the argument found a warm welcome among policymakers, particularly in the United States, many of whom had felt for years that the promotion of democracy abroad served U.S. national security interests.

**THE END OF HISTORY**  Related to the democratic peace literature is the provocative argument by Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) that liberal democracy is the final ideological condition of humanity. According to Fukuyama, the Western idea of liberal democracy has triumphed and humanity’s ideological evolution has reached its end. Neither communism nor fascism remains a viable alternative ideology, and ideologies based
on religions or ethnicities lack universal appeal. Moreover, nationalism in its milder and more common incarnations is fully compatible with liberal democracy.

In the book version of his argument, Fukuyama asserts that liberal democracy is the ultimate form of political organization not only because of its demonstrated superiority in achieving economic success, but also because it satisfies the innate human need for recognition, a drive as basic as any material desire. This drive can take two forms: a desire for recognition as equal to others, or the desire for recognition as superior. The former is the best that can be achieved in a stable and peaceful world, while the latter is the root cause of much aggression and war. Because no plausible alternatives to liberal democracy could equally well satisfy the need for recognition, liberal democracy represents the final stage of human ideological evolution. While for the present, much of the world is still stuck in "history," with all its potential for violence, the spread of liberal democracy will eventually bring an end to large-scale conflict.7

The Obsolescence of Major War One scholar went well beyond the "democratic peace" perspective, arguing that war is already obsolete, at least among the "developed" countries, even if they are not liberal democracies. John Mueller wrote in the late 1980s that "the long peace since World War II is less a product of recent weaponry [i.e., the advent of nuclear weapons] than the culmination of a substantial historical process. For the last two or three centuries major war—war among developed countries—has gradually moved toward terminal disrepute because of its perceived repulsiveness and futility" (1989, 20). In other words, Mueller goes beyond the widely accepted argument that the advent of nuclear weapons deters nuclear weapons states from attacking one another. Instead, he argues that peace has become the ingrained habit of modernized countries. War has gone beyond being reprehensible to being literally unthinkable, "rejected not because it's a bad idea but because it remains subconscious and never comes off as a coherent possibility" (240).

All of these assertions have provoked controversy. The hard-core Realists, of course, dismiss them all out of hand as failing to recognize the inherently conflictual nature of the anarchical international system (see, e.g., Mearsheimer 1990a.) Beyond this, the literature has received varied responses. The democratic peace thesis is generally accounted plausible,
although some question whether the lack of war between democracies might be due to the relatively small number of democracies in the world until quite recently, or to the difficulty of defining a “democracy,” rather than to any particular peaceableness of democracies (Carothers 1997, 14). Mueller’s norm-change argument has been much less accepted, with critics noting it is impossible to disentangle the effects of the nuclear standoff from other possible causes of the long peace. Fukuyama’s “end of history” argument created another cottage industry, much of it based on a misapprehension that Fukuyama was arguing that the triumph of liberal democracy was already complete. One critic asserted that even if one accepts the claim that liberal democracy has really triumphed among the world’s major powers, old ideologies could revive, conflicts within liberalism could arise, or new and potentially conflictual ideologies could emerge. He ends on a cautionary note: “To hope for the benign end of history is human. To expect it to happen is unrealistic. To plan on it happening is disastrous” (Huntington 1989, 43).

The Economic Inutility of War

Interdependence theorists have long asserted that the neo-realist view of the world is woefully incomplete. In reality, they argue, states can and do divide functionally as well as hierarchically, specializing economically so as to profit from the gains available from trade. In other words, states can choose to become interdependent. In this view of the world as economically interdependent, states have mutual as well as competitive interests (Keohane and Nye 1989). And this mutuality of interests is being reinforced by the declining economic utility of war, as the costs of seizing territory increasingly outweigh any likely gains. With the notable exception of oil, the physical resource base that comes with additional territory has relatively little value in a knowledge-based global economy, and populations are increasingly hard for conquerors to exploit.

But, as several writers have stressed, this economic argument against war holds only for countries whose economies are actually knowledge-based rather than resource-based—i.e., countries for which the relative economic value of territory really has declined. Richard Rosecrance, for example, argues that the world is now divided into a “trading world” and a “military-territorial world,” with profoundly different interests (1986, 24). While the trading world and the military world currently coexist, the trend is in favor of the trading world, driven by military technology
(the impossibility of defending one’s population) and by the growing refusal of citizens to accept unquestioningly “the demands of the military-political and territorial world” (27). This does not mean that all war will end, as ideological conflicts may persist and rulers of unstable polities may still resort to war to try to unify their population against a common enemy. It does mean, however, that Realism describes only one of the currently existing international systems, and not one that is inevitable. Ullman makes a similar argument: “In the nonmodern societies of much of the Third World, land as such continues to be among the most valuable of assets. In advanced, industrialized states, land itself is of much less economic value than what enterprising individuals might build upon it, or the education and skills—the ‘human capital’—that the society routinely provides to them, and which they can carry in their heads wherever they go” (1991, 27).

New Strategies
During the cold war, many security thinkers believed that the nuclear revolution had undermined the ability of all states to rely solely on self-help to achieve security. Such thinking underlay arms control efforts to ameliorate the security dilemma through agreements over control of the means of destruction, a view that has been the subject of many writings on strategies and tools for avoiding war. A Brookings Institution project on cooperative security, for example, argued for the development of a broad range of tools for addressing the security dilemma. The book contended that prevention of war between states is both possible and essential, using strategies of reassurance rather than deterrence. In other words, the Realist assumption about the inherently conflictual nature of the international system could be overcome through strategies of cooperative engagement (Nolan 1994).

NEW CAUSES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT
Another perspective accepts the premise that security threats involve intergroup organized violence, but it extends the analysis to levels both smaller and larger than the state and goes beyond the Realist concepts of the balance of power and the security dilemma to encompass other sources of violent conflict. Included in this perspective are the literatures
on identity-based conflict and on the “new” or emerging issues that may increasingly prompt violence.

**Identity**

One rapidly growing set of writings argues that the causes over which groups fight are cultural rather than strategic. Its fundamental difference from traditional security thinking is the assertion that war is waged not over the interest of the state but over the identity of the group (which may or may not be synonymous with the population of a state). As one such analyst put it: “What ultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic interest. Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for” (Huntington 1993b, 194). Similarly, as a leading specialist in ethno-political conflicts has noted, “It is seriously misleading to interpret the Zapatistas as just a peasants’ movement or the Bosnian Serbs as the equivalent of a political party: They draw their strength from cultural bonds, not associational ones” (Gurr 1996, 53).

**Ethnic Conflict** The repeated failures of American and Canadian interventions to prevent or manage conflicts that have led to massacres all too reminiscent of the horrors of World War II have driven scholars and policymakers to devote a great deal of attention to “ethnic” conflict. Both the United States and Canada see such conflicts as affecting them, the United States because its unique military capabilities and position as the world’s most powerful state virtually ensure that it will be expected to contribute to the resolution of such conflicts, and Canada because of its long tradition of leadership in multilateral peacekeeping and peace-making operations.

Although many journalists and some policymakers early in the cold war years bemoaned the apparent resurgence of “ancient hatreds,” the more careful analyses of late have stripped much of the mystery from these events. Major disputes remain over what policies will work in what circumstances, but it has become clear that ethno-national conflicts are neither inevitable nor unmanageable (Gurr 1993, chap. 10).

Some of the initial confusion arose from the different meanings that can attach to nationalism. One branch of the academic literature on nationalism aims to explain the sense of political and cultural unity that
arose in Western Europe over the past three centuries and underlies the cohesiveness of nation-states there. Much of the post–World War II literature on modernization and development in the Third World similarly saw nationalism in a positive sense, as the basis of a broad civic identity that could overcome traditional communal, ethnic, religious, and other such divisions. The common usage now could hardly be more different, focusing on the resurgence of narrow ethnic and (to a lesser extent) religious identities and the bloody conflicts that have ensued. It is this latter sense that is the focus of the literature reviewed here.

Different sources give different explanations as to why recent years have witnessed such an explosion of conflict between ethnic groups. Some authors attribute the outbreak to a response to global processes of modernization, seeing existing cultural groups as squeezed by the expanding power of the state in some countries, aggrieved by the growing impact of the global economy, and benefiting from the organizational opportunities proffered by the communications revolution (Gurr 1996, 55–62). Others, particularly those specializing in the former Soviet Union, see the emergence of ethnic conflict as a power struggle resulting from the vacuum created by the collapse of the USSR. Still others note that such conflicts are hardly new to the post–cold war era, but are receiving more attention now that the nuclear sword of Damocles no longer seems so likely to drop on the world.

