With the end of the Cold War, the danger of a global nuclear holocaust has become remote. Yet the post–cold war world is not freed of other types of security threats. These include environmental degradation, energy and food scarcity, overpopulation, refugees and migration, ethnic conflicts, transnational terrorism, and organized crime. These issues have acquired more salience as the traditional military concerns of national security have subsided. To some, these problems collectively constitute the "new security" agenda.

In the United States, where security studies had become dominated by traditional military concerns during the cold war era, the concept of security is now being fundamentally reexamined (Baldwin 1995). Is this American trend a worldwide phenomenon? The purpose of this chapter in the first instance is to examine whether this is true of Japan. It surveys, therefore, current Japanese literature on traditional as well as the above-mentioned nontraditional security issues with the aim of identifying general trends in the public debate on security. In the process, the distinctive characteristics of Japanese debates on security will become apparent.

As will be explained below, many of the so-called new security issues were actually a part of Japan’s traditional security agenda, whereas its new security priorities are really quite “traditional.” This juxtaposition is probably unique to Japan, which raises the question as to why this is so. To explain this fully requires understanding the somewhat unique nature of Japanese security policy making in the post–World War II period.
The second aim of this chapter is to identify and explain changes to the public debate about the security of Japan in the wake of the cold war. It will be argued that there are some new features, primarily concerning the appropriate international role for Japan in the next century.

Finally, this chapter also aims to clarify the concept of security by examining various approaches to security and their interrelationships. This theoretical discussion is necessary to analyze Japanese security debates in a systematic way. It will also be useful for examining policy debates on Japan’s international role.

More specifically, the following closely related questions will be addressed in this chapter: Which issues on the new security agenda have been identified as security challenges by experts and government officials in Japan? To what extent are they discussed as potential sources of international conflict in the short or long term? Are there contending schools of thought? What kinds of policy prescriptions are offered for addressing security challenges facing Japan after the end of the cold war? Are there shortcomings in the public debate on security that need to be filled, and how might they be filled?

THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

Japanese security policy after the end of World War II has been shaped by two sets of interrelated factors, one inhibiting an active military security role for Japan and the other encouraging it. The 1947 Constitution, strong public pacifism, domestic politics, and an acute sensitivity in Asia to Japan playing a military role have been the inhibiting factors. The international environment of the cold war and recurrent American pressure on Japan to increase its military contribution to the Western Alliance have been the promoting factors. Japanese security policy in a broad sense has also been influenced by the oil “shocks” and commodity crises in the 1970s that deepened Japan’s sense of economic vulnerability.

Article 9 of the Constitution has set the basic framework for Japanese security policy since the end of World War II. The first paragraph of the article prohibits the use of or the threat of the use of armed forces as a means to settle international disputes, and the second paragraph prohibits the possession of armed forces. Because of the existence of Article 9, the 1947 Constitution is often called the Peace Constitution.
It might not be an exaggeration to say that Japanese security policy after World War II has been more or less shaped by U.S. policy toward Japan. As is well known, the present Constitution was first written in English by the American occupation authorities headed by General Douglas MacArthur, and then translated into Japanese (Watanabe 1993). The primary U.S. aim was to prevent Japan from ever again engaging in a war of aggression. However, this initial American policy was reversed in the late 1940s as the cold war intensified. The victory of the Communist Party in China in October 1949 and in particular the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 impressed on Washington the strategic importance of rebuilding Japan as a sovereign partner in the Western Alliance (Hosoya 1984; Borden 1984).

As a first step, MacArthur ordered the creation of a seventy-five-thousand-person National Police Reserve to fill the security vacuum left by the departure of American occupation forces to the Korean peninsula. This Police Reserve comprising ground and maritime forces was developed into the Japanese National Safety Forces in August 1952, and eventually into the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self Defense Forces following the creation of the Japanese Defense Agency in July 1954 (Uemura 1995).

By then, the United States and Japan had signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which provided for the withdrawal of American occupation forces, and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which provided for an American military presence in Japan. Both were signed on September 8, 1951, and simultaneously put into effect on April 28, 1952. Under the terms of the 1951 defense pact, the United States possessed the right to use American forces, at the request of Tokyo, “to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.” Washington’s main worry was the possibility of communist subversion from within rather than direct military attack by an external power. The treaty further stated that Japan would not grant, without the prior consent of Washington, military bases to any third power.

In effect, Japan became a de facto U.S. protectorate under the 1951 defense pact. For some Japanese nationalists, this state of affairs so soon after the restoration of sovereignty was humiliating. To rectify this situation, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke pushed for the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in January 1960, to replace the 1951 defense pact. This treaty clearly states America’s obligation to defend Japan,
something that had not been clear in the original defense pact. Tokyo in turn agreed to provide bases and facilities in Japan for use by American armed forces, not only to defend Japan but also to maintain peace and stability in the Far East.

