researchers of the United States and American scholars of China have scant knowledge of Japan. With a few exceptions, this is a long-established pattern.

This discontinuity has made it difficult for the actors to establish points of contact for trilateral exchange and has minimized opportunities for three-way endeavors. It is a major fetter to expanding relations to a trilateral basis. This structure is surprisingly deep rooted even in the United States and is serious problem in China, as in Japan. In all three countries, area-studies researchers are too narrowly specialized; they are well versed in their own area but tend to know little about others. What is more, the increasing use of English for policy-oriented multilateral exchange puts Chinese and Japanese specialists on China-Japan relations at a disadvantage.

In view of this situation, initiatives toward trilateral cooperation in all three countries must begin with diversification of the actors, the conscious cultivation of experts who can not only monitor relations among China, Japan, and the United States but also engage in joint study of these relations in the broader context of Asia Pacific and offer policy proposals. I have the impression that this is starting to happen in China and the United States as an older generation of experts gives way to a younger; the problem is more serious in Japan, where generational turnover is slow. Establishment of a new system for cooperation among the policy research institutions that are the nucleus of track two is also required. This means not relying on existing networks alone but promoting the participation of new institutions in order to form more richly layered networks.

We can see big differences in the makeup of policy research institutions in the three countries. The United States has by far the most, chiefly in the private sector; Japan has a moderate number, mostly set up under the government’s aegis; China has relatively few, almost all under direct government control. Policy-oriented research at the university level differs, as well. That track two can accommodate these differences is one of its strengths, but of course they affect its nature. If the relevant institutions are too close to the government, discussions lack flexibility and free debate and forward-looking proposals may be inhibited. In the medium to long term, especially in China and Japan, it is hoped that institutions capable of leading policy debate on the basis of private-sector initiatives will develop and networks expand.

In China, as market-opening reforms have taken root, initiatives toward creation of a new dialogue framework have begun to emerge. The China Reform Forum set up in Beijing in 1994 is one example. This independent NPO, which stretches across business, government, and academe, is trying to enhance dialogue on economic issues and international relations with various other countries. The very concept of a sector embracing business, government, and academe is new in China. There are reported to be over two hundred thousand registered NPOs nationwide and more than three hundred foundations extending grants to such NPOs (Toyota Foundation 1997). Initiatives in Japan to enact a
so-called NPO Law are another highly welcome sign of this trend. In future, more new actors in trilateral intellectual exchange will be needed, not only in policy research institutions but also in major NPOs and international NGOs.

**Increased Funding for the Study of Shared Issues**

The second problem is the need for increased funding of joint research aimed at the resolution of shared problems. In addition to global issues—security, economy, and the environment, for example—the three countries have in common such issues as graying population structures and urbanization. Despite this, insufficient funds are being directed to the promotion of trilateral cooperation to resolve such problems.

I am not proposing funds to benefit China, Japan, and the United States alone. There is no reason not to include ASEAN countries, Russia, South Korea, and even Europe; in addressing some problems, that is actually far preferable. The particular mix of countries and regions is not the issue; the point I am making is that insufficient funds are being directed to the promotion of initiatives with trilateral cooperation as the core, as opposed to funds for bilateral (Japan-U.S., China-Japan, China-U.S.) use or for general multilateral use.

Why such funds are needed is clear. As I have already said, trilateral cooperation is not something that will develop spontaneously. Trilateral cooperation that neither threatens nor excludes other countries cannot be achieved without conscious work over time and without funds. Nevertheless, mid- and long-term funding with this in mind is meager.

Quantity is not the only problem; another is methods and aims of funding, especially in Japan's case. Let me give an example. A number of American foundations have long-standing relationships with China. These include the Asia Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Henry Luce Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Rockefeller Foundation. The Ford Foundation, the world's largest foundation, was the first to establish an office in Beijing that has remained in continuous operation. It began promoting understanding of China in the United States and elsewhere back in the 1950s. It inaugurated programs in China in 1979 and, with the support of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, established an office in Beijing in 1988. From then through September 1995 the Ford Foundation invested about $50 million in China. At present, the Beijing office is headed by the renowned Dutch Sinologist Anthony J. Saich and has an annual budget of about $8 million. Although this is reportedly only about a day's worth of what the World Bank spends on China, the foundation changes its priorities as China's social needs shift and has built up a cooperative network extending from the village to the national level. Present priorities include programs on rural poverty and resources; reproductive health; economic reform and its social consequences; and law, rights, and governance. The foundation is also
bringing Chinese who have studied in the United States to Beijing and involving
them in the education and training of the next generation (Ford Foundation 1995).