The urgent question in this literature, of course, is what to do about cases where people are killing each other in large numbers based on ethno-national identity. Analysts have put forward diametrically opposed solutions based on differing assumptions about the nature of ethnic conflict. The most important of these assumptions has to do with the degree to which ethno-national or other cultural identities are relatively durable, or whether they are malleable political creations.

Michael Lind (1994) is among those who assume that ethnic groups are fairly long-lasting entities. At least some of the stateless nations need to receive the legal status of statehood, he argues, because only the true nation-state is a viable political unit. He argues that the principle of nationalism can be accommodated without leading either to endless fissuring or the emergence of parochial tyrannies. In his view, there exist a reasonably small number of identifiable nations that are “numerous, unified and compact enough conceivably to serve as the nuclei of sovereign nation states,” a number much smaller than the thousands of ethnic
and linguistic groups around the globe (90). And a linguistic-cultural definition of nationality is perfectly compatible with a liberal-constitutional organization of the state, even if nationalism has too often of late been conflated with illiberalism and militarism. Indeed, he claims, only the linguistic-cultural nation can command the sentimental attachment that creates the extra-political community on which democracy depends (94). In other words, Wilsonian self-determination must be the guiding principle of international organization.

Chaim Kaufmann (1996) calls for physical separation of ethnic groups in conflict, arguing that violence hardens ethnic identities to the point that they cannot be replaced by more inclusive civic identities. Once ethnicity has become the basis of high levels of violence, no cross-ethnic political appeals can work, and no power-sharing arrangements can resolve the mutual fear and suspicion of the contending groups. Members of one group have come to fear that if they relax their vigilance, the other group might find a way to achieve victory, and would then wipe them out. The only alternatives to the permanent separation of the groups into self-governing communities are either the total military victory of one side (a very bloody prospect), or outside military occupation to suppress the conflict, which is not likely to be sustained.

Critics respond on two grounds: (1) that separating the world’s nations into territorially defined states is simply impractical, or (2) that such views fundamentally misunderstand the nature of nationalism. The pragmatic response points out that there are few places where new nation-states can be created without stranding other nations inside the new borders. In many cases, more than one nation asserts a claim to the same territorial space. And some nations are diasporas, making it difficult to carve out stable homelands for them (Gottlieb 1994).

The more fundamental objection to addressing nationalist conflict through partition, separation, or other forms of creation of new political units comes from the view that “nations” are political creations, not extant linguistic-cultural units at all. This view cites the extensive literature showing how recently—and how deliberately—even the European national identities were created (Weber 1976; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). In this view, nations “are not ‘out there’ to be counted; they are a function of social, political, and economic processes” (Laitin 1995, 5). Therefore, rewarding the political entrepreneurs who “create” a sense of nationalism in a group with political power will simply encourage more political
entrepreneurs to create new fissures, establishing themselves as the heads of new groups so that they can reap the rewards. Instead, policymakers must adopt the more long-term approach of encouraging “nations” to become cosmopolitan and internally heterogeneous, and demonstrating to ethnic entrepreneurs that the rewards of partial assimilation outweigh those of separation (13).

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS Samuel Huntington started a major new debate with a 1993 Foreign Affairs article that argued that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. . . . The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (1993a, 22). As the non-Western civilizations join the West as “movers and shapers of history,” civilization becomes the grouping that matters (23).

Civilization is a broad category, “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species,” and is defined by shared language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and subjective self-identification (Huntington 1993a, 24). The basic, fundamental divide among people that civilization constitutes has long generated “the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts,” and the tensions among civilizations will be exacerbated (1) as the shrinking world experiences more interactions among civilizations, (2) as fundamentalist religious identities grow stronger and unite civilizations across state boundaries, (3) as non-Western elites increasingly turn away from the West to seek their identities, and (4) as successful economic regionalism reinforces civilization-consciousness (and may in turn depend on starting with a common civilization) (25–27). Clashes will happen both at the micro level (occurring at the geographic borders between civilizations), and at the macro level, over policy issues ranging from human rights to immigration to trade to the environment, and over Western promotion of Western values (29).

Huntington asserts that a “kin-country” phenomenon is evolving, as groups or states belonging to one civilization try to rally support from other members of their own civilization during wars against groups from other civilizations, with increasing success. Hence the substantial Arab public support for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, Turkey’s
support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia, and the relative lack of condemnation Croatian atrocities have received from the West. This civilizational rallying is likely to spread and strengthen, and it will have the effect of rendering between-civilization conflicts bloodier and more likely to expand than conflicts within civilizations (Huntington 1993a, 35–38). Indeed, Huntington argues, “the next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations” (39).

The biggest divide of all is that of the “West versus the Rest.” Western military capabilities, economic strength, and dominance of existing institutions are so great that world politics will be defined in large part by how non-Western civilizations respond to Western power: through isolation, attempting to join the West, or by balancing against it (Huntington 1993a, 41). The West needs to recognize the growing primacy of conflict between civilizations as the dominant (though not exclusive) form of conflict. In the short term, says Huntington, the West must strengthen bonds within Western civilization and attempt to incorporate Latin American and Eastern European countries, while limiting the relative growth of Confucian-Islamic military capabilities and strengthening groups in other civilizations that are sympathetic to Western values and interests. In the longer term, the West needs not only to maintain its own relative economic and military power but also to learn how to accommodate other civilizations, based on a more profound understanding of those civilizations and the potential commonalities with the West (48–49).

Every aspect of Huntington’s argument has been attacked. Many critiques have found fault with Huntington’s specific categorization of where the current civilizational boundaries lie, but the bigger objections are to the basic premises of the argument. From a Realist perspective, Fouad Ajami argued that states as always pursue their interests—power and wealth—and remain the prime actors (1993, 2–9). Civilizations exist and persist, though they are far messier and more internally divided than Huntington acknowledged, but they do not determine state behavior. Instead, “states avert their gaze from blood ties when they need to; they see brotherhood and faith and kin when it is in their interest to do so” (Ajami 1993, 9). Similarly, Albert Weeks argues that “the world remains fractured along political and possibly geopolitical lines; cultural and historical determinants are a great deal less vital and virulent. . . . It is willful, day-to-day, crisis-to-crisis, war-to-war political decision-making by nation-state units that remains the single most identifiable determinant
of events in the international arena” (1993, 25). Wall Street Journal editor Robert L. Bartley sees the resurgence of interest in cultural, ethnic, and religious values as both provoked and countered by integrative forces: “the combination of instant information, economic interdependence and the appeal of individual freedom” (1993, 16). The Western values that Huntington sees as threatened by other civilizations may in fact be an artifact of economic development, which creates a middle class that then demands such Western values as democracy (Bartley 1993, 17). Jeane Kirkpatrick points out that the worst violence of the twentieth century occurred within civilizations (Stalin’s Russia, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, the Holocaust). She asserts that the great divide in the world today is not between civilizations, but between moderates and extremists within civilizations (Kirkpatrick 1993, 22–24).

Huntington (1993b) dismisses the criticism on the ground that no one is offering anything better as a paradigm for understanding world politics. The alternatives, he says, suffer from even greater weaknesses. The “end of history” assumption that liberal democracy has won a global victory ignores the many alternative forms and bases of political organizations (authoritarianism, nationalism, corporatism, market communism, and religions). Modernization and economic development need not have a homogenizing effect, as the successes of non-Western modern societies such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore make clear. Many current events can be explained and would have been predicted by the civilizational paradigm, and no paradigm explains everything. And finally, the civilizational paradigm has struck “a responsive chord throughout the world,” indicating that it can provide an effective means of organizing thinking about the future of security (194).

Underlying Causes of Violent Conflict

Michael Renner suggests that both the ethno-nationalism literature and Huntington’s thesis, which postulates “ethnically motivated communal violence writ large” as the primary security threat of the future, overlook the underlying causes of these conflicts (1997, 117). Where ethnic tensions exist, argues Renner, they did not arise in a vacuum. He acknowledges that animosities can to a large extent be traced to the artificially imposed state boundaries resulting from the end of colonial rule, which brought together people of the same culture, language, or ethnicity for the first time. However, he believes it is superficial to believe these conflicts stem
solely from ethnic, religious, cultural, or linguistic divisions. While these divisions may "likely dominate the perceptions of the protagonists themselves," he writes, "... it is important to examine the underlying stress factors that produce or deepen rifts in societies ..." (118). These stress factors include "glaring social and economic inequities—explosive conditions that are exacerbated by the growing pressures of population growth, resource depletion, and environmental degradation" (25). Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) notes that "failed or limited human development leads to a backlog of human deprivation—poverty, hunger, disease, or persisting disparities between ethnic communities or between regions. This backlog in access to power and economic opportunities can lead to violence" (1994, 230).