Until quite recently, the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) had been one of the most controversial political issues in Japan. It was ironic that the left-wing political forces sympathetic to the communist bloc criticized the existence of the SDF as unconstitutional in light of Article 9, whereas the pro-Western bloc forces in the government had to defend the SDF with great difficulty. Several court battles, as a consequence, were waged over the constitutionality of the SDF as well as the American military presence in Japan. The Japanese judiciary, however, has so far avoided making any legal judgment on the issue; the Supreme Court has ruled that it is a political matter.

In Japan’s parliament, the Diet, a common understanding has evolved about the constitutionality of the SDF through a long history of debates and deliberations. Thus it is understood under Article 9 of the Constitution that Japan is entitled to possess “the minimum level of armed strength” for self-defense purposes; that Japan is not allowed to possess offensive weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, and aircraft carriers; and that Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defense.

Besides America’s predominant influence, post-World War II Japanese defense policy has been characterized by self-imposed restraints. Japan’s stated security policy after World War II has been to maintain an exclusively defense-oriented posture; hence, the range of military equipment for the SDF has deliberately been restricted. In the 1960s, owing to opposition parties’ criticism in the Diet, the bombsights and in-flight refueling devices on Japan’s F-4EJ Phantoms were regarded as “offensive” and removed despite the fact that to do so required extra cost.

The Basic Policy for National Defense that laid out the guiding principles regarding defense has remained unaltered since its adoption by the Kishi cabinet in May 1957. Since the adoption of Japan’s first Five-Year Defense Buildup Plan in the same year, Japanese defense forces have been expanded and modernized only very gradually through successive defense buildup plans. Thus the National Defense Program Outline, formulated in 1976, which defined Japan’s basic defense policy in more concrete terms during much of the cold war period, was surprisingly
only replaced by the new Defense Program Outline in November 1995.

In 1976, the Miki government decided also to restrict defense spending to 1 percent of the gross national product. This ceiling lasted until 1987, when it was deliberately broken by the Nakasone cabinet for the 1986–1990 Five-Year Defense Plan. Despite its publicity and controversy, Nakasone Yasuhiro’s decision to raise defense spending marginally higher than 1 percent of GNP as a result of a hike in salaries of defense personnel was more rhetorical than substantial. Since then, Japan’s defense spending has been kept at around 1 percent of GNP. Japan has also constrained its freedom to export arms. In April 1967, it adopted three principles on arms export that virtually banned Japan’s exports of military equipment and technologies. In the same year, moreover, Tokyo officially reaffirmed its three nonnuclear principles by declaring it would neither possess, produce, nor permit the entry of nuclear weapons into Japan.

Japan’s defense policies and programs were framed in close consultation with Washington during much of the cold war period: Tokyo was willing to share the defense burden of the West to the extent requested by the United States. A transition to a more active Japanese role came with the signing of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in November 1978, which facilitated closer cooperation and an operational division of labor between the three branches of the SDF and their American counterparts. As a result, notwithstanding the stated intention of adopting a defense policy that was devoted exclusively to the defense of Japan, the SDF were integrated de facto into the American global military posture during the Reagan years of the 1980s.

If there has been a defense policy of Japan’s own making, it was the strategy of “comprehensive security.” During the 1970s, Japan was faced with many difficulties and uncertainties arising from international economic disturbances such as the oil shocks and shortages and price hikes of other major commodities. The old International Monetary Fund regime of fixed exchange rates collapsed as a result of President Richard Nixon’s decision to sever the link between the U.S. dollar and the price of gold. In the security field, as well, the Nixon administration signaled its desire to gradually disengage from Asia with the announcement of the Guam doctrine in July 1969. In the eyes of the Japanese, the 1970s was a period when the basic international economic and political frameworks created at the end of World War II appeared to be collapsing.
Reflecting on these uncertainties, the Nomura Research Institute, a private think tank, issued a report in December 1977 that first invented and made public the concept of “comprehensive security.” In 1980, a report compiled by Prime Minister Óhira Masayoshi’s Policy Study Group further articulated the concept. It stated that “security means protection of the people’s life from various types of threats,” and the “various types of threats” here included not only traditional military threats but also a collapse of the free trade system, scarcity of energy and industrial resources, and natural disasters such as large earthquakes (Naikaku Kaikaku Kaikaku Shingishitsu 1980, 21). The necessary means to prepare for nonmilitary threats were also defined as mostly nonmilitary in nature (1980). As a result, the Council of Ministers Concerned with Comprehensive Security was set up within the cabinet in December 1980 by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō, who succeeded Óhira after his sudden death (Umemoto 1988; Matthews 1993; Tanaka 1994a).

The adoption of comprehensive security as the national strategy involved an element of political compromise between those who supported more efforts in the field of military security and those who were in favor of nonmilitary security measures. Both certainly shared the basic view that Japan should bear more of the defense burden of the Western security alliance. Yet preference for the means differed. For example, those more oriented toward economic security tended to downgrade the practical importance of military security. The continuing taboo surrounding any discussion of narrow military security aims as well as a sensitivity to potential Asian concerns meant that a budgetary increase for Japanese military buildup tended always to go in tandem with a corresponding increase for economic aid during the years of overall budgetary restraint in the 1980s.

