With the end of the Cold War and the accelerating pace of regional and global integration, economic development has become more closely intertwined with security issues. In the process, the impact of "traditional" military security issues on international relations arguably has declined, while the importance of "nontraditional" security issues, such as resource scarcity, environmental pollution, population growth, terrorism, transnational crime, domestic strife, civil war, state disintegration, and ethnic and religious conflicts, has increased. Because few countries have been spared from the effects of these issues, they represent a major challenge to regional and global international relations after the cold war. Therefore, how to understand and analyze these nontraditional security issues and, moreover, how to develop regional and global policy responses to address and to mitigate their effects have become pressing subjects of study, not least for countries in the Asia Pacific region.

THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S CONCEPT OF SECURITY

The political, economic, and military security situation in the Asia Pacific region has undergone dramatic changes since the end of the cold war. The Asia Pacific region has emerged from a prolonged period characterized by major conflicts and intense confrontation, presenting contemporary China with a peaceful, stable, and favorable international environment. For the first time since 1949, or even since the beginning of
this century, China is free from the danger of foreign invasion. Also, it no longer faces an imminent nuclear threat from the United States or the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the number of conflicts in neighboring areas has decreased significantly, and the regional situation in general has become comparatively peaceful and stable. All the countries in the Asia Pacific region, generally speaking, now focus their attention on domestic economic development and on solving internal problems.

Since the end of the 1970s, China has followed the road of reform and has opened itself up to the outside world. Economic development is seen as the central task necessary to realize China’s modernization. Seeking economic development and maintaining and enhancing China’s international economic interests have become, therefore, important foreign policy goals. While it is clear that sustained and stable economic development requires a peaceful international environment, economic development in turn tends to enhance national security. Accordingly, Chinese scholars now are paying much more attention to the impact of economic development on national security. Zhou Shulian, a well-known Chinese economist, believes that “if a country wants to maintain comparatively quick sustainable economic development, it must handle its national security issues properly. Economic development is the most important national security issue” (Zhao, Xu, and Xing 1994, 3).

China’s concept of security has evolved in response to changes in both the domestic and the international situations. Domestically, the modernization of China has raised many challenges that require urgent attention, such as political system reform, weakening relations between central and provincial governments, imbalanced development between the east and midwest regions, inflation, rampant population growth, reform in state-owned enterprises, slow agricultural development, urbanization pressures, deteriorating social security, and development and stability in minor ethnic regions of the border areas, as well as resource scarcity and environmental problems. Internationally, challenges derive from the increased liberalization of trade, investment, and finance particularly in the Asia Pacific region, which has fueled rapid economic development especially among the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This has brought with it, however, some friction and divisiveness, which may continue to rise over such issues as resources, energy, the environment, migration, and domestic instabilities. These problems are becoming transnational in nature and
effect and require, therefore, strengthened cooperation and coordination by all the countries in the Asia Pacific region.

With regard to the above facts, Chinese scholars’ views on national security and Asia Pacific regional security are as follows: (a) The above problems arising from the course of reform and development have a direct bearing on national security, and it is therefore important to solve them in the order of their relative importance so as to ensure domestic stability and sustained development. (b) Direct threats to national security are chiefly reflected in the power politics of international relations, external economic sanctions, and outside interference. (c) The conflicts left over from the cold war era in the Asia Pacific region, such as the Korean peninsula and Taiwan issues, and potential conflicts arising from sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea also have a direct influence on China’s security and on peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region (Wang 1996, 6–9). (d) The concern over national economic interests and economic security in Asia Pacific could encourage protectionist measures that in turn trigger interstate frictions and, possibly, even confrontations (Yao and Liu 1994, 97). (e) Those problems that affect long-term stability and development both in developed and developing countries, such as environmental pollution, resource scarcity, internal conflicts, population explosion, poverty, ethnic and religious conflicts, transnational drug trafficking and terrorism, and refugee problems, may lead to future contradictions and conflicts among various countries in the Asia Pacific region. (f) The growing importance of economic factors requires China to renew its security concept so as to participate in Asia Pacific regional cooperation with a new political and economic security concept (Chen and Li 1996, 54–56; Shi 1996, 41–46).