Along the same lines, Michael Klare agrees with the cultural thesis that the "most severe and persistent threats to global peace and stability" will arise "from increased discord within states, societies, and civilizations along ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, caste, or class lines," but he contends that these divisions will be seriously exacerbated by economic, demographic, sociological, and environmental stresses (1996, 354). To anticipate where violence may occur in the decades ahead, he argues, analysts will have to correlate the aforementioned cleavages with "other forms of data: economic performance, class stratification, population growth, ethnic and religious composition, environmental deterioration, and so on" (355). In other words, analyses should be reoriented "away from relations among the military forces of states ... to the underlying dynamics that can serve as the sources of interstate conflict" (Krause and Williams 1996, 235).

Of the new sources of conflict, the combination of environmental and demographic pressures has received the most attention. Jessica Mathew's 1989 article on "Redefining Security" in Foreign Affairs was the first to bring this nexus to the attention of a wide foreign policy and security audience. Since then, the most important work tracing the causal connections among population growth, renewable resource scarcities, migration, and violent conflict has been done in a series of research projects since 1990 led by Thomas Homer-Dixon. Homer-Dixon argues that "the interactions among environmental scarcity, poverty, rapid population growth, and refugee flows have foreign policy and national security implications for the United States, Canada and the other major industrial powers, insofar as these interactions: affect states with large populations
and extensive resources . . . affect states in key regions . . . and/or produce a complex humanitarian emergency where the degree of human suffering warrants international action or assistance . . .” (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996, 2–3).

Finding that environment-population-conflict links were “more common in developing regions,” Homer-Dixon’s team of more than one hundred researchers from fifteen countries made those regions the geographic focus of their work. The Toronto-based group notes that “on first analysis, the main causes of civil strife appear to be social disruptions, such as poverty, migration, ethnic tension, and institutional breakdown” but that “scarcities of renewable resources, including water, fuelwood, cropland, and fish, can contribute to these disruptions and thereby exacerbate strife” (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996, Introduction).

Environmental scarcity is said to have three sources: a diminishing of supply due to degradation or depletion of the resource; an increase in demand due to increased consumption of the resource; and structural reasons due to uneven distribution that gives “relatively few people disproportionate access to the resource” to the disadvantage of others. “Whatever its source,” says Homer-Dixon, “environmental scarcity is never the sole cause of conflict,” yet “conflict can result when scarcity powerfully interacts with economic, political, and social factors” (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996, Introduction). Scarcity “induces various social effects, including migration and economic hardship, and these social effects, in turn, contribute to conflict” (52). Homer-Dixon anticipates the number of such conflicts will rise sharply in the developing world in the decades ahead where scarcities and population pressures are expected to increase.

Homer-Dixon’s case studies demonstrate that environmental scarcities can interact with the aforementioned factors and lead to “declining agricultural production, economic hardship, migrations of people from areas of environmental stress, and tensions within and among groups.” Scarcities can also “reduce the ability of states to respond to the needs of their populations,” leading to a rise in popular grievances. And when states fail to alleviate hardship and/or dissatisfaction, there are heightened “opportunities for violent collective action” (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996, Introduction). As Renner put it, there is “considerable scope for environmental scarcities and social inequities to feed on each other” and to create “explosive conditions” (1997, 126, 118).
Homer-Dixon underscores that environmental scarcity "rarely, if ever, causes interstate war" but rather "contributes to chronic and diffuse strife within countries" (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996, Introduction). He adds, however, that civil strife can affect the international community if it occurs within a strategically or economically important region, if the afflicted country possesses weapons of mass destruction, or if the violence results in large refugee flows across international borders. Civil strife can also provoke insecure regimes to become more authoritarian, and such regimes are often more aggressive in their external relations. In addition, it can produce complex humanitarian disasters (as in Rwanda and Somalia); rich nations are then called upon to provide humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping and peacemaking services. (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996, Introduction)

At what levels and in what ways environment and population pressures contribute to conflicts remains contested. Astri Suhrke argues that "the empirical basis for current concepts of conflict-generating 'environmental refugees' is weak" (1996, 113). Other analysts doubt that environmental issues play any significant role in conflict formation. To them, antecedent political and economic variables more likely represent the necessary and sufficient conditions for violent conflict. Critics are often skeptical that researchers have been unable, or unwilling, to assign a relative weight to the environmental and population variables in conflict formation. In addition, critics warn against reaching conclusions until research better explains cases in which environmental scarcities are present but violent conflict does not occur (Levy 1995).

Homer-Dixon acknowledges that when environmental scarcity causes conflict, "it does so only in interaction with other political, economic, and social factors" (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996, 52). But he adds that just because one cannot separate the causal role of environmental scarcities from other political, economic, and social contextual factors "does not mean that environmental scarcity is not an important cause of conflict in some cases"(52). He claims that many critics underestimate the social stress caused by environmental scarcity because they are unaware of just how dependent developing-country citizens are on natural resources for their daily existence. Furthermore, environmental scarcity "often reciprocally influences the political and economic character of social systems
—for example, when it stimulates resource capture by powerful social coalitions and elites" (53). And if environmental degradation becomes irreversible, the degradation will remain "an independent burden on the society" thus permanently contributing to social conflict. Finally, Homer-Dixon warns against placing too much faith in societies' abilities to adapt to resource scarcity through market mechanisms, legal reforms, and technological innovation. He contends that in many developing societies experiencing scarcities, the "prerequisites for effective adaptation" often do not exist; instead, these societies are plagued by incompetent bureaucracies, unclear property rights, lack of incentives for entrepreneurs, and low levels of education, technical capacity, and financial capital. In fact, scarcities "can actually undermine the ability of developing societies to generate social and technical solutions" because they often "cause . . . narrow vested interests to mobilize to protect their interests and to block institutional reforms" (53). 

THE ROLE OF THE STATE

One of the biggest challenges to traditional security thinking questions the utility of conceptualizing security in state-centric terms, given the "crisis of the nation-state." This strikes at the core of traditional security thinking. As one analyst puts it:

For most of the past four hundred years, security has been intimately associated with the state. It has long (though not exclusively) meant "protection from organized violence caused by armed foreigners." Since "foreign" implies a person who is "not like us," and since territorially-based states (or nation-states) emerged in Europe after 1648 as the dominant organizing principle for separating "us from them," security's identification with the state is not surprising. . . . [T]he state became not only the chief provider of security, but also its chief interpreter; for much of history, "security" simply meant what the rulers said it meant. (Del Rosso 1995, 183)

But whether the state still has the capacity to define and provide security in an era of rising interdependence is now open to question. Many writers have argued that nations should be concerned about the environmental, demographic, and economic forces discussed in previous sections because of their potentially detrimental effects on state authority,
national economic strength, and stability. Some writers see a widespread change in the role of the state. Barber (1995) argues that the nation-state is threatened from without by the forces of McWorld (the globalizing capitalist economy), and from within by Jihad, as people turn to particularistic ethnic or religious communities in search of identities being stripped away from them by McWorld. Similarly, Guéhenno (1995) says that the territorial nation-state is being overwhelmed from without by transnational networks based on information technology and from within by ethnic divisions (see also Dunn 1995; Horsman and Marshall 1994). And Mathews points to "a novel redistribution of power among states, markets, and civil society," with states forced to share "political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty" with businesses, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (1997, 50).

Although these trends have obvious relevance to discussions of human well-being (or "human security," as described in the section by that name), this section is limited to the following arguments: (1) domestic determinants of national strength and security (a strong economy, an educated workforce, etc.) are growing in importance relative to military strength; (2) global interdependence is gradually eroding the effectiveness of state instruments of power, necessitating an alternative approach to state- and military-centered response mechanisms to nontraditional security issues; (3) domestic challenges and transnational issues, such as natural resource scarcities, rapid urbanization, and crime, may increasingly weaken states' capacity to govern, harm national economies, limit the range of policy choices available, erode unifying or cherished national values, and potentially lead to anarchic conditions; and (4) interdependence—coupled with the intensity, rate, and scale of many global issues—means that one country's problems are increasingly likely to spill over into other nations.

State Capacity in the Developing World

Much of the literature argues that many developed societies will be able to cope with such forces, but that developing nations will often become overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude and rate of change—especially of population growth. As Mathews put it, "A government that is fully capable of providing food, housing, jobs and health care for a population growing at 1 percent per year (therefore doubling its population in 72 years), might be completely overwhelmed by an annual growth rate of
3 percent, which would double the population in 24 years” (1989, 164). Homer-Dixon adds that the “multiple effects of environmental scarcity, including economic decline and large population movements, may weaken the administrative capacity and legitimacy of the state in some poor countries” (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996, 8). State capacity, he notes, is already weak in many of these countries that are marked by a “persistent and serious ingenuity gap” (Homer-Dixon 1995, 605). Homer-Dixon concludes that the “widening gap between the demands on the state and state capacity to address these demands aggravates popular grievances against the state, erodes the state's legitimacy, and increases rivalries among powerful factions. . . . The state may then find itself vulnerable to violent challenges by groups whose power or identities have been enhanced by the very same scarcity” (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996, 8–9).