Whether it was a political compromise or not, the fact remains that the endorsement of the comprehensive security strategy by the government, and its wide acceptance by the public, reflected a general sense of economic vulnerability. The economic shocks of the 1970s were not Japan’s first experience of this kind of vulnerability. “Export or die” was the policy slogan of successive post–World War II Japanese governments. Economic diplomacy aimed at securing energy resources, industrial raw materials, foodstuffs, and export markets for manufactured goods occupied a central place in overall external policy. Economic security, therefore, had always weighed high in Japan’s conception of
national security well before the government’s formal adoption of the concept of comprehensive security.

Since the end of the cold war, American security policy toward Asia and Japan’s basic defense policy as embodied in the Basic Defense Program Outline have been reexamined. In April 1996, following yearlong consultations between officials of both countries, a Joint Declaration on the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance for the Twenty-first Century was issued by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and President Bill Clinton. While the United States reaffirmed its military commitment to the defense of Japan, Japan pledged to play a greater role in the event of emergency situations in the surrounding area. Japan and the United States also agreed to cooperate more fully in UN peacekeeping operations. The mission of the alliance was thereby adapted from deterrence against the Soviet threat to coping with regional armed conflicts.2

While the joint declaration was enthusiastically welcomed by many, it also attracted much criticism from those who were worried about Japan increasing its military role abroad, inasmuch as this could be interpreted as contravening Article 9 of the Constitution prohibiting Japan’s participation in collective defense. These concerns surfaced again during the review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation that was completed in 1997.

Despite the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet threat, traditional security issues for Japan are in a sense more alive today than during the cold war period, when there had been little room for independent strategic policy and thinking. Whether it liked it or not, Japan would have been almost automatically entangled in a global war, which is one reason why there remained such strong opposition to the alliance with the United States. With the end of the cold war, security concerns have shifted from global nuclear war to the heightened risk of regional conflict. Moreover, in this new security environment the continued U.S. security commitment is not so self-evident. To ensure the U.S. commitment, Japan has to play its part in regional security, including cooperation in regional emergencies and active participation in global UN peacekeeping operations. These new challenges in turn provide more room for Japan’s own thinking and policy making.

Regional conflicts caused by ethnic and religious differences have attracted increasing attention since the end of the cold war. The role of the United Nations and regional security organizations in regional armed
conflicts has as a consequence been reappraised. After prolonged and heated debates in the Diet, Japan finally decided to send peacekeeping forces to Cambodia in 1992, an operation that is now regarded as a success (Tanaka 1995; Tanaka 1994b). Japan is also eager to make use of the ASEAN Regional Forum as a framework for Asian security dialogue and confidence-building measures.

Narrow military security concerns, however, do not necessarily preoccupy the Japanese government’s overall external policy: Tokyo has also been eager to play a major nonmilitary role to combat common global problems, which can be considered a part of the new security agenda. In line with this policy, the Japanese government adopted a Charter for Official Development Assistance (ODA Charter) in 1992, in which safeguarding the environment is given high priority. For example, Tokyo has placed special emphasis on environmental concerns in successive loan agreements with China. In January 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi and President George Bush also issued the Tokyo Declaration on Global Partnership, in which both leaders pledged to cooperate in finding solutions to miscellaneous global issues facing humanity.

Since September 1993, both governments have discussed a Common Agenda for dealing with these problems as part of the Japan-U.S. Framework Talks. A wide variety of issues has been discussed, including population growth, HIV/AIDS, development assistance for environmental protection, children’s health, narcotics, and energy-efficient technologies (Ogura et al. 1997). As a result, a new document on the Common Agenda was released in conjunction with the above-mentioned Joint Declaration on the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance. This demonstrates both governments’ (especially Tokyo’s) preference for a balanced approach to dealing with traditional military and the new types of security challenges facing the world.

DEBATES ABOUT THE MEANING OF SECURITY AND JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE

Throughout the cold war period, Japanese security studies were basically concerned with Japan’s broader diplomatic and international relationship with the United States rather than with narrow military security issues. Some argued strongly against the alliance either from the point of
view of ideology or out of a fear of becoming embroiled in a U.S.-Soviet conflict, while some conservative scholars and opinion leaders strongly supported the alliance as the only feasible and reliable way to guarantee Japanese security. Overall, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that there were few meaningful security debates in Japan during the cold war. The opposition parties simply did not approve of or even recognize the existence of the SDF, and refused to discuss security issues in the Diet in an intelligent manner. The discussions that took place were more like theological debates.

With the end of the cold war, however, Japan’s “domestic cold war” also ended. The Japan Socialist Party, now named the Social Democratic Party, finally approved the existence and constitutionality of the SDF and changed its policy of opposition to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty when the party formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democratic Party in July 1994. In today’s Japan, political conditions now exist, for the first time since World War II, for meaningful security debates to take place.

As a result of the redefinition of the Japan-U.S. security alliance by Clinton and Hashimoto in April 1996, it appears as if traditional military security concerns have become the new security agenda for today’s Japan. Conversely, American security concerns seem to have broadened with the end of the cold war to include areas other than narrow military security issues. The role of the SDF and the future of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty have become central issues for debate in the wake of the end of the cold war.