Based on the security changes in the Asia Pacific since the cold war, China has adjusted its views on and approach to regional security. Before 1993, China’s policy of regional security was implemented basically through bilateral dialogue, negotiation, and consultation. In 1993, China began taking a positive stance toward multilateral security dialogues and institutions in the Asia Pacific region. In an interview with the Japanese daily newspaper the Asahi Shimbun in August 1993, President Jiang Zemin made it clear that China’s stand on security mechanisms in Asia Pacific is to hold bilateral and regional security dialogues in various forms, on various levels, and through various channels, with the goal of strengthening communication and trust (Jiang 1995a). Chinese Vice Premier and
Foreign Minister Qian Qicheng made similar remarks at the second ASEAN Regional Forum conference on August 1, 1995: "Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fields of economy, politics, and society are increasingly important. To create a favorable inner and outer environment and to build an advanced economy are the basic goals and foundations of mutual cooperation for the nations in the Asia Pacific. . . . Confidence-building measures should cover not only the military field but also politics, the economy, and society, improving the security environment on the whole" ("Qian Qicheng huijian dongmeng" 1995, 146). The Chinese government is willing to solve the disputed issues with parties involved through peaceful negotiations according to commonly agreed upon international law and marine law, including the principles and systems set up under the UN Law of the Sea Convention (1995, 149).

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF SECURITY STUDIES IN CHINA

Although security studies research conducted at most Chinese institutions of international studies and by most Chinese scholars focuses mainly on traditional security issues, such as regional security, economic security, and military security, nontraditional security issues have begun to draw more attention.¹ Several studies on terrorism, nationalism, religious conflicts, nuclear proliferation, the environment, marine resources, and information warfare have already been conducted. Those institutions and scholars not specializing in international studies have conducted the majority of these studies (Wang 1996, 11–13; Yu 1996; Li Shaqin 1996, 13–16; Pang 1996, 9–12; Li and Shen et al. 1996, 4).² Their interest in nontraditional security issues has arisen from their research on China's strategy toward economic and social development, including urbanization, industrialization, provincial and district development, population control, resource management, utilization of energy, the gap between the rich and poor, consumption patterns, the labor market, the rural economy, and food problems (Lin and Shao 1995, 4).

Until now, the term "nontraditional security" has not appeared in any papers or books written by Chinese scholars who are experts in security issues.³ Nor are there any articles or books that systematically discuss nontraditional security issues. However, terms such as "comprehensive security," "overall security," "great security," and "national security
assurance strategy” (Zhao 1992, 395–396; Li Yunlong 1996, 23) are used. National security is also sometimes divided into subcategories, such as political security, economic security, military security, scientific and technological security, social security, information security, cultural security, ecological environment and national security, psychological war and national security, disaster and national security, food security, resource security, and energy security (Zhao 1992, 1–5), which, according to my understanding, cover all the issues that fall under the category of non-traditional security issues. Within these subcategories, many scholars and experts have already conducted research and analysis for internal consumption by policymakers as well as for open publications.

All security scholars in China believe that national security threats “not only stem from abroad but also may originate internally from such problems as domestic terrorism, deterioration of the ecological environment, major natural calamities, etc.” (Zhao 1992, 1–5). The various factors that produce harmful effects and threaten development and stability, however, are new subjects to be discussed in national security studies. Furthermore, Chinese scholars believe that with the broadening and deepening of China’s program of reform and opening up to the outside, the scope and implications for “national security” have correspondingly been enlarged. As one scholar notes, “without military means, modernized national security does not work, nor does it work with military means alone. Military security must be considered only as one component in a comprehensive national security strategy” (Shen 1996). Finally, as the focus of security studies has broadened and as China has begun to place more emphasis on multilateral cooperation in Asia Pacific, Chinese scholars increasingly acknowledge the diversity of regional security concerns as well as the differing priorities of individual countries (Li Yunlong 1996, 23–24).