Renner similarly argues that when the aforementioned pressures are accompanied “by weak, nonrepresentative political systems that are increasingly seen as illegitimate and incapable of attending to people’s needs,” the result can be “the wholesale fragmentation of societies” (1997, 118). In some countries, this manifests itself in “generalized lawlessness and banditry—whether by marauding ex-soldiers (in several African nations), drug cartels (in Colombia), or various forms of organized crime (in Russia)” (22). James Rosenau termed those countries plagued by these phenomena “adrift nation-states” (1994, 266). As summarized by Renner, Rosenau explained that in these countries “the economy is being depleted; the state is unable to provide anything like adequate services to its citizens; grievances are disregarded and political dissent is repressed; the social fabric is unraveling; and the political system is unable to cope with growing tensions among different ethnic groups, regions, and classes, or it plays different groups off against each other in an effort to prolong its rule” (Renner 1996, 22–23).

In February 1994, journalist Robert Kaplan popularized the idea that the environment would play an increasingly determining role in states’ capacity to govern and in generating political instability, conflict, and anarchy. In an Atlantic Monthly article titled “The Coming Anarchy,” he identified the environment as the national security issue of the early twenty-first century. Kaplan lauded Thomas Homer-Dixon’s work on environment and conflict and suggested that “our post–Cold War foreign policy will one day be seen to have had its beginning” in Homer-Dixon’s
“bold” and “detailed” 1991 article in International Security (Kaplan 1994, 58). The article’s cover page summed up Kaplan’s controversial “preview of the first decades of the twenty-first century,” predicting that nations would “break up under the tidal flow of refugees from environmental and social disaster.” Borders would “crumble,” diseases would spread, wars would be “fought over scarce resources,” and war would become “continuous with crime” (cover).

Kaplan expanded his treatment of these issues in a 1996 book entitled The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century. In it, Kaplan defended his thesis that troubled developing countries would increasingly export their misery to other parts of the world. But he also admitted, “The more I saw of the world, the less I felt I could fit it into a pattern” (In Kennedy 1996, 21). Paul Kennedy’s review of the book echoed the conventional wisdom that emerged after the Atlantic Monthly article. While Kennedy found Kaplan’s work “serious,” “formidable,” and “important,” he also called it “troublesome and most uneven.” Though critical of Kaplan’s methodology and “habit of generalizing from a limited number of cases,” Kennedy nonetheless agreed that “demographic and environmental pressures building up in certain parts of the globe are weakening their social systems so much that we may well see more and more of what he called ‘collapsed states’—including some very large countries—in the years to come. The effects of deep poverty, population growth, pollution, and corrupt, selfish government, as well as, in some cases, fanatical fundamentalism, could cause more than a few societies to break apart” (20).

Kennedy, writing with Robert Chase and Emily Hill, similarly asserted in Foreign Affairs months earlier that “the threats” to many “pivotal” states in the developing world are “overpopulation, migration, environmental degradation, ethnic conflict, and economic instability, all phenomena that traditional security forces find hard to address” (Chase et al. 1996, 36). This echoed Kennedy’s earlier assertions made in Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (Kennedy 1993).

State Capacity in Developed Countries

Although rich countries tend to have stronger institutions, many writers voice concern over the relationship between the aforementioned trends and the capacities of even stable and wealthy states to manage change. Two basic themes are discernible. First is the argument that growing
global interdependence has rendered rich countries increasingly vulnerable to spillover from the kinds of developing-country problems cited above. Second, a large number of North American writings have argued that the stability, strength, and cohesion of even developed countries like the United States and Canada may increasingly be affected by domestic issues such as economic competitiveness, crime, drugs, and poverty.

Allen Hammond has argued that "as the world becomes ever more connected, instability in one place can have devastating effects elsewhere." He notes that the "emerging security threats"—including terrorism, crime, large-scale population movements, and social instability—will "challenge the capacity of states to govern, of nature to provide, and of societies to cope." He continues: "The wealthy industrial nations of the west may be spared the direct impact of some of these novel security threats, but not all. In an increasingly integrated world, misery is often easily exported, and the economic and social costs of conflict and instability are likely to be widely shared" (Hammond forthcoming, ms. chap. 8, 101, 103).

On a similar note, journalist Jeffrey Goldberg argues that "there is a whole new set of what might be called biological national-security issues: environmental destruction, explosive population growth, the rapid spread of disease and the emergence of entirely new diseases." While it may be obvious how these forces hurt places like Africa, Goldberg suggests that the age of "porous borders and transcontinental flights" make it more likely that diseases will be "exported" from the developing world. And the problem stems not just from existing diseases; many believe the worst is yet to come from unknown pathogens, with some envisioning the "existence of a 'doomsday' virus ... lurking somewhere in the rain forests of Central America" (Goldberg 1997, 35).

In the second category, many writers making the case for linking domestic concerns with security have invoked the words of Eisenhower, who warned Americans not to "undermine from within that which we are seeking to protect from without" (Peterson and Sebenius 1992, 58–59). And the final report of the seventy-ninth American Assembly concluded that many domestic U.S. problems, if left unattended, "could eventually threaten the [U.S.] ability to defend [itself] in traditional military terms. . . . [I]t is mistaken to think of a 'zero-sum' trade-off between America's international and its domestic agendas. The two must be addressed together" (Allison and Treverton 1992, 448–449).
According to Peter Peterson, the National Security Council in the 1950s clearly included domestic threats in its mandate: "to preserve the United States as a free nation with our fundamental institutions and values intact" (Peterson and Sebenius 1992, 57). To Peterson, this goal "implied a combination of military, political, and economic objectives" (57). He argues that the "concept of national security has historically encompassed domestic threats, such as armed insurrections" (58). He continues: "For some time, it has been clear that U.S. national security interests must include the development of policies that will increase our economic strength and domestic stability. Now, I believe a new definition of national security that recalls the vision of 1947—and augments it with more forceful economic and domestic policy components—is urgently needed. Indeed, I suspect that no foreign challenge of the 1990s will affect America's security as much as what we do, or fail to do . . . " (58).

Peterson argues that a country’s failure to address priorities such as investing in productive capacity, research and development, infrastructure, education, and the exploding underclass "may entail a progressive loss both of political will and economic capacity to take actions abroad that promote our real national security interests" (Peterson and Sebenius 1992, 59). To him, military and economic security over time depend on each other: "Countries that lose control of their economic destinies lose control over their foreign policies" (61). He suggests that if the United States is economically weak, it will lack the necessary resources to sustain or defend its various national interests and global obligations. Furthermore, "perceptions of relative U.S. economic decline could well mark a psychological turning point in others' perception of our long-term ability to back allies and oppose enemies, of our vulnerability, and of our unreliability" (66).

But other analysts have noted that national economic security is hard to define, much less promote. As Barry Buzan (1991) reasons, since market economies depend on insecurity of actors (the threat of bankruptcy) to operate efficiently, what can "economic security" mean? He provides two sets of answers. First, the state depends on domestic economic capacity both to achieve international status and to provide the resources for state functions (including military). Second, in developed states "the concern is that because socio-political structures have come to depend on sustained growth rates and functional specialization, domestic political stability may be undermined by disturbances in the economic system as
a whole" (Buzan 1991, 129). Yet, Buzan cautions, incorporating economic threats into national security considerations remains problematic:

Economic threats do resemble an attack on the state, in the sense that conscious external actions by others result in material loss, strain on various institutions of the state, and even substantial damage to the health and longevity of the population. The parallel with a military attack cannot be sustained, however, because while a military attack crosses a clear boundary between peaceful and aggressive behaviour, an economic “attack” does not. Aggressive behaviour is normal in economic affairs, and risks of loss are part of the price that has to be paid to gain access to opportunities for gain. (130)

Some threats to state capacity, such as the increasingly prevalent drug and crime problems, originate from both domestic and global sources, pose unprecedented challenges, and make effective government responses more difficult. Paul Stares does not frame the drug challenge specifically in “security” language, but notes that the expanding global drug market poses threats of great concern “to the integrity and legitimacy of governments and public institutions, as well as to the prosperity and stability of communities” (Stares 1996, 8). Similarly, Senator John Kerry, invoking the language of battle in The New War, argues that the new “enemy” is global crime. To Kerry, multinational criminal gangs enjoy enormous power—so much so that at times they even dictate the actions of governments, thus affecting other nations. “We may not think it’s an all-out war, but they do,” he adds, arguing for an “international crusade . . . just as we led the world in the fight against” communism (Kerry 1997 in Feldstein 1997, 54, emphasis added).