There are in today’s Japan four broad groups taking positions regarding Japanese security policy: the pro-alliance Realists, the pro-alliance liberals, the independence-oriented nationalists, and believers in “global” or “human” security.

The first group, made up of pro-alliance realists, argues that medium- to long-term uncertainties surrounding China and Russia and the more immediate possibility of conflict on the Korean peninsula require Japan to enter into closer and more substantial military cooperation with the United States at both the regional and global levels. They also support a more active role for Japan in UN peacekeeping operations. To cooperate fully with the United States in security affairs, the pro-alliance Realists point out the need to revise or reinterpret Article 9. Though they do not neglect the new security issues, these are treated as subsidiary concerns.
This position is represented by, among others, Satō Seizaburō of Saitama University, Nishihara Masashi of the National Defense Academy, former diplomat Okazaki Hisahiko, member of the House of Councillors Shiina Motoo, and former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. In journalism today, the biggest daily newspaper, the Yomiuri shimbun, and the high-quality monthlies Chūō kōron (Center opinion) and This Is Yomiuri, more or less represent this (and also the next) point of view.

The second group—the pro-alliance liberals—basically supports the continuation of the alliance with the United States but with no change to the current Peace Constitution, particularly Article 9. Many of the scholars and opinion leaders in this group are also more concerned with economic security, in which military means play little or no role. This relative lack of interest in strictly military security issues may partly be explained by their confidence in Japan’s security, which is ultimately guaranteed by the alliance with the United States. This position is represented by, among others, Yamamoto Yoshinobu (1989) of the University of Tokyo, Inoguchi Kuniko (1989) of Sophia University, and former Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichī.

The arguments of the third group, made up of independence-oriented nationalists, resemble those of the French Gaullists. This group favors a revision of the 1947 Constitution and also advocates a more equal or balanced status for Japan in the alliance with the United States as a basic requirement for maintaining the alliance. Their conception of security is very much a military-dominated traditional one. This group is represented by, among others, Nakanishi Terumasa of Kyoto University, well-known critic Etō Jun (1996), and former Diet member and writer Ishihara Shintarō, author of The Japan that Can Say No. Similar views are often voiced in articles in the monthly magazines Seiron (Right opinion), Voice, and Shokun! (Ladies and gentlemen!).

The fourth group of scholars and activists—the believers in “global” or “human” security—is concerned primarily with poverty, hunger, population, and environmental degradation in the developing world and tends to be either politically center-left or in the school of “peace research” within the discipline of international relations. The state of peace is not defined simply as the absence of war but as a positive condition in which there is no occurrence of “structural violence,” which includes poverty, political oppression, and lack of human rights (see Inoguchi 1989, 258–264; Gultung 1969). The peace research school treats the
military-security roles of states as something basically negative. For this reason, most scholars and opinion leaders in this school are either implicitly or explicitly against the continuation of the Japan-U.S. security alliance. In contrast, the role that NGOs and individual volunteers can play to enhance peace and security is emphasized (Taya 1994). This ideological position is represented by, among others, Sakamoto Yoshikazu (1997) of Meiji Gakuin University, who long taught at the University of Tokyo’s Department of Law; Tsuru Shigeto (1996a, 1996b), an economist and former president of Hitotsubashi University; Asai Motofumi (1994) of Meiji Gakuin University; journalist Maeda Tetsuo; and Ōe Kenzaburō, winner of the 1996 Nobel prize in literature. In journalism, the second biggest newspaper, the center-left daily the Asahi shimbun, and a journal of center-left idealism, Sekai (One world), represent mostly the views of the fourth group (and sometimes the second group). The academic journal Heiwa kenkyū (Peace studies) published by the Peace Studies Association of Japan also represents this position.

In general, the pro-alliance Realists and liberals as well as the left-wing peace researchers all treat security issues more holistically than the independent-oriented nationalists. However, there is a marked difference between the stand of the former two and that of the global security advocates. Whereas the Realists and the liberals approach the global issues primarily from the point of view of enlightened “national self-interest,” left-wing peace researchers in Japan tend to approach the issues either from the viewpoint of the developing South or on the basis of individual (global) citizen rights.

In terms of actual influence on Japan’s security policy, the peace research school has little, if any, a fact which its members do not seem to mind, as one of the school’s outstanding features is an essentially negative view of the state’s role in the military-security field. In contrast, Realists and liberal thinkers of economic security appear to have had more influence on government policy. This is perhaps because their policy prescriptions are more in tune with the official thinking by conservative LDP governments and those ministries in charge of comprehensive security—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Finance, among others.

If there is an outstanding characteristic of Japanese security debates today, it is the fact that they form part of a larger debate about Japan’s
role in the world. The Persian Gulf War was largely responsible for initiating this debate. While Japan made a handsome financial contribution to the coalition forces that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi aggression, many Japanese felt that the country’s contribution did not receive the respect it deserved from the international community. Indeed, Japan was criticized for its “checkbook diplomacy,” that essentially money alone was not a sufficient or satisfactory international contribution. As a result, some argued that Japan should adopt a traditional security role in the world and become a “normal” power. There were counterarguments, however, to the effect that Japan should continue to contribute in non-military ways to addressing global challenges and that this not only would be welcomed by others but also would constitute an example for others to emulate.