In Japan, meanwhile, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and some other foun-
dations have programs to support graduate-level study courses in China or pro-
vide scholarships for Chinese students in Japan. The Japan Foundation has the
largest-scale involvement with China. It began full-fledged programs directed
at China in 1979. After a period in which it seconded staff members to the
Japanese embassy in Beijing, in 1994 it opened its own office in Beijing with an
annual budget of about ¥800 million, roughly the same as the Ford Foundation’s.
But the funds are used mainly to operate Japanese-language programs at the
Beijing Center for Japan Studies, and most other programs are also aimed at
promoting understanding of Japan. In short, they belong to the domain of cul-
tural exchange. Earlier I said that the establishment of the Japan Foundation
Center for Global Partnership in 1991, and with it the inauguration of support
for intellectual exchange, represented a major shift for the Japan Foundation,
but even now the center’s funds are directed mainly at Japan-U.S. endeavors.
The Japan Foundation Asia Center was set up in 1995 to promote initiatives in
Asia similar to those of the Center for Global Partnership, but since its forerun-
er was the ASEAN Culture Center, its programs still target ASEAN; no major
funding is directed toward intellectual exchange with China.

The difference in the American and Japanese approaches to funding is inter-
esting. China has a wide variety of needs, and this disparity in focus presents us
with food for thought as to what kind of mid- and long-term investment is
most conducive to building an enriching relationship. Today, I think, we need
to go beyond the narrow definition of pursuit of the national interest that pre-
vailed during the cold war. If we perceive the success or failure of China-Japan-
U.S. cooperation as crucial to the development of Asia Pacific stability, we will
recognize that it has finally become necessary to invest increased funds in build-
ing solid trilateral cooperation.

Long-term Investment in Human Resource Development

The third problem, considering that trilateral cooperation is becoming increas-
ingly important with the approach of the twenty-first century, is investment in
developing human resources capable of sustaining a cooperative relationship. In
the long term, this means investing in student exchange programs at the level of
higher education; in the medium term, it means investing in policy research by
young researchers.

Figure 1 outlines trilateral investment in student exchange programs in 1995.°
U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 triggered the flow of
Chinese students to the United States. At first there were fewer than forty, a
figure that rose to over one hundred. In 1978, China announced a plan to
dispatch three thousand people overseas, and in 1979, the year bilateral relations were normalized, the number of students traveling to the United States hit the one thousand mark. Thereafter the number grew rapidly, exceeding ten thousand in 1984. In 1985, China drew ahead of Japan, in 1986 the figure exceeded twenty thousand, and in 1988 it reached almost thirty thousand, with China taking over from Taiwan as the top dispatcher of students to the United States. In 1993, the rate of increase fell for the first time, and in 1995 the number of Chinese students in the United States reached 39,613 (about 9 percent of all foreign students there), second only to the 45,531 from Japan. There were 12,018 students from Hong Kong studying in the United States in 1995 as well.

Fig. 1. The Trilateral Flow of Students: Totals in 1995

![Diagram of student flow](https://example.com/diagram.png)

Source: See endnote 6.
Note: 1994 for the number of American students in China.

China and Japan normalized relations in 1972. In 1973, five Chinese students went to Japan, but little headway was made thereafter. In 1978, when China formulated its three-thousand-people plan, there was one Chinese student in Japan, and even the next year there were only 151. In 1981, Japan revised its Immigration Control Law, which now permitted the admission of "trainees," mainly for Japanese-language study. In 1984, the Japanese government announced the One Hundred Thousand Foreign Students Plan. The next year students from China exceeded those from Taiwan, but there were still fewer than two thousand—a tenth the number studying in the United States at the time. After that, however, there was a rapid increase. The total passed ten thousand in 1989, approached twenty thousand in 1992, and reached 24,026 in 1995, about 45 percent of all foreign students in Japan. This was twenty-two times
the 1,087 American students in Japan (the fifth largest number) and about 60 percent the number of Chinese students in the United States (Oka and Fukuda 1995).

In 1994, there were 1,257 American students in China. This figure differs little from that for American students in Japan but is several orders of magnitude lower than the figures for students from China and Japan in the United States. The number of Japanese in China for study or technical training reached 12,947 in 1995, a little over one-third the number of Japanese in the United States for the same purpose and only about half the number of Chinese in Japan. That same year there were 2,121 Japanese in Hong Kong for study or technical training and 1,507 Japanese in Taiwan for the same purpose.