THE MAJOR NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS FACING CHINA

The major nontraditional security issues that concern Chinese government officials and scholars are environmental pollution, ecological deterioration, resource deficiencies, excessive population growth, food security, and domestic instability. In terms of China’s economic development, environmental pollution, resource deficiencies, and excessive
population growth are the top priority concerns, while internal turmoil, overpopulation, and food shortages are the critical issues from the point of view of maintaining national stability and unity. The following section addresses these key issues separately and in turn.

**Environmental Pollution**

Some experts and scholars believe that environmental pollution, which is a comprehensive problem pertinent to both national and global survival, will severely impede sustainable growth and "lead to resource deficiency, deteriorating living conditions, and the inefficient use of limited resources." The widespread effects of environmental pollution may also be an important factor causing conflicts between or among countries (Zhao 1992, 245–248). As one expert notes, "because the political boundaries of a country do not coincide with its environmental boundaries, the settlement of regional environmental disputes involves the individual legal systems of the parties concerned, as well as international treaties. Also, the political relations between countries bear on the settlement of such disputes, which in turn directly affects the future relations of the countries concerned. Therefore, environmental disputes inevitably take on a strong political coloring" (Cai 1994, 221). Consequently, environmental diplomacy is becoming more and more important. "Eco-environmental issues have now entered diplomatic discussions between China and its neighboring countries" (Zhao 1992, 245–248). This viewpoint, however, is rare in published articles or books.

In line with China’s economic development and rapid urbanization, the Chinese government now attaches greater importance to reducing the atmospheric and hydrospheric pollution caused by the increase in industrial solid waste and city trash, as well as to improving the rapidly deteriorating state of some agricultural areas (Lin and Shao 1995, 69–72; Zhongguo huangjing zhuanghuang gonghao 1995). The government departments concerned now think that pollution and ecological deterioration represent the greatest threats to China’s long-term sustainable economic growth as well as to the health and longevity of its people. To prevent further damage, scholars and government officials have proposed tougher measures to safeguard the environment.

To date, in addition to the Law of Environmental Protection and the *China Environmental Situation Communiqué*, issued annually since 1989, China
has promulgated the Chinese Agenda for the 21st Century; the Program of Green Project across Centuries; and the Environmental Protection Outline of the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Term Targets through the Year 2010 and its two appendices, the Plan for the Control of the Discharge of Polluting Materials during the Ninth Five-Year Plan, and the Program of Green Project across Centuries (Xinhuashe 1996a). Each stipulates that China’s economy should not develop at the expense of its environment, and that if it is to maintain sustainable and healthy growth China has to deal with the pollution caused by earlier development as well as newly emerging problems (Song 1996a).

By means of the aforementioned legal edicts, China’s government has tightened controls on waste discharges—particularly into the Huai, Hai, and Liao rivers, the Tai and Cao lakes, and the Dian Lake valley—as well as those on acid rain (Song 1996b; Li Peng 1996a). Meanwhile, the government has agreed to abide by the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Huang 1996). Also, a high-level nongovernmental consultative agency—the Chinese International Committee of Environment and Development—was also established in 1992 to improve scientific decision making on environmental protection (Song 1996c). Moreover, at the fourth summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum held in November 1996, President Jiang Zemin announced that an environment research center would be set up in China as part of a general campaign to promote cooperation on environmental protection in the Asia Pacific region.

Resource Deficiencies and Population Growth

Maintaining the economic growth of China assumes the availability of abundant resources. Yet, many scholars and experts believe that China will face resource deficiencies in the future. Some even think that resources are a “strategic factor” guaranteeing national economic and general security, and that the three main resources of water/soil, minerals, and energy are already at the stage of being “very strained” (Zhao, Xu, and Xing 1994, 102). From an economic perspective, some scholars consider that China is facing more serious resource deficiencies and population pressures than in the 1970s and 1980s. In line with projected population growth, pressure on agricultural resources will grow, bringing
into question further agricultural development. This in turn implies a reduction in the employment prospects for rural labor.