THE NEW SECURITY AGENDA AND JAPAN

While traditional security concerns have grown in prominence for Japan since the end of the cold war and become in the process the source of growing public debate, the need to view national security in comprehensive terms has also received greater attention. Colonel Nakamura Yoshihisa (1994) of the National Institute of Defense Studies, for example, has pointed out the importance of nonmilitary security threats when considering the creation of a cooperative security framework in Asia and the Pacific. Tanaka Akihiko (1996) of the University of Tokyo also has pointed out the importance of looking at security threats that are posed by unidentifiable non-state actors possessing no clear hostile intent. Yamamoto Yoshinobu has presented a model in which both unspecified and specified security threats are given equal weight and attention. These scholars have emphasized the importance of international cooperation and the creation of effective regimes to handle such unspecified threats (Yamamoto 1995). A study produced by officials of the Economic Planning Agency writing as private citizens is also worthy of special mention. The book, Kokusai fiansō to Nihon (International conflicts and Japan), edited by Katō Masashi and Nishi Tatsuo (1993), discusses Japan’s post–cold war strategy. Its authors define “unconventional security threats,” which include population growth, poverty and income disparities between the North and the South, global environmental problems, drugs, HIV/AIDS, and piracy and terrorism.
Katō and Nishi define the typical characteristics of unconventional security threats as complex, difficult to predict, prolonged in their development, and hard to handle as there is little scientific knowledge on how to address them. Military responses, however, do not appear appropriate. Moreover, these problems pose a threat not only to the security of a country but also to the destiny of the entire human species (Katō and Nishi 1993, 45–46). In response, they propose a system of goals with a clear hierarchy. The highest goal is the maintenance and betterment of the well-being of the Japanese people, which in turn comprises two parts: (i) the betterment of the material standard of consumption and (ii) the nonmaterial betterment of well-being, such as social stability. Katō and Nishi argue that the betterment of the material standard of consumption, which is in essence identical with economic growth, has to be attained with due regard to industrial pollution and the environment. Measures to safeguard human life and private property, which are included in (2), comprise the prevention of crimes, disaster relief, compensation for damages caused by natural disasters and human crimes, internal and external military security, and measures for mass unemployment and bankruptcy (98–108).

It can be seen that their proposed response includes virtually everything the Japanese government already performs as daily tasks. Katō and Nishi do not use the term “security” to describe their strategy. Yet it can be interpreted as equivalent to a security strategy if the broad definition of the term security by Kumon Shumpei is employed.9 Their work, which treats security comprehensively, constitutes a typical example of security studies in Japan after the cold war.

While Katō and Nishi’s work covers almost the whole range of issues on the new security agenda, many journal articles focus on a single or a few related issues. Among them, the environment, in this author’s view, is now the most popular subject for study—though not necessarily treated as a security issue—in Japan.10 Studies and public debates on the environment have been stimulated by developments at the international level. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 was an epoch-making event in this respect. Numerous writings on the subject have been published since then. Besides political scientists and students of international politics, economists, natural scientists, technicians, businesspeople, journalists, and environmental activists are also among those
who are concerned with environmental problems. All have their own concerns and approach to the issue. Most Japanese studies treat the environment as a scientific or technical problem. Concepts of security are typically not employed in these studies.\textsuperscript{11}

There is also a large literature on the environment by neoclassical economists. Yet economists do not treat the problem of the environment as a security issue, either. They treat it as an issue of “externalities” or “market failure.” Political scientists might be able to infer that there must always be some security concerns, explicit or implicit, in any environmental study. However, it is a noteworthy fact that most Japanese literature on environment is not written from the point of view of national security. Rather, environmental issues are discussed either as a global issue, an Asian issue, or an issue that affects particular local residents.

The spectacular industrialization of China and other Asian countries has also encouraged environmental studies in Japan. While economic growth in China is generally welcomed, its side effects, notably an increase in environmental pollution, have given rise to growing concerns in Japan. Because of the prevailing westerly winds, Japan suffers from acid rain that, it is alleged, originates mostly in China. The more general problem of global warming is another source of concern. One notable study, \textit{Chikyū kankyō no yuuke: chikyū ondanka no wagakuni e no eikyō} (Future of the global environment: effects of global warming on Japan), edited by the Environment Agency (Kankyōchō Chikyū Kankyōbu 1994), examines the likely effects of the warming of the earth on Japan in respect to water resources, agriculture, forestry, ecological systems, land, energy, infrastructure in coastal cities, and human health. Each author estimates damages and costs arising from the warming of the earth. This can be taken as a work on “national security,” though the authors themselves did not specify it as such.

In contrast to the official government-sponsored research, most of the studies on the environment produced by Japanese academics and environmental activists have been critical of private enterprise, especially multinational corporations, and administrative negligence or even collusion on the part of responsible governments.\textsuperscript{12} Often their focus is environmental problems in the developing countries in connection with human rights’ violations and Japan’s ODA, which tends to overlook these (Taya 1994).