These kinds of arguments are not new to American policy. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan signed a secret directive that “identified the illegal [drug] traffic as a national security threat and authorised the Department of Defense to engage in numerous antidrug operations” (Romm 1993, 9). Reagan’s “war on drugs” provoked debate over whether the U.S. drug problem is a national security issue that can be solved by military means. The security parlance used regarding drugs evoked the same kinds of concerns raised by environmentalists when discussing the potential role of the military in environmental protection.12 To some skeptics, “employing a strategic-military rationale to deal with the drug problem leads,
and has led, to an interventionist attitude and policy which places national sovereignty in great jeopardy” (Tokatlian 1988 in Romm 1993, 11). Efforts could “inadvertently foster abuses of human rights . . . and/or . . . strengthen the military at the expense of the civilian government, thus undermining the authority of already beleaguered democratic governments” (Perl 1990 in Romm 1993, 11).

Romm believes that domestic drug consumption is a societal ill that is not usefully defined as a national security problem. To him, only international drug trafficking, “insofar as it supports terrorism and threatens the stability of nations that Washington considers to be of strategic importance, [falls] within the realm of traditional security problems”—even then not on the same order of traditional threats like nuclear proliferation (Romm 1993, 14). Others worrying about indirect effects on national values, political stability, economic strength, and so forth like Peterson would probably argue that rising domestic drug use is indeed a security issue.

The increasingly blurred distinction between domestic and global issues complicates redefining security arguments. Romm believes, for example, that “no single issue demonstrates the interconnectedness of the new security discussions better than energy” because it is related to: (1) “strategic” U.S. interests because of oil dependency and vulnerability to disruptions in supply; (2) environmental interests because of energy’s relationship to global warming; and (3) economic interests because oil imports affect the U.S. trade deficit (1993, 37). Romm notes that the oil shock of 1973 “caused many to accept energy security and economic security as key components of national security” (37). In response to some critics’ arguments, Romm asserts that it is “incongruous to argue that environmental and economic threats facing the nation are not legitimate security threats merely because they are long-term dangers that require long-term approaches” (99).

**HUMAN SECURITY**

Perhaps the most fundamental disagreement in the “redefining security” literature is over whose security should be the object of security policy: that of the state (as in traditional national security thinking) or that of the individual. The former view assumes that an effective state is the sine qua non of security for all citizens, the alternative being the violence and
chaos the world has witnessed in such failed states as Somalia. The latter view, which focuses on “human” rather than “national” security, includes two sets of people: (1) those arguing that it is in our common interest to promote collective action for all, and all citizens of the world matter equally; and (2) those arguing that each national government should increasingly worry about nonmilitary threats to its citizens’ health and well-being—i.e., their human security—but not concern itself with the same threats to the citizens of other lands.

Many of the writers cited here have also argued that their issues are relevant to organized violence or state capacity, but they are treated more extensively in this section because their contributions are widely associated with a more fundamental challenge to traditional notions of security. Many of their arguments focus on the well-being of individuals. In recent decades, a growing number of “scholar activists” have characterized various phenomena such as environmental degradation, population growth, economic threats, and some domestic problems as security issues because they directly threaten significant numbers of people. These threats have been characterized as “presenting an existential threat to human survival and the earth’s ecosystem, not just to survival of the state or the state system” (Del Rosso 1995, 185). Promoting more holistic or “redefined” conceptions of security that extend beyond protecting the state from external aggression, these writers have argued that nonmilitary threats can seriously threaten human health and well-being (including values) and/or economic security. Critics have dismissed these writers for trying to move security conceptions away from the fundamental notion of “protection from organized violence.” Daniel Deudney, for example, states that it is “analytically misleading to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat, because the traditional focus of national security—interstate violence—has little in common with either environmental problems or solutions” (1990, 461). In response, those favoring broadened security conceptions would argue that all actors—not only states—should guard against nonmilitary risks for the same reason they protect against organized violence: because these dangers have the capacity to “cause harm to human, material, and natural resources on a potentially large and disruptive scale” (Del Rosso 1995, 189).

One of the first writers to make the conceptual linkage of nonmilitary threats and security was Lester Brown in his 1977 “Redefining National
Security” paper that cited a plethora of environmental threats to the planet and to human well-being. As Stephen Del Rosso has observed, Brown’s failure to speak the language of more traditional security analysts limited the appeal of his argument to “preaching to the converted” (1995, 185–186). In 1983, Richard Ullman argued for analyzing “security” in terms of how to measure the incremental value of expenditures aimed at addressing differing harms to society, harms that could include restrictions on the availability of resources, “a drastic deterioration of environmental quality,” or urban violence possibly resulting from immigration (134–135). Norman Myers followed with “Environment and Security” in Foreign Policy in 1989. But it was not until Jessica Mathews published “Redefining Security” in the more widely read 1989 Foreign Affairs in a “radically changed geopolitical climate” that the appeal to incorporate environmental, demographic, and other factors into security thinking was made “more palatable and accessible” (Del Rosso 1995, 187).

Since then, writings on human security have abounded, as have statements by U.S. policymakers on the need to think of security more in human terms. Mathews contends that there is a growing sense that individuals’ security “may not in fact reliably derive from their nation’s security. A competing notion of ‘human security’ is creeping around the edges of official thinking, suggesting that security be viewed as emerging from the conditions of daily life, . . . rather than flowing downward from a country’s foreign relations and military strength” (1997, 51). To Michael Renner, this broader conception of human security “entails such seemingly disparate concerns as peace, environmental protection, human rights and democratization, and social integration. Concerns about human security are in a sense as old as human history, yet they are now magnified by the unprecedented scale of environmental degradation, by the presence of immense poverty in the midst of extraordinary wealth, and by the fact that social, economic, and environmental challenges are no longer limited to particular communities and nations” (1997, 116).

At its broadest interpretation, the 1994 United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report defines the components of “human security” as economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, communal security, and political security. To the UNDP, this means addressing a range of “global challenges to human security,” including population growth, disparities in
economic opportunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and international terrorism (UNDP 1994).

In discussing environmental issues as “new security threats,” Ian Rowlands argues that these issues are unique from other security problems because they are genuinely global in scope and are not initiated deliberately by foreign actors. He believes there are, however, useful analogies to traditional threats: “Any force that had the power to inflict such harm upon a state—kill some of its citizens and displace others, reduce its agricultural output, threaten its water supply, and destabilize its ecological balance—would be received with considerable attention. . . . just because these particular challenges are not being issued and controlled by a national leader does not mean that they should be ignored. Indeed, the fact that they are beyond such control makes them all the more threatening and ominous” (Rowlands 1991, 103).

Other writers discussing nonmilitary issues have invoked security language to win attention for their issues and/or to propose new paradigms altogether whose end goal is addressing their priority issue for its own sake. On environmental issues, for example, Hugh Dyer writes: “Environmental security and national security are alternative values, arising in the context of alternative world-views. If the case is made for adopting a global perspective, environmental security could stand as a universal value on which more localised environmental policy could be properly founded. If traditional inter-state perspectives hold sway, there is little chance of environmental security becoming any more than an addendum to the traditional politico-military security agenda” (1996, 37).

Dyer’s arguments reflect other writings that emerge “more from the idealist rather than the realist tradition” and often carry with them “the normative objective of replacing coercion, conflict, and war in the international system with cooperation, bargaining, and peaceful change” (Shultz, Godson, and Greenwood 1993, 2). Dyer, for example, asserts as a given that “interdependence is already widely accepted as the baseline for international relations,” and “shared values such as environmental security are more salient than the particularistic interests . . . of the individual nation states” (1996, 31). To Dyer, the environment has become “the manifestation of new political values and norms as [an end result] of the Cold War experience” (1996, 31). Renner has similarly argued that “environmental security” is superior to “military security” because it is “positive and inclusive” and seeks to “protect or to restore” (1989 in Levy
This kind of logic has prompted critics like Marc Levy to state that "environmental security" is often "nothing more than a shorthand for outcomes favored by certain environmentalists" who use the security rubric as a "rhetorical attention-getter" (1995, 44).