Experts also point out that the average per capita water resource is 2,600 cubic meters and the average per capita arable land is 1,760 cubic meters (Zhongguo Shuili Dianlibu Shuidianju 1985; see tables 1 and 2). At the beginning of the 1980s, the annual consumption of water was 450 billion cubic meters, which rose to 650–700 billion cubic meters after the mid-1980s (Chen 1987, 2), creating an annual water shortage of about 40 billion cubic meters (Zhongguo ziran ziyuan shouce 1990, 493). China’s arable land amounts to 1.4 billion mu, or a per capita average of 1.22 mu (Lin and Shao 1995, 67). With the area of arable land decreasing at 300,000 hectares per year (Kang 1994, 376), the average per capita arable land will decline to 1.11 and 1.02 mu in 2000 and 2010, respectively (Lin and Shao 1995, 67). This will have serious consequences for the availability of food (Ye and Chen 1992, 188).

The average per capita energy consumption remains very low but unevenly distributed across China. In addition, nonrenewable energy sources such as coal and oil constitute the bulk of energy sources consumed. If China’s gross national product keeps growing at an annual 6 percent, approximately 1.5 and 2.5 billion tons of coal, 24.5 and 44.0 million tons of oil (yielding gaps of 80 and 200 million tons, respectively), and 30 and 124 billion cubic meters of natural gas will be needed in the years 2000 and 2015, respectively. China’s expanded production capacity

Table 1. Regional Water Resources in China, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Area (100 km²)</th>
<th>Precipitation (100 million m³)</th>
<th>Surface Water (100 million m³)</th>
<th>Ground Water (100 million m³)</th>
<th>Total Water Resources (100 million m³)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rivers in northeastern China</td>
<td>14,485</td>
<td>6,377</td>
<td>1,953</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainan-Luohé River Valley</td>
<td>3,182</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huaihe River and rivers in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong Peninsula</td>
<td>3,292</td>
<td>2,890</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huanghe River Valley</td>
<td>7,947</td>
<td>3,891</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangtze River Valley</td>
<td>15,685</td>
<td>19,386</td>
<td>9,513</td>
<td>2,564</td>
<td>9,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers in southern China</td>
<td>5,866</td>
<td>8,987</td>
<td>4,868</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>4,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers in southeastern China</td>
<td>2,398</td>
<td>4,216</td>
<td>2,557</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>2,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers in southwestern China</td>
<td>8,314</td>
<td>9,246</td>
<td>5,853</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>5,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental rivers*</td>
<td>33,744</td>
<td>5,321</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>1,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers in China</td>
<td>954,533</td>
<td>61,889</td>
<td>27,110</td>
<td>8,288</td>
<td>28,124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ye and Chen (1992, 186).

*Including the Erqin River.
cannot meet the actual demands of economic growth, and therefore China’s importation of oil will steadily increase, which will in turn affect the demand and supply of the international oil market (Zhou 1995, 22–23).

China now ranks eightieth in the world in terms of per capita consumption of minerals. Known resources of twenty-eight out of forty-five major minerals will be sufficient to meet the demands of Chinese economic development through the early twenty-first century; the proven deposits of ten out of the same forty-five minerals are, however, inadequate. After 2020, the proven deposits of most minerals will not be able to meet the expected demand (Zu 1996). Some significant minerals, such as copper, iron, chromium, and sylvite, will need to be imported in the future (Liang and Shen 1991). With the demand for steel in 2010 likely to reach 350 million tons, 700 million tons of iron ore will be needed (assuming two tons of iron ore produce one ton of steel). However, China’s total domestic production of iron ore is only just over 200 million tons. Total production worldwide is 800 million tons per year and global trade amounts to only 200 million tons (Wang and Hu 1995, 12), making it impossible for China to import a great quantity of iron ore.