Proposed prescriptions to environmental problems include a variety
of measures: governmental regulation, an environmental tax, new technology, new energy resources, energy-efficient systems, recycling, lifestyle changes, international cooperation, international environmental regimes, and so on.\textsuperscript{13}

After environmental concerns, regional conflicts have attracted the most attention in Japan. Many regional conflicts and civil wars today are located in areas bordering the former Soviet empire. Ethnic and tribal wars are also prevalent in Africa and some developing countries in other parts of the world. The common features of these areas of conflict are low living standards, high population growth, political instability, and, in some cases, collapsing or collapsed state controls.

Such conflicts also typically present a dilemma between satisfying the requirements for "international order" on the one hand and "justice" for minority groups aspiring to a new nationhood on the other. Katō and Nishi argue, in their book cited earlier, that we cannot deny the principle of national self-determination, which reflects the ideals of freedom and democracy at the international level. They maintain, however, that national self-determination of a minority group cannot always be approved if it leads to civil war and long-term political instability, and if a new nation-state thus created cannot sustain itself economically or politically.

Poverty and large income disparities often underlie such conflicts among ethnic groups. Katō and Nishi argue that industrialization and economic growth may be the ultimate solutions to the ethnic problems of the world. However, this prescription overlooks the fact that the problem of separatist movements is not confined to low-income developing countries. Economically prosperous Belgium and Canada have ethnic problems, as well. Katō and Nishi find a clue to the peaceful solution of minority problems in the development of supranational organizations such as the European Union because they provide minorities with more room for autonomy than national authorities. Supporting their argument is the fact that institutional frameworks for local autonomy are highly developed in the areas where there is also a strong movement for supranational regionalism.

If there is a noticeable trend in current Japanese security studies regarding specific geographical regions or countries, it is a growing concern with the future of the Korean peninsula and China. This concern includes both traditional military security as well as other new security issues.
It is generally recognized that the economy of North Korea may collapse at any time in the near future. The possibility of another Korean War is also not precluded. Of particular concern is that armed conflict on the Korean peninsula will likely lead to a large-scale exodus of refugees to Japan, given its proximity. Accordingly, the government has already initiated studies on how to accommodate refugees in the event of an emergency situation on the peninsula.  

In contrast, most of the security concerns voiced about China address longer-term problems. China’s spectacular economic growth in recent years has given rise to concerns about the future supply of food and energy to China and the rest of the world (Wakabayashi 1996, 42–48). Works on this problem by Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute, Kent Calder of Princeton University (now special advisor to the U.S. ambassador to Japan), and Paul Kennedy of Yale University have been translated into Japanese and widely read (Buraun 1995; Kenedi 1993; Karuda 1996).

While China’s economic and demographic growth poses its own set of problems, another set of problems will arise should Chinese economic development falter. Okazaki Hisahiko and Nakajima Mineo, both well-known pro-Taiwan security analysts, anticipate that a slowing down or leveling off of China’s economic growth will make its population growth a real problem and lead in turn to political instability. They argue that the present system of “one-party dictatorship” is inherently unstable, and that this underlying weakness will come to the fore once economic growth slows. As witnessed in the former Soviet Union and East European countries, China’s communist political system will also not be able to pay adequate attention to environmental problems, which have global ramifications (Okazaki and Nakajima 1996).

Policy prescriptions for security concerns posed by the future uncertainties of China include a variety of measures. Okazaki’s policy prescription, for example, is identical to the American policy of “democratic enlargement,” which aims at the peaceful democratization of China while containing China’s military adventurism with regard to Taiwan. For this policy to succeed, Japan’s close alliance with the United States is essential (Okazaki and Nakajima 1996, 79–81).

In contrast, paying high respect to China’s self-determination, Sakamoto Yoshikazu argues that the United States, China, and other countries in Asia should essentially “live and let live” and refrain from intervening in each other’s internal affairs (the “sumiwake gata” security
system, in Sakamoto’s words). He calls for international solidarity among
global citizens in approaching security issues facing Asia and the world
(Sakamoto 1997, 58–59). 15

China specialist Tanaka Akihiko offers a variety of policy prescrip-
tions, reflecting three different scenarios for China, namely, (1) a chau-
vinnistic China seeking hegemony, (2) an economically stagnant China in
political chaos, and (3) an open China embedded in a network of inter-
national interdependence. He maintains that (3) is the most welcome
scenario, and that therefore Japan’s policy toward China should be
framed in such a way as to realize that scenario. His proposed prescrip-
tions include encouraging China’s incorporation into the global economy
and the key multilateral institutions that regulate global society, thereby
ensuring that China will become a more open and responsible country.
However, as a precaution against China seeking hegemony or falling
into political chaos, the American military presence in Asia (and the
Japan-U.S. security alliance) needs to be maintained (Tanaka 1994c).