For many of these writers, the core of the argument (not to mention the impetus behind making the argument in the first place) is to change dramatically the ways and means through which we respond to important nonmilitary issues. The priority issues at hand are, more often than not, long term in nature, unintended, and not able to be solved through military institutions' involvement or the use of force. On the environment, Mathews described in 1989 the need for "a new diplomacy and for new institutions and regulatory regimes to cope with the world's growing environmental interdependence" (174).

Many proponents of these ideas therefore argue against the disproportionately large amount of resources and power allocated to military institutions vis-à-vis institutions addressing nonmilitary and human development issues. According to Renner, "the military absorbs substantial resources that could help reduce the potential for violent conflict if invested in health care, housing, education, poverty eradication, and environmental sustainability" (1996, 30). In addition, these writers stress that cooperation among nations will be pivotal in solving many nonmilitary threats.

Critics of redefining security to include threats to well-being do not dispute the important connections between such issues as environment, health, and economics. They disagree, however, with the characterization of environmental, social, and economic issues as security concerns, and argue that environmentally related health and well-being issues are fundamentally different from military threats. Deudney asserts that the fashionable trend to link environment with security "risks creating a conceptual muddle rather than a paradigm or world view shift" and prompts a "de-definition rather than a re-definition of security." If one includes "all the forces and events that threaten life, property and well-being ... as threats to our national security, we shall soon drain the term of any meaning" (Deudney 1990, 465). Rather than co-opting an existing term or idea, Deudney believes, like Dyer, that the environmental movement can become the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization (469).

Concerned that the definition for "security" will become overly broad
and “meaningless in an operational sense,” Kenneth Keller argues that analysts should focus on identifying threats to well-being “that may lead to traditional security problems and those that can be responded to most effectively by military organizations” (1996, 11). In his essay on the need to “unpack” the notion of the environment, he adds: “By avoiding the temptation to label a confusingly broad category of problems with a ready-made, if slightly ill-fitting, title, we may actually contribute to a larger goal: seeing our vital interests as something broader than national security and the tools available to us to protect those vital interests as necessarily more nuanced than military action” (11).

Other critics have raised the concern that combining environment and security will have the unintended and inappropriate effect of “securitizing” environmental issues. Expressing a pessimism about the ability to change existing security institutions and mindsets, these observers think a militarization of approaches to the environment is more likely than a greening of security. According to this perspective, specific departments and agencies (and environmental nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) are employing the honorific term of “security” only to win more attention and funding for environmental priorities (Dabelko and Simmons 1997, 131–132, 138). As Deudney argues, environmentalists need to challenge, not try to become integrated into, the “chronic militarization of public discourse.” Environmental degradation is “not a threat to national security” but rather a “threat to ‘national security’ mindsets” (Deudney 1999, 475).

Astri Suhrke likewise urges caution when putting migration issues under the security rubric. Suhrke has observed that some analysts have already “established primary connotations” with words like “enemy” and “defense.” Migrants and refugees have become “threats rather than victims or assets”—even when authors like Myron Weiner have “differentiated between types of ‘threats’ and actual versus perceived danger” (Suhrke 1996, 115). Suhrke explains that “this does not necessarily mean that the security paradigm is inappropriate for migration and environment issues, only that its applicability in relation to the empirical material must be assessed with great care” (115).

To Del Rosso, what distinguished the writings on the “new gospel of security” from earlier appeals on nontraditional issues was “their pretension for filling the conceptual vacuum left in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet threat and the end of the Cold War” (1995, 189). In addition,
a common thread in many of these analyses was the "recognition that any attempt to redefine the field must entail a clear articulation of both the object and scope of the inquiry" (r87). But despite the greater receptivity to these reconceptualizations of security, Del Rosso observes that these writings did not produce a "singular, widely-accepted new paradigm"; instead, an "additive 'laundry list' approach to security became commonplace" and led to the production of a "raft of dimly remembered and rarely consulted" books and articles (r90).

Paul Kennedy, writing with Robert Chase and Emily Hill, extends his criticism to an enormous and diverse group of individuals writing on redefining security, calling "inadequate" the "new interpretation of security, with its emphasis on holistic and global issues" (Chase et al. 1996, 36). One assumes that the writers to which they are referring include those who advocate on behalf of global issues plus those who discuss the relevance of "new" or "nontraditional" issues to conflict, state capacity, economic, and other issues. Kennedy, Chase, and Hill note that many "new" security thinkers are "opposed to invoking the national interest to further their cause," and make the point that the "universal approach common to many advocates of global environmental protection or human rights, commendable in principle, does not discriminate between human rights abuses in Haiti, where proximity and internal instability made intervention possible and even necessary, and similar abuses in Somalia, where the United States had few concrete interests" (36).

They conclude that "neither the old nor the new approach will suffice," so they propose instead a "pivotal states" strategy that would have the United States focus its efforts on a small number of countries whose future will "profoundly affect their surrounding regions" (Chase et al. 1996, 36, 33). This, they believe, would integrate the "new security issues into a traditional, state-centered framework" while making some "long-term consequences of the new security threats more tangible and manageable" and confirming "the importance of working chiefly through state governments" (37).

POLICY

Both Canadians and Americans have been prominent in virtually all aspects of the conceptual debate over rethinking security, and this chapter makes no attempt to divine specific "Canadian" or "American" schools of
thought. In the policy arena, however, where countries determine how national budgets will be allocated, it is logical to separate the analysis on national grounds. Canada and the United States face many of the same questions and problems: severe budget constraints fostered by the need to cut the deficit, uncertainty about their appropriate roles in the world, and disagreement over what constitutes vital national interests. There are differences, of course, most notably in the far greater support in Canadian policy circles for multilateral organizations. But what is most striking is the considerable similarities in the policy pronouncements. The two governments have come up with similar tripartite themes for their increasingly blended foreign/security policy frameworks. While both list issues such as migration, drugs, and environmental degradation as serious concerns, the emphasis is on traditional security concerns, economic competitiveness, and democracy and democratic values. And in both, the change in rhetoric outweighs the minor, though not insignificant, operational changes, which are constrained by demands to limit governmental spending.

\textit{Canadian Policy}

Canada has carried out an active and structured policy debate on rethinking security, involving academia, the NGO community, and the government. This debate has taken the form of special parliamentary committees, national discussion forums, and governmental white papers on foreign policy and defense. From these has emerged what appears to be a consensus on a broadened definition of security at the rhetorical level, with some modest operational implications.

Both the rhetoric and the policy changes need to be understood in the context of the history of Canadian security thinking and policy (Stairs 1994). During the decades of the cold war, Canada had a peculiar problem. Given its location, it was fated to be defended by the United States, whether or not (as Canadians wryly pointed out) it wanted to be. Given the vast disparities in power between the two countries, Canada had an incentive to deal with the United States as much as possible through multilateral rather than bilateral means. Hence, while maintaining independent military forces to protect its own territory, Canada strongly championed the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and played a major role in the United Nations. Its leadership in
the creation and implementation of UN peacekeeping remains a source of considerable national pride.

Nineteen ninety-four was the peak year for rethinking security in Canada, when five major reports appeared. First was that of the National Forum on Canada’s International Relations, the first in what became an annual series of such fora involving Canadians from various walks of life in discussions with the ministers of foreign affairs, trade, and defense (Pettigrew and Stein 1994). Their report emphasized that Canada faces a dramatically different kind of security environment. The threat of direct attack on our territory and on our allies is no longer immediate. The principal threats to Canada’s security come from forces that threaten global security: demographic pressures; environmental degradation; poverty; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; ethnic and regional wars; and instability in the territories of the former Soviet Union. The adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is directly relevant to Canada’s international relations. The new global challenges require new policies, new instruments, and a different distribution of resources. (Pettigrew and Stein 1994)

Next came Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century, produced by the Canada 21 Council (1994), an ad hoc group that aimed to promote an informed public debate on the changing nature of Canadian security. It defined Canada’s security in terms of protecting the two core Canadian values of civility and community, and saw threats to these core values from such sources as the “unprecedented conjunction of demographic, economic and environmental stresses” facing the world (1994, 25). The report argued that the end of the cold war gave Canada a new opportunity to reclaim sovereignty long subordinated to the superpower conflict, but cautioned that “grave new threats to Canadian sovereignty and security cannot be addressed in Canada by Canadians alone” (11). It urged that Canada reorganize and redeploy its resources to focus on taking preventive action to address the sources of conflict, and on strengthening Canada’s capacity to contribute to the multilateral peacekeeping and peacebuilding needed when preventive action fails.