Population growth is the fundamental problem in Chinese society. With the population of China expected to grow to 1.29 billion by 2020 and to 1.49 billion by 2010, the number of workers will respectively reach 860 million and 960 million (Lin and Shao 1995, 10). This increase will put pressure on resources, the environment, employment, and sustainable economic growth. The population density in the cities will also rise sharply. The density of the urban population in 1995 was 346 persons

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Table 2. Components of Land Resources in China, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Area (billion mu)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated land</td>
<td>14.4 (20.4*)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden plot (e.g., mulberry, fruit, rubber)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest land</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassland</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usable grassland</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water area</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal area</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental area (e.g., rivers, lakes, reservoirs)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban land (e.g., cities, industry, transportation)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncultivated land</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Estimate figure by the Ministry of Agriculture.
per square km, 22 higher than the year before (*Zhongguo huanjing zhuang-
kuang gongbao* 1995, 4–5). By 2010, the total urban population will have
risen from 320 million in 1995 to 840 million. In the process, the number
of big cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Tianjing, and mid-
size cities will have doubled from 500 to 1,000, with cities of at least two
million and five million inhabitants numbering sixty and thirty, respecti-
vely (Wang and Hu 1995, 12). Such rates of population growth, and conse-
quently effects on environmental pollution and resource availability,
could seriously impede China’s sustainable economic growth and eco-
nomic security in the coming five to fifteen years.

In response, China’s government has formulated a Strategy of Sus-
tainable Growth to comprehensively tackle the population, resource, and
environmental challenges. This consists of, first, a birth-control program
to curb rapid population growth; second, various laws and decrees to
protect resources and ensure the rational use of resources, for instance,
the Law Protecting Mineral Resources and the Suggestion of Further
Comprehensive Use of Resources (Xinhua 1996b, 1996d); and, third,
an initiative to encourage the thrifty and efficient use of resources, in-
cluding substituting mineral fuels for cleaner energy sources such as
solar energy, wind energy, small-scale hydro energy, geothermal energy,
tidal energy, and bio-energy. The focus of these efforts is on rural areas,
where 80 percent of China’s population now lives (Song 1996b). The
overall goal is to realize sustainable development through the coordi-
nated control of population growth, resource use, and environmental
pollution. In doing so, emphasis is also placed on technical and financial
cooperation with developed countries as well as on “South-to-South”
cooperation between developing countries, including exchanges of in-
formation on environmental protection, population growth control, and
research and development of renewable resources (Xinhua 1996c; Luo 1996).

*Food Security*

Recently, food security has become a hot issue among Chinese scholars,
with one even asserting that it is a “strategic problem relevant not only
to political and social stability but also to national security” (Li and Ni
1996, 242). This growing interest stems from several factors: China’s
transformation to a “market economy,” the expectation of major infra-
structural and social changes in the next few decades, along with China’s
lagging agricultural sector. The book *Who Will Feed China?* written by Lester R. Brown has also played a role.

On the basis of China's projected gross national product and population growth, some scholars have forecast China's food situation between 1990 and 2050 (tables 3, 4, and 5). According to estimates in the "National Program for Agricultural Development in the 1990s," by 2000 and 2010 the areas under cultivation will be 95 percent and 87 percent, respectively, of the so-called warning line of 1.65 billion mu that China's government believes to be the minimum necessary to ensure that annual grain production meets or surpasses per capita grain consumption. The seeded areas were 1.68 billion mu in 1991, 1.66 billion in 1992, 1.65 billion in 1993, and 1.64 billion in 1994 (Li and Ni 1996, 14-15).