Resource scarcity is currently not a major concern in the Japanese
security debate primarily because supplies of oil and food in the 1990s
have been stable. The price of crude oil in real terms has been on
average as low as before the oil shocks of the 1970s. Together with the
appreciation of the yen, Japan’s importation of energy and agricultural
commodities has not faced any difficulties during the 1990s, which prob-
abley underlies the relative lack of reference to the concept of “(national)
economic security” after the end of the cold war. Yet it should be noted
that the problems of food, energy, and the environment are widely dis-
cussed in today’s Japan as either long-term global or regional issues that
cannot but affect Japan in the end.

An article by Suetsugu Katsuhiko, “Higashi Ajia no enerugī to kan-
kyō no anzen hoshō kōsō” (Security policy for East Asian energy and en-
vironment), is one such study of energy and environmental security in a
regional context (1995). A unique aspect of this study is its clear recogni-
tion of the linkage between the problems of growing energy consumption
and environmental pollution, which constitutes in Suetsugu’s view a
new type of security threat to human life and the ecological system. He
points out that the contradiction between East Asian economic growth
and the environment has been caused by energy-intensive industrializa-
tion and the lack of social and political will to internalize its environ-
mental costs.
Suetsugu’s policy prescription for stable energy supply is a mixture of traditional Realist and liberal remedies. In his view, the maintenance of the West’s military power, which ultimately guarantees the political and military security of states in the Middle East, is the fundamental factor in maintaining a stable oil supply. In this respect, China’s independent involvement in Middle Eastern security on the one hand and possible disunity in the Western alliance on the other are potential sources of instability. The essential requirement for energy security is to avoid any destabilization of the fragile Middle Eastern security system.

Suetsugu’s other policy prescription for energy security is the development of a mutually beneficial relationship of cooperation and interdependence between the oil-producing countries and the oil-consuming developed countries. The factors standing in the way of such a relationship have been differences in culture, religion, land, and climate between the two, and also difficulties in developing a horizontal division of labor through investment and technology transfer. He emphasizes the importance of governmental responsibility in providing a stable political framework to reduce country risks and induce free market mechanisms to work.

Like energy, the long-term future supply of agricultural commodities is uncertain. Should shortages arise in the next century, they could again become a central element in the national security strategy of Japan. Arguments for food security today are put forward mainly by those who favor some form of agricultural protectionism. From the standpoint of economic efficiency and the need to uphold the international free trade system, most enlightened Realists and liberal economists today do not approve of agricultural protectionism. The June 1996 issue of Kokusaï mondai (International affairs) was a special edition on the food outlook for Asia. An article in this issue by Haseyama Takahiko, “Ajia no jizoku kanō na seichō to shokuryō anzen hoshō” (Sustainable Asian economic growth and food security), discussed the challenges of maintaining an adequate food supply, a safe environment, and an open trading system. Haseyama (1996) argued that governments must closely watch food production and distribution in each country and maintain an adequate balance between economic efficiency, security, and ecology to minimize potential problems.

Drugs, criminal organizations, and transnational terrorism are normally considered law enforcement issues in Japan and are therefore
handled by the police. Nowadays, however, criminal organizations have acquired extremely destructive heavy weapons, e.g., automatic rifles and grenades, in some foreign countries. Such a security challenge requires, therefore, the involvement of the military. So far as Japan's internal security is concerned, Tokyo has not been faced with such serious security problems, with one exception. In March 1995, after the cult organization Aum Shinrikyō attempted indiscriminate mass slaughter in the metropolitan Tokyo subway system with the nerve gas sarin, the Japanese police had to seek assistance from the SDF. Many journal articles on terrorism have been published in Japan since then, most of which concern Aum. These articles uncovered Aum's extensive connections with Russia, through which it smuggled weapons and conducted military exercises, and it is precisely the international dimension to such criminal activities that has attracted considerable attention in the Japanese mass media.

As of October 1996, around seven hundred and sixty thousand Japanese lived abroad either with a long-term visa of more than three months or on a permanent basis. These Japanese are often the targets of terrorists. The prolonged hostage crisis (December 17, 1996, to April 22, 1997) at the Japanese ambassadorial residence in Lima, Peru, caused by the leftist Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement is bound to further stimulate policy debates on international terrorism and counter-terrorist measures (see “Peru taishikōtei senkyo jiken no kyōkun” 1997).

**CONCLUSION: SOME SUGGESTIONS**

Concerning the present state of Japanese security studies, there is in general a lack of interdisciplinary cooperation and multidisciplinary research. As discussed above, issues like the environment have many interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary aspects. Although there is a significant body of work on the subject in each discipline, there are few studies that synthesize the relevant knowledge. There has also been a lack of international cooperation in Japanese security studies, and many areas are left unexplored. Cooperative ventures in Asia and the Pacific can be expected to produce more fruitful outcomes and offer better policy advice.

Most major English-language works on security have been quickly translated into Japanese. The works by Brown, Calder, and Kennedy
cited earlier are such examples. They constitute an integral part of the Japanese security debate. Little effort is made, however, to make the research and writings of Japanese scholars more accessible through translations to a wider audience beyond Japan. This should be rectified.