These figures indicate the overwhelming presence of the United States in providing the international intellectual infrastructure for fostering human resources. Japan has been a major beneficiary, but the benefits to China have been especially great. About 82 percent of Chinese students in the United States in 1995 (32,512) were graduate students. (There were more Japanese students in the United States, but only 7,819, or about 17 percent, were graduate students.) What proportion of the Chinese students in Japan that year were graduate students is not known, but extrapolating from the fact that about 35 percent of all foreign students in Japan were graduate students, we can assume that the proportion was much lower than for Chinese students in the United States. There was also a big difference in the number of Chinese doing research in the two countries: 9,228 in the United States (compared with 5,127 Japanese in the United States for research) as opposed to 317 in Japan (147 researchers and 170 university teachers). By comparison, there were only 582 Americans in Japan for research, 82 researchers and 500 teachers. Naturally enough, how and where tomorrow's leaders of intellectual exchange are cultivated will determine the future current of intellectual exchange.

The United States' significance in providing the intellectual infrastructure for students from China has changed surprisingly little in almost a century. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan attracted more Chinese students than the United States, but around 1910, when the quality of Japanese education was under fire, the best and brightest young Chinese began heading for the United States instead. In short, the United States' provision of the world's highest standard of education and its policy of accepting foreign students in order to cultivate the next generation of leaders (from the U.S. viewpoint, the next generation of counterparts) gained support from Chinese even before World War II. The U.S. emphasis on fostering human resources over the medium to long term was also seen in American missionaries' establishment of nineteen universities in prewar China. The United States' "soft power" has fashioned a lasting intellectual link with China.

This, however, is not sufficient for trilateral intellectual exchange. Japan neither sends out nor takes in enough human resources at the graduate level—
future leaders of intellectual exchange—and does not train enough Japanese conversant with China. The cultivation of Americans knowledgeable about China and Japan is also a major task. China is exerting itself to nurture future leaders by sending young people abroad for graduate-level education, but of the approximately 220,000 who have gone overseas since 1979, only “about a third” have returned to China.\(^8\) China also needs to accept more students from other countries. And none of the three countries is bending itself to encourage the cultivation of human resources through three-way exchange. All take a lopsided approach to human resource development. As long as that is so, investment in this area will not help build a sound, long-term relationship of trilateral cooperation. The balanced development of talented human resources capable of utilizing multiple channels is essential for building confidence; all three countries need to make a long-term, multidimensional investment to this end.

**In Conclusion**

Here we have reviewed the process that unleashed the potential of track two intellectual exchange in Asia Pacific in the 1980s and 1990s. Now is the time to apply this experience to the most difficult task of building a trilateral relationship among China, Japan, and the United States.

In recent years, the United States has been stepping up criticism of China in three major areas—human rights, security (especially in the context of Taiwan), and trade—and American warnings of a “Chinese threat” have been growing louder. In Japan, meanwhile, there is a sense that “friendship and goodwill” exchange with China has hit a ceiling, and differing perceptions of Japan’s role in World War II and other issues are clouding bilateral relations. The formation of sister-city links has dropped off rapidly since peaking in 1994, and a growing number of Japanese identify China as a country they dislike. China, too, has been showing increasing distrust of Japan since the latter “redefined” its security relationship with the United States in 1996. The publication of *A China That Can Say No* in 1996 is indicative.

In all three countries, nationalistic sentiment could take a nasty turn. I have already observed that bilateral exchange is structurally insufficient to developing into trilateral exchange, and the present situation, when even bilateral relations are troubled, bodes ill for trilateral cooperation. To keep from scuttling its chances, flexible, process-oriented trilateral dialogue is crucial. Enhancing and sustaining this dialogue calls for diversifying the actors, increasing funding, and undertaking the long-term development of human resources. Such low-key efforts are the only way to build confidence and achieve regional stability. What is needed now is conscious, trilaterally oriented intellectual exchange aimed at the creation of a China-Japan-U.S. intellectual community.
Notes

1. What some call “track three” maneuvering has begun in order to give NGOs greater authority in the setting and disposition of such agenda items as territorial disputes, which tracks one and two have had difficulty handling. Since such efforts are not necessarily of a different dimension, however, I classify all nongovernmental activities as track two for the purposes of this discussion.

2. PECC has continued to operate, and APEC has sought to use it to keep in touch with private-sector thinking. The Eminent Persons Group APEC organized in 1992 and the Pacific Business Forum it set up in 1993 can be seen as track two bodies given birth by this track one forum.

3. The program guidelines of the Center for Global Partnership were finalized in July 1991. I was involved in all the preparations for the center and wrote the draft of its program guidelines, and I can report that there was considerable debate over whether the Japanese translation of intellectual exchange had become a household term and what the English phrase implied. At the start of the 1990s, the concept had not yet been established in Japanese official circles. When the Japan Foundation embarked on the stimulation of intellectual exchange on a global scale, there was reluctance to stop giving top priority to the traditional approach of encouraging cultural exchange designed to help other countries understand Japan. Even when the Japan Foundation embarked on global intellectual exchange, conflicts arose with those still clinging to the idea that exchange should center on efforts to have Japan be better understood in other countries. This remains a bone of contention.