Experts predict that unless remedial measures are taken, China's grain production will be 467 million and 484 million tons lower than the 1993 level in 2000 and 2010, respectively. This could have dire consequences. As two experts warn, "Without land, there is no food; without food, anything can happen" (Li and Ni 1996, 16-17). According to an estimate by the Chinese Economic Planning Committee, the food output in 2000 will have to be 500 million tons to meet the demand of the expected population of 1.28 billion at that time. This implies an annual increase in food production of eight billion kilograms in each of the next six years (Chen 1995, 11; Ye and Chen 1992, 207).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. General Demand Forecast for Grain Crops and Cereals in China, 2000–2050</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2040</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General demand for grain crops</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>8.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General demand for cereals</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>7.39</td>
<td>8.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General demand for grain crops per capita (kg)</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| Table 4. Grain Yield Forecast in China, 2000–2050 |
|--------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Area of cultivated land (10,000 hectares)        | 9.311| 9.011| 8.711| 8.411| 8.111| 7.811|
| Multiple crop index                               | 1.6  | 1.6  | 1.6  | 1.6  | 1.6  | 1.6  |
| Sown area of grains as percentage of all crops (%)| 70   | 65   | 65   | 65   | 65   | 65   |
| Per unit area yield of total sown area of grains (kg/ha)| 4.364| 4.821| 5.221| 7.017| 9.430| 12.673|
| Total output of grains (100 million tons)          | 4.55 | 4.52 | 4.73 | 6.14 | 7.95 | 10.29 |

Table 5. Supply and Demand Gap for Grains in China, 2000–2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2040</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unprocessed food grains (100 million tons)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grains*</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals†</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processed food grains (100 million tons)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grains</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratio of the gap (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grains</td>
<td>6.76</td>
<td>15.51</td>
<td>22.59</td>
<td>12.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>15.72</td>
<td>22.85</td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture considers grains to include tube crops and beans in addition to cereals, making the category slightly different from that commonly used throughout the world.
† Cereals does not include tube crops and beans.

Some scholars continue to believe, however, that if economic conditions remain good over the long term, the potential for increased production exists provided that the area sown increases and the multiple crop index improves. As one predicts: “In 2000–2040, China’s grain exports will continue to increase, then decrease, and by 2040, China will be self-sufficient in or even an exporter of grain” (Kang 1996, 43). Some scholars believe, moreover, that global grain production has not reached its theoretical limit and that with market adjustments to the grain trade, China’s increasing grain imports will not cause a global food disaster. Moreover, China’s food security is well above the warning line on the basis of assessments of grain trade dependence, grain reserves, changes in grain production, and per capita grain consumption. The challenge of feeding China, however, still exists. In the mid to long term, growth in grain production will be slow unless there is a breakthrough in agricultural technology. With the growth of China’s population and changing consumption patterns, the country’s self-sufficiency in food is declining while its dependence on trade is rising. In this sense, China’s food security will decline in the future (Zhu 1996, 30).

Accordingly, experts argue that the government must manipulate the industrialization process so that it enhances food security. This requires careful management of rural labor migration, control of the encroachment of development on arable land, the reclamation of waste and spoiled land, higher rates of agricultural productivity and land use efficiency, and more effective food distribution systems. At the same time,
China must meet shortfalls in food production through imports, although not to the extent that it exposes itself to the risk of a food embargo (Zhu 1996, 32–33).

Some scholars insist that China's food security strategy be clearly defined in terms of the following elements: a food security warning line, a grain security policy, a united domestic grain market, a grain trade policy, a grain reserve policy, and a grain distribution policy (Zhu 1996, 33–36; Zhong 1995, 7; Cao 1993; Li 1983). Views and proposals incorporating these elements have been provided to both central and local governments.

The Chinese government's attitude to grain security was made clear by Premier Li Peng at the World Food Summit convened in Rome on November 15, 1996. He argued that it is China's fundamental policy goal to develop its agricultural sector in a way that guarantees self-sufficiency. Also, China is willing to set up stable food trade relations with other countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, as well as to strengthen cooperation on agricultural production with other countries in order to realize sustainable agricultural growth (Li Peng 1996b).

**Chaos and Stability**

The late Deng Xiaoping stressed that the linchpin of economic development and the Four Modernizations is stability. Jiang and other Chinese leaders attach a similar importance to domestic stability, pointing out that "stability is the precondition for development and reform, and development and reform in turn support a stable political and social situation. Now that China is in a state of flux, we must consider and handle the relationships among reform, development, and stability" (Jiang 1995b).