The Canada 21 report helped set the agenda for the two special joint parliamentary committees reviewing foreign and defense policies. The
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy came out with its report, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*, in November 1994. It defined the threats to Canadian security as emerging from such global problems as population, poverty, pollution, and weapons proliferation, and the interactions among them. As the report argued,

Pressure on resources may result from population growth and may be exacerbated by growing disparity between rich and poor. Accumulated environmental degradation may make matters worse. That in turn may lead to reduced agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement and disruption of the social fabric. The resulting desperation is a breeding ground for violence. These conditions are often combined with lack of democratic norms, abuse of human rights and mistreatment of minorities, which also carry the seeds of violence. Instabilities in any of these fields may lead to the use or threat of force or the risk of war; conversely, armed conflict may well have an impact on one or more of these fields. (Special Joint Committee of the Senate 1994, 11)

But the report cautioned that recognizing the reality of the connections between security and policies on environment, trade, and development assistance should not lead to confusion over which policy instruments to use in specific situations. Traditional instruments should be reserved for traditional security threats involving the threat or use of force. To “ensure that the various elements of security are addressed in an integrated manner,” the committee recommended the establishment of a high-level government mechanism, such as a cabinet committee, along with a restructuring of the relevant Standing Committees of Parliament (Special Joint Committee of the Senate 1994, 13).

The committee also warned against worrying excessively about security labels like collective, cooperative, and common security. “The task is collective—all states to agree to renounce the use or threat of force among themselves and to assist any member under attack. The methods must be cooperative—seeking through multilateral methods to work with others, not against them. And the results should be shared in common—security as one dimension of the ‘global commons’” (Special Joint Committee of the Senate 1994, 12).

The government responded to the parliamentary report in early 1995.
with two documents: the “Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy” and a foreign policy statement entitled “Canada in the World.” Both define three central foreign policy objectives: promoting prosperity and employment; protecting Canadian security within a stable global framework; and projecting Canadian values and culture. These endorsed the committee’s call for a broader concept of security that included “recognition of threats to stability, democracy and sustainable development as well as the threats posed by such factors as environmental degradation, overpopulation, involuntary population movements and organized international crime” (“Government Response” 1995, 5). The government announced that it would create a new senior-level office for global issues in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to help bring greater coherence to the government’s capacity for addressing internationally such issues.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defense Policy, in its report *Security in a Changing World*, argued that the Canadian Forces have had four tasks: the protection of Canada’s territorial sovereignty and security; the defense of North America in cooperation with the United States; the maintenance of collective security in Europe through participation in NATO; and participation in multilateral peace operations. While the end of the cold war has reduced the relative significance of the second and third of these tasks, the protection of sovereignty and participation in multilateral peace operations have become more important and more complex. New threats to Canadian territorial sovereignty include such problems as “drug smuggling, the destruction of fish stocks by foreign over-fishing; illegal migration, and new sources of terrorism,” all areas in which the Canadian Forces have been playing an increasing role (Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defense Policy 1994, 8–9). On the multilateral front, “For Canada, the search for multilateral ways to encourage peace and preserve stability is not an option—it is an essential element of our national interest and of our foreign policy” (12).

The government’s response took the form of a defense white paper. This listed such problems as population growth, environmental degradation, refugees, failed states, and weapons proliferation as international security concerns, but noted that the need for fiscal restraint (with debt servicing accounting for some 27 percent of the total federal budget) had already led to significant cuts in defense spending, and more would be
needed. The white paper stressed that the Canadian Forces would play several roles at home: peacetime surveillance and control of Canadian territory; fisheries protection (including, if absolutely necessary, enforcement action beyond the 200-mile exclusive fishing zone); environmental surveillance in cooperation with the Department of the Environment; disaster relief; and search and rescue. Abroad, Canada would continue its close cooperation with the United States and would increase its already strong participation in multilateral peace operations. To pursue the latter aim, Canada would reconfigure its defense forces to increase the relative weight of land combat and combat support forces.

**U.S. Policy**

Policy pronouncements regarding post–cold war American security policy have increasingly blurred the distinction between “security” and other U.S. national interests. Readers of the White House’s annual *National Security Strategy*, a document mandated by Congress to set forth America’s security policy, have come to expect more of an indication of overall U.S. foreign policy directions than a clear rendering of security priorities. The 1997 Strategy sets a few overarching priority objectives: (1) to enhance security with effective diplomacy and with military forces; (2) to bolster America’s economic prosperity; and (3) to promote democracy abroad (White House 1997). The latter two objectives sound more like part of a foreign policy mission statement than a security strategy. Indeed, the document’s discussion of “threats” and other priority issues ends up including just about every major foreign policy issue of the day. The document clearly and understandably endeavors to broaden the strategy’s appeal to diverse constituencies that support international engagement. But it also reflects the administration’s inability, and unwillingness, to set priorities among the myriad issues described in the Strategy. Meanwhile, even though the nontraditional issues are certainly gaining attention within the security and foreign policy establishment, the institutions and budget outlays that drive policy have not yet fundamentally changed.

As in previous administrations’ Strategy documents, Clinton’s identifies his No. 1 priority as enhancing security. The document’s emphasis remains on protection against military-related threats, instability, and arms control. The military is of paramount importance, and the Clinton administration is “committed to ensuring that this military capability is not
compromised” (White House 1996, Preface). The Strategy also places familiar emphasis on the importance of building alliances and maintaining stability.

But what differs from previous administrations’ Strategy documents is the increased emphasis given in the “Enhancing Security” section to non-traditional threats and/or “new” sources of instability. The Bush administration tended to describe many such issues as threats to democracy promotion and human and economic well-being, more clearly separating them from what were implicitly considered more serious military-related threats (White House 1988-1992). In contrast, the 1997 Strategy document more prominently includes many “new” threats early on in the document, breaking down “threats to U.S. interests” into three categories: (i) “regional or state-centered threats,” including deliberate acts of aggression against the United States or its allies and spillover effects of other sources of instability; (ii) “transnational threats,” including “terrorism, the illegal drug trade, illegal arms trafficking, international organized crime, uncontrolled refugee migrations, and environmental damage” that “threaten American interests and citizens, both directly and indirectly”; and (iii) “threats from weapons of mass destruction” by other nations and/or nongovernment actors. The language in the 1996 report of the secretary of defense to Congress uses just as broad a definition of “threats” as the Strategy and includes discussion of virtually all the same issues (Department of Defense, 1996).

The second component of the U.S. security strategy is bolstering America’s economic prosperity. The Strategy argues that U.S. “economic and security interests are inextricably linked” because the “strength of our diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military, the attractiveness of our values abroad—all depend in part on the strength of our economy” (White House 1997, 14–15). That economics are so central to Clinton’s security strategy in part reflects America’s increasing attention to domestic concerns. But it also reflects continuity in U.S. Strategy documents dating back to the Reagan years, as even then economic objectives were cited as key. Mutually reinforcing the economic strategy, according to the administration, is an emphasis on democratic “enlargement”—the third objective of Clinton’s security strategy. While an emphasis on democracy promotion in foreign policy is nothing new in U.S. foreign policy, what is significant is its explicit incorporation into security thinking—reflecting the adoption of academic arguments that democracies
are less threatening to other democracies. As a presidential candidate in 1992, Clinton announced that “no national security issue is more urgent than securing democracy’s triumph around the world” (Smith 1994, 320). And his Strategy argues that democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners, and are far less likely to wage war on one another” (White House 1996, 2, emphasis added).

The increasingly forceful rhetoric on nontraditional issues has been accompanied by some institutional and attitudinal changes in the executive branch. Soon after the election of President Clinton, the administration signaled its interest in “new” security issues by creating several new offices in traditional wings of the government in 1993. In the intelligence community, a national intelligence officer for global and multilateral issues position was created to oversee monitoring and analysis on a variety of transnational issues. The Defense Department gained a deputy undersecretary of defense for environmental security, whose office initially focused almost exclusively on strategies for military pollution prevention and toxic cleanup but in recent years has paid increasing attention to the connections between environmental stress and instability as part of the Defense Department’s strategy of “preventive defense.” The Pentagon has also seen the creation of “trade desks” in recognition of the growing emphasis on economic security, “causing career military officers to scratch their heads in puzzlement” (Brinkley 1997, 127). The State Department experienced some reshuffling and added an undersecretary for global affairs responsible for several revamped bureaus, including a renamed Bureau of International Narcotics Control (now the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) that gained new responsibility for international crime; an expanded Bureau for Refugees (now the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration) that now focuses additionally on population and migration issues; and a changed Bureau of Human Rights Affairs (now the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor) that added democracy promotion to its portfolio (East and Dillery 1997). And the National Security Council (NSC) added a new Directorate for Global Environmental Issues, which represented an attempt to upgrade the importance of international environmental policy at the White House and to integrate environmental considerations throughout the other NSC divisions’ decision making.