Lastly, as Ikie Masaru and others argue, education on security and security studies in the traditional sense needs to be encouraged in Japan so as to correct the biases of the past. Education on military affairs and security was a taboo for a long time in Japanese academia (Ikie 1996, 2–3). The growing importance of considering security in comprehensive terms does not negate the importance of traditional security studies nor should it be used as an excuse for deliberately eschewing traditional security studies. As this chapter has maintained, if traditional security concerns now occupy a much higher priority for today’s Japan, such studies should be encouraged. In the process, Japan can hopefully make an important international contribution as we enter the next century.

NOTES

1. These questions were originally raised by Paul Stares in his framework paper on the new security agenda.

2. In Umemoto’s view, Japanese security policy after World War II can be divided into three phases: the late 1940s to the early 1970s, the early 1970s to the late 1970s, and the late 1970s to the time of his writing. Extending his periodization, the third phase would be from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, with the fourth phase from the mid-1990s. See Umemoto (1988). For the joint declaration, new Japanese defense policy, and the Japan-U.S. relationship, see Kuriyama (1996) in a special Gaikō foramu (Forum on foreign affairs) issue on Japanese security and “Nichibei kankei no 21 seiki” (1997) in a Gaikō foramu issue featuring the Japan-U.S. relationship in the twenty-first century.

3. These and other publications carry articles by these opinion leaders on Japanese security. Satō’s view on security can be seen in Satō (1992, 1993), which are written in English. Some scholars and opinion leaders defy simple categorization. For example, Inoguchi Takashi and Tanaka Akihiko, both at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the University of Tokyo, can be taken as Realists as well as liberal thinkers of interdependence. (They should thus be called “liberal Realists.”) This difficulty in categorization holds more or less true for any scholar or opinion leader, and also for newspapers and journals. Thus, the categorization presented in the text should be taken as a general framework.
4. Nakanishi (1996) supports the alliance with the United States but objects
to keeping U.S. military bases in Japan.
5. Since the publication of No to ieru Nihon (The Japan that can say no) in
1989, Ishihara Shintarō has published extensively in magazines and books
either alone or together with others who have a similar policy orientation. See
Ishihara, Watanabe, and Ogawa (1990); Ishihara and Etō (1991); Ishihara and
6. Maeda (1995) argues that the SDF should be reformed so that it can
handle natural disasters more effectively, which in his opinion is what most
Japanese expect to be the SDF’s main role.
7. Gunshoku mondai shiryō (Materials on disarmament), issued by the Utsu-
nomiya Disarmament Research Institute, also reflects the fourth position, which
basically opposes the military alliance with the United States and favors the dis-
armament of Japan and the world.
8. Reflecting its strong antimilitary ethos, the Peace Studies Association of
Japan in principle does not admit members of the SDF and related organiza-
tions. This principle is specified in its organizational rules (4).
9. Kumon defined the term security as the “maintenance of a certain value
of an object by certain means in face of disturbances in its environment”
(Heiwa Anzen Hoshō Kenkyūjo 1979, 13–16; Kumon 1980, 46). Kumon argued
that the traditional meaning of national security is a special case in this broad
definition. It should be noted here that Kumon’s broad definition was presented
in the 1970s to clarify the then fashionable concepts of “economic security” and
“comprehensive security” in Japan.
10. This and the following observations are based on a counting of the
number of journal articles (both academic and nonacademic) listed on the CD-
ROM Ōashi kōji sakain (Index of journal articles), compiled by the National Diet
Library (Nihon Kokkai Toshokan n.d.) from January 1990 to August 1996.
11. For example, Eko Bijinesu Netto Waku (Eco-business Network) (1996)
discussed a whole range of business opportunities in the field of environment,
with a particular focus on technological frontiers and rapidly growing markets.
But as stated in the text, there is not much Japanese academic literature focusing
specifically on the security aspect of the global environment. One such work
is Utsui and Watanuki (1993).
12. The center-left monthly journal Sekai (One world) issued special editions
on environmental problems in Japan and Asia from the point of view of ordinary
citizens. See “Shimin ni yoru Nihon kankyō hōkoku” (1996) and “Ajia kankyō
13. Comprehensive measures for coping with the problems of energy and
the environment are proposed in Ministry of International Trade and Industry

14. In comparison with some West European countries, Japan has not been faced with internal ethnic violence and terrorism, which are often concomitant with immigration from foreign countries. Nevertheless, Takeda Isami (1994) of Dokkyō University warns that the problems of population explosion and international migration could become Japan’s major security issues in the near future, and he has made several policy proposals for Japan. At present, the problem of refugees in times of regional armed conflicts has attracted much attention in connection with a review of the Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines.

15. Sakamoto also supports the American engagement policy toward China with some reservations (see Sakamoto 1997, 60–61).

16. There is always a substantial genre of literature on safety and crisis management abroad, as there is a large market for it. For example, Sasa (1984) was written by the former head of the Cabinet Bureau in charge of national security and has been widely read.

17. Taikōsen Kenkyū Kyōkai (Japan Society of Air Pollution) (1993) discusses environmental problems from the point of view of international cooperation in Asia.

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