4. Global ThinkNet is a JCIE initiative. Rather than being a huge think tank with many researchers working for it, it is a network-type think tank. Premised on a global perspective on the quality of research and the scope of proposals, it seeks to employ efficiently a very wide network of first-class research institutions and researchers, bringing together the best human resources around the world on an ad hoc basis for research on specific policy issues.

5. Germany’s Friedrich Neumann Foundation also had an office in Beijing but closed it in June 1996, when the Dalai Lama visited Germany at the foundation’s invitation. The British Council and the Japan Foundation have offices there, as well, but both these organizations are government funded.

6. Figures for students to and from the United States are from the Institute of International Education, 1996, Open Doors 1995/96. Figures for students to Japan are from Ministry of Education, 1996, Wagakuni no ryugakusei seido no gaiyo: Ukeire oyobi haken (A brief outline of student exchange of Japan). Figures for students from Japan are from the Ministry of Justice, 1996, Shutsunyakoku kanri tokei nenpo (Statistics on immigration control). In 1995, only the rate of students from Japan and the United States to China showed an increase over the previous year.
7. The first thirteen Chinese students went to Japan in 1896, after Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. The number increased rapidly thereafter, rising to two hundred in 1899, five hundred in 1902, after the Boxer Rebellion, and one thousand in 1903. In 1905, with Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the number jumped to eight thousand and peaked at about ten thousand in 1906. This was an amazing eight hundred-fold rise in ten years. Japan was not equipped to deal with so many Chinese students, however, and the quality of its intensive education became a major problem. As a result, the number began to plummet in 1907, dropping to about half the 1906 figure in 1908, to about one-third in 1911, and to about one-seventh in 1912. Thereafter the number rose again, sustaining a level between two thousand and four thousand into the 1920s. These rapid rises and falls were due partly to changes in Chinese government policy but mostly to the low quality of the education Japan was able to offer and to anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Chinese students began going to the United States in 1874, considerably earlier than to Japan, but the conservative Chinese regime’s fear of the Americanization of its young people led it to stop sending students in 1881. The flow was resumed early in the twentieth century, when the United States’ Open Door policy enabled closer relations with China again. Educational and cultural initiatives flourished: American missionaries engaged in educational activities in China, the Rockefeller Foundation and other organizations undertook social and medical activities there, Harvard and Princeton Universities conducted educational programs there, and the U.S. Government inaugurated a program of bringing Chinese students to the United States. This last was started by President Theodore Roosevelt, who funded it with the more than $10 million in Chinese reparations received after the Boxer Rebellion. Under this program about eighteen hundred Chinese studied in the United States between 1909 and 1929. Although more Chinese students went to Japan, the brightest headed for the United States. About 70 percent attended elite universities, and about half earned master’s degrees or doctorates. According to statistics for 1925, 40 percent of students returning to China became university teachers, almost 20 percent engineers, over 10 percent entrepreneurs, and 10 percent bureaucrats or politicians. Japan, alarmed by this shift, emulated the United States some fifteen years later, inaugurating China-oriented cultural programs with Boxer Rebellion reparations in 1924. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up the Cultural Affairs Department to undertake educational and cultural programs in China, encourage Chinese studies in Japan, and encourage Chinese to study in Japan. Anti-Japanese sentiment was already high, however, and Japanese aggression in China put an end to the endeavor. For details see Abe (1990).

8. Statement by Chinese Minister of Education Zhu Kaixuan, as reported in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 15, 1995. In 1992, the Chinese government launched a bold “appeasement policy” to encourage students who had studied overseas to return, but so far it has had little effect. It is reported that the proportion of returnees is even lower than the Chinese government has admitted. It is hoped that some of those who have remained overseas will act as intermediaries in future intellectual exchange.
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The Japan Center for International Exchange

Founded in 1970, the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) is an independent, nonprofit, and nonpartisan organization dedicated to strengthening Japan's role in international affairs. JCIE believes that Japan faces a major challenge in augmenting its positive contributions to the international community, in keeping with its position as one of the world's largest industrial democracies. Operating in a country where policy-making has traditionally been dominated by the government bureaucracy, JCIE has played an important role in broadening debate on Japan's international responsibilities by conducting international and cross-sectional programs of exchange, research, and discussion.

JCIE creates opportunities for informed policy discussions; it does not take policy positions. JCIE programs are carried out with the collaboration and cosponsorship of many organizations. The contacts developed through these working relationships are crucial to JCIE's efforts to increase the number of Japanese from the private sector engaged in meaningful policy research and dialogue with overseas counterparts.

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