These institutional changes have been more than cosmetic. They
represent a trend among most agencies of the U.S. government to take more seriously the nontraditional issues cited in the National Security Strategy, and have contributed to heightened awareness of and interest in these issues across various strata of the bureaucracy. In addition to the officials in the newly created positions listed above, the president, secretary of state, national security advisor, secretary of defense, and director of central intelligence (DCI) have all publicly acknowledged the increasing prominence of nontraditional security issues in foreign and security policy making. In one of the most significant efforts in this area, former Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced in 1996 an unprecedented initiative to make environmental issues part of “the mainstream of American diplomacy” (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1997, 186). He stated that “as we move to the 21st century, the nexus between security and the environment will become even more apparent” (1996, 1) and ordered the State Department’s regional bureaus and overseas missions to identify environmental issues that affect key U.S. interests and to develop appropriate policies to address those concerns. Similarly, former DCI John Deutch announced that the intelligence community would play an expanded role in monitoring and analyzing environment and population dynamics because “there is an essential connection between environmental degradation, population growth, and poverty that regional analysts must take into account” (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1997, 114). These remarks and other similar ones reflect a growing consensus among practitioners that international forces are increasingly complex and require long-term approaches and interventions sensitive to contextual factors.

It has been difficult, however, for the U.S. government to match its rhetoric on other nontraditional issues with comparable levels of funding and policy initiatives, particularly given the competition for foreign policy resources at a time of declining public and Congressional support for foreign engagement. With the U.S. foreign assistance budget lower in real terms than it has been in over two decades (Collier and Nowels 1996, 103), the Congress is reluctant to allocate resources for long-term strategies to address issues that are not yet of crisis proportion. While Congress continues to fund fully the administration’s requests for humanitarian and refugee relief (a longstanding Congressional priority), it has cut by 20 percent long-term programs to address the root causes of human suffering and strife, such as programs to promote economic
growth, educate populations and support adequate health conditions, and expand opportunities for participatory democracy (109). Given the pressure on resources, the administration in its fiscal year 1998 international affairs budget request needed to fight for essentials like funding for existing commitments to multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the operational expenses for core diplomatic infrastructure and functions (Nowels 1997). Meanwhile, levels of U.S. military spending, though significantly down from cold war highs, still remain almost fifteen times greater than the levels allocated to nonmilitary foreign policy priorities. In the words of Brian Atwood, administrator of the Agency for International Development, “Many in the foreign policy community have embraced the goal of preventive diplomacy but not the methods, particularly those that cost money” (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1996, 87).

Furthermore, advocates of “new” issues are still often greeted with resistance, skepticism, and occasional disdain by members of their own bureaucracies whose traditional priorities are competing for dwindling international resources. For example, when former Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced his environmental initiative, most foreign service officers and officials in the regional bureaus of the State Department paid only lip service to the initiative. The initiative has raised environmental awareness and sensitivity throughout the department, but the leadership has thus far made very few staffing or funding changes in response, and the regional bureaus appear not to have altered their priorities significantly. Similarly, the repeated proclamations by the deputy undersecretary of defense for environmental security that the environment should be a “key component” of “preventive defense” have yet to be matched by either serious shifts in budget outlays or supporting statements by the defense secretary that addressing environmental problems should be part of conflict prevention strategies.

**CONCLUSION**

The rich and (particularly in the United States) contentious debate within North America on rethinking security admits of few easy conclusions. Some (though not all) of the broadest redefinitional efforts have fallen into the trap of refusing to set priorities among values, trying instead to define security as protecting every individual and group from every
conceivable threat. Even those who have tried to stick to the traditional paradigm have sometimes nonetheless found themselves drawn into the morass. One effort to create a revised curriculum that stayed focused on “the threat, use, and management of military force, and closely related topics” but noted the need to incorporate economic, environmental, and other issues soon found itself sliding down the slippery slope, bringing in culture and values, nonmilitary instruments of power and influence, new actors, and environmental issues (Shultz, Godson, and Greenwood 1993, 2–9).

Some efforts have tried to deal with the problem of setting priorities by redefining “vital interests,” rather than security per se, implicitly assuming that calling something a vital interest attracts the same attention as calling something a security issue. But efforts to finesse the security label may not suffice. The cold war legacy of giving priority to whatever went under the security rubric is too strong to ignore. Security is a powerful term that brings with it a strong presumption of priority and a plethora of well-funded, largely military, institutions. Its power creates a vicious circle, in which some issues that get labeled as “security” succeed in attracting new funding and attention, thereby broadening the definition of security and leading others to try to expand it still further to incorporate other issues, until the word becomes meaningless.

But the debate over the meaning of “security” reflects more than efforts to get resources reallocated. It stems from the struggle to create a way of understanding a world that lacks any one great overarching unifying threat. Some of the efforts to “redefine security” appear to throw the security label at everything in hopes that the word alone will create a conceptual framework through which a confusing world can be understood. This has had positive effects, bringing together intellectual communities across disciplinary boundaries. But a label does not a framework create.

The difficulty is inherent in the nature of the beast. Analysts are only beginning to understand the relationships among the issues that increasingly appear to be of vital importance, and those understandings are not widely shared. The world is undergoing a vast number of incremental changes, ranging from shifts in power and political authority within and between states to fundamental alterations of the basic physiology of the planet. These incremental changes rarely pose the relatively simple linear threats to security familiar to us as military aggression. Instead, it is the consequences of their aggregate impact and the interactions among
them that may cumulate to the point of threatening human well-being and survival on a large scale.

It is not clear that much is gained by continuing to debate what to include under the rubric of “security.” Too much disagreement exists about whose security matters, about how the various new “threats” interact, and about where policy interventions could be most effective. These disagreements will not readily resolve themselves. Addressing them directly might prove a more fruitful avenue than debating how to label the category.

NOTES

1. For a listing of some past and current projects, see Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project (1997).

2. For example, the chapter omits most of the vast theoretical literature in political science on the security consequences of anarchy. See Buzan (1991, 1997) and Lipschutz (1995).

3. Most analysts date the origins of Realist thinking back at least a millennium to Machiavelli’s The Prince, or more than two millennia to Thucydides’s account of the Peloponnesian War. The major statement of classic Realism is Morgenthau (1948). The main work on structural Realism is Waltz (1979).


5. There is an important distinction worth noting here between nonrenewable resources, like oil and minerals, and renewable resources, like fresh water, soil, and forests. According to Homer-Dixon and Percival, there have been several interstate wars over access to nonrenewables during the twentieth century, but there are few, if any, examples of interstate war over renewables. The one possible exception is water, but Homer-Dixon and Percival find that “wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbors are likely only in a narrow set of circumstances”—among which must be “a history of antagonism between the two countries” and the “downstream country must be militarily much stronger than the upstream country” (1996, 9). This chapter provides more detail in section three on recent research and arguments connecting renewable resources with intrastate conflict.

6. This does differ from the traditional paradigm in one important aspect. Failure to pay attention to these factors leads to a decline in national power, but
not necessarily to military subjugation from a foreign invasion. We are indebted to Paul Stares for this point.

7. Yet Fukuyama is not altogether happy with his prediction, because he sees the liberal democratic system as shallow. "The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands" (Fukuyama 1989, reprinted in Betts 1994, 17).

8. In the words of one analyst, the "historical animosities or religious differences ... usually become significant because they are invoked by contemporary ethnopolitical leaders seeking to mobilize support among threatened and disadvantaged peoples, not because religious or historical differences generate a primordial urge to conflict" (Gurr 1996, 74).

9. Although Huntington came out with a book-length version of the argument in late 1996, the work cited here is the 1993 article, on which most of the debate to date has been based.

10. The Toronto-based effort has published case studies on Chiapas, Mexico; Pakistan; Gaza; Rwanda; Bangladesh-India; the Senegal River basin; and South Africa. It has also published case summaries on El Salvador-Honduras; Haiti; Peru; the Philippines; and the West Bank; as well as thematic reports on urbanization and violence, research methodology, and social adaptation. Finally, Homer-Dixon has overseen research on the links between environmental scarcities, state capacity, and civil violence, publishing reports on China and Indonesia, with a forthcoming report on India. For a detailed summary of findings of the Environment, Population and Security project, see Homer-Dixon and Percival (1996).

11. For a review of the literature on environment and security, including a discussion on the critiques of the arguments on environment and conflict research, see Dabelko and Simmons (1997) and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1996, 45-71). For an extensive list of sources, see the bibliography section in the Woodrow Wilson International Center (1995, 1996, and 1997).

12. For a discussion on why some environmentalists fear a "securitization" of the environment, see Dabelko and Simmons (1997, 131-132, 138).


14. These include the Council on Foreign Relations' Project on National Interests and the Commission on America's National Interests.
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