At present, the following issues affect China's domestic stability: first, continuing poverty and regional development imbalances (Hu and Wang et al. 1995; Kang 1995); second, the central government's ability to maintain authority and control over the provinces, especially those undergoing rapid change; third, the stability of border areas where some ethnic and religious problems exist; fourth, the growing gap between the rich and the poor and the divergence of interests among different strata; and, fifth, the rise in violent crimes and terrorist activities. In response, the government has adopted various measures to address these problems, most of which are related. These include accelerating the economic development of midwestern China in the latest Five-Year Plan, a new tax distribution system, new initiatives to handle ethnic and religious
relations, and a set of comprehensive measures to clamp down on criminal activity. Meanwhile, the Chinese government is making an appeal to Asia Pacific countries for broad cooperative efforts against smuggling, piracy, and terrorism.

CONCLUSION

China's modernization is now entering a vital stage. Great changes in Chinese society are under way as the economic system adapts to market principles. Accompanying these changes are many problems that have the potential to hinder and jeopardize China's long-term development, notably environmental pollution, rapid population growth, and resource deficiencies. These problems, which are the direct and largely unavoidable side effects of China's socioeconomic development and modernization, require urgent attention.

Research on nontraditional security issues has just started in China. It is obvious that Chinese scholars' definitions of security issues differ from those of Western scholars. In any case, the concept of security after the cold war should include both the traditional and the nontraditional aspects. So far, however, there is no clear-cut definition widely accepted by Chinese scholars.

On the one hand, because many nontraditional security problems transcend national borders, China's scholars and leaders attach great importance to regional and global cooperation in tackling them. On the other hand, compared with traditional security problems nontraditional security problems are more closely related to a country's domestic situation and reflect its national sovereignty, interests, and sociocultural values. Accordingly, China opposes the politicization of these problems in the international arena. Furthermore, China's nontraditional security problems have their own special causes and character, which differ from those of the other Asia Pacific countries. In dealing with such difficult problems, therefore, China should adopt policies and measures that correspond to its own situation. In general, to minimize the potential of nontraditional security problems to produce international friction and even conflict, the Chinese government firmly believes that individual countries should first try to solve their own problems by making policies and taking measures in keeping with their particular situation.

To effectively resolve the problems of environmental pollution and the
deterioration of resources, China should implement appropriate policies for economic development, including the introduction of advanced science and technology and the securing of adequate capital. In the developed countries, environmental pollution caused by industrialization and urbanization is the main environmental problem, whereas for China, which still has largely an agricultural economy, environmental problems include not only those caused by industrialization and urbanization but also the destruction of agricultural ecology. To benefit more from future regional cooperative efforts, most Chinese scholars and government officials believe that China should expand its technological and scientific research and transfers with different countries, as well as secure more capital assistance from abroad.

With nations becoming increasingly interdependent, critical problems such as the supply of resources, energy, food, and other problems related to economic development can be solved only through international cooperation. Environmental, resource, and food diplomacy will inevitably play more important roles. It is necessary, therefore, for scholars and research institutes of the Asia Pacific region to have closer exchanges and cooperation so that good solutions can be found.

However, one of the most critical impediments to cooperative non-traditional security studies research is the fact that each country in the Asia Pacific region has a distinctive definition of “security” and a unique set of priorities. Also, it is difficult to distinguish “nontraditional security” from “traditional security” issues because they are so closely related to each other, as are economic development and security issues. With a clearer understanding of the relationship between nontraditional security and traditional security issues, it will be easier to generate the appropriate level of concern, dispel some political misgivings, and increase confidence about and promote wider cooperation on regional security issues.

NOTES

1. This refers to such institutions as the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the China Institute of International Studies, the Institute of World Economy and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as well as institutes of the armed forces.
2. This refers to the Academy of Macroeconomics in the China State Planning Commission; study groups relating to the State Environmental Protection Administration and the State Meteorological Administration; institutes or special subject groups of industrial, agricultural, population economy, and rural and urban development belonging to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; the Forecast Studies of Chinese Global Trends group composed of the Chinese Academy of Sciences' one hundred scientists; the Center for Ecological Studies; and institutes or special study groups specializing in the atmosphere, environment, and resources.

3. My use of the term in a recent article is, I believe, rare. See Yu (1997).

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