

Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and Preventive Diplomacy

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As ASEAN MOVES toward the formation of an ASEAN Community by 2015, and as Japan re-engages with its Asian neighbors under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, both ASEAN and Japan must consider what role they can play in regional security in the coming years. There is increasing awareness among ASEAN members that Asian states have a wider responsibility to ensure peace and security not only within the region, but potentially around the world. As 2015 approaches, discussions regarding greater action in this area have taken place under the framework of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). However, ASEAN has yet to reach consensus on several of the proposals being discussed under the APSC.

In Japan, the future of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) proved to be an election issue in 2012. During the election campaign, suggestions were made that the SDF might eventually be reformed into a force able to more freely conduct overseas operations. In 2013, this debate has continued, with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government under Prime Minister Abe exploring the potential changes to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution that would be required to reform the SDF. Since 1992, there has been a gradual loosening of the restrictions governing the SDF's activities, but the SDF's status and Japan's role in regional security will continue to be a contentious issue for Japanese politics.

It is in this broader context, for both ASEAN and Japan, that there is the potential for peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and preventive diplomacy. While traditional peacekeeping under the UN model will remain important, and there are good prospects for cooperation in training and capacity building in this area, there is a growing need to think beyond the UN, and to develop civilian-led peacebuilding and regionally led preventive diplomacy.

Peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy are promising avenues for ASEAN and Japan to play a proactive role in maintaining peace and stability, while not compromising mutually held principles of noninterference.

In the APSC, for instance, some members have suggested the creation of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. Although others have expressed reservations, citing potential sensitivities, such thinking is a considerable step forward for the group. Thus far, ASEAN officials have only agreed to more modest initiatives such as sharing training and best practices for peacekeeping among the armed forces of ASEAN members, as well as supporting regional dialogues among defense officials. Support and encouragement from other non-ASEAN partners may assist in this development for both ASEAN and the wider Asia Pacific.

This paper discusses ASEAN and Japan's shared history in maintaining peace and security in the region, beginning with a review of traditional peacekeeping operations. Although both ASEAN member states and Japan have had successful involvement in UN peacekeeping, political dynamics and sensitivities make it unlikely that ASEAN states and Japan will play a greatly expanded role in peacekeeping operations in the near term. There is, however, considerable potential for ASEAN and Japan to become more involved in peacebuilding, in providing humanitarian and technical assistance in post-conflict situations, as well as in the practice of preventive diplomacy.

JAPAN AND THE UN TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA

The UN bases peacekeeping on three basic principles: the consent of governments where peacekeepers are deployed, the impartiality of peacekeepers, and the non-use of force (except in self-defense and defense of their mandate). Both Japan and the members of ASEAN have provided forces to UN peacekeeping operations. A high point was Japan's first participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, which is today an ASEAN member. The Cambodian peace process was a critical diplomatic effort for ASEAN and a formative experience for the group in its early years, and Japan's role may be regarded as a milestone in ASEAN-Japan relations.

Throughout the 1980s, ASEAN took action to draw attention to the situation in Cambodia at the international level, mainly through bilateral diplomacy and by keeping Cambodia on the agenda in the UN General Assembly while the subject was stalled at the UN Security Council level due to the Soviet Union's veto. However, it was only in 1989 that significant

progress was made, with the convening of the “Conference on Peace in Cambodia” (Paris Peace Conference) in July–August 1989, involving the Cambodian factions, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, ASEAN states, and other countries. Japan began to play a leading role in the peace negotiations at this stage, alongside Indonesia and Australia, and eventually served as host for a further meeting of the Cambodian factions in 1990. The final “Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict” (Paris Agreements) were signed in October 1991 in France. Following the ceasefire agreement, the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia was dispatched between October 1991 and March 1992, after which it was subsumed by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Over its 18-month mandate, UNTAC would eventually oversee Cambodia’s successful elections and the establishment of a stable government.

Progressing from its involvement in the peace negotiations, Japan played a leading role in UNTAC from the beginning, contributing some 1,300 SDF personnel, civilian police officers, and election monitors.² The establishment of UNTAC in 1992 was the first deployment of SDF troops under the “Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations” (PKO Act). Japanese leadership was also apparent in the UN’s choice of leaders of UNTAC, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi, the first Japanese citizen to hold such a post.³

The decision to become involved in UNTAC was not an easy one for the Japanese authorities, particularly with regards to deployment of the SDF. Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese constitution, established in the wake of World War II, formally renounces war as an instrument of foreign policy.⁴ When Japan established the SDF in 1954, it was founded for national defense, with prohibitions against its deployment overseas. However, there was always a fundamental tension between Japan’s caution against deploying its troops and the feeling of many that Japan had a responsibility to contribute to international peace and security. The 1992 PKO Act was an attempt to reconcile this dichotomy by allowing the SDF to be involved in UN peacekeeping operations (including ceasefire monitoring), international humanitarian relief, and international election observations.⁵

When the PKO Act was finally passed, it imposed heavy restrictions on the overseas dispatch of the SDF, including five basic principles, one of which limited SDF troops to minimum use of force, and only in self-defense. A freeze was also imposed on many peacekeeping activities, effectively restricting the SDF only to rear-support missions.⁶ Some of these initial prohibitions have since been loosened; in December 2001, the freeze on acceptable peacekeeping activities was lifted, and the law was also amended

to allow SDF personnel to use force in protecting people “under their control,” not merely in self-defense.⁷

But in 1992, many in Japan were critical even of the original, more conservative PKO Act. Opinion polls showed that a majority of the Japanese public felt the SDF’s overseas deployment was constitutionally questionable.⁸ However, then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa insisted that Japan had to fulfill its obligations and remain in Cambodia until the completion of the country’s elections later that year.⁹

It is now generally accepted that, although not without setbacks and challenges, UNTAC was a success. The effort led by Japan eased Cambodia’s transition by helping to maintain order and supervising the key elections that established Cambodia’s national government.¹⁰

Despite UNTAC’s success, involvement in UNTAC posed great challenges to Japan’s domestic politics. The Japanese debate on the acceptable role of the SDF has not subsided but has instead continued to the present, especially in relation to Japan’s alliance with and support for the United States.¹¹ In January 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Abe confirmed that the LDP will seek to change the country’s constitution to further lift restrictions on the ability of Japan’s armed forces to operate overseas, a prospect that was raised during the 2012 elections.

The concept that the SDF is technically not a military remains deeply ingrained in Japanese society. This is notwithstanding the fact that Japan’s defense spending is currently ranked the sixth highest in the world. Many lawmakers are uncertain about the implications of changing the constitution, which has not been formally altered since it was created in 1947. Constitutional amendments in Japan must also be ratified by a national referendum, and the public remains divided on the issue.

ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY AND PEACEKEEPING

Compared with Japan, ASEAN countries face far fewer legal restrictions on the deployment of their armed forces. Several ASEAN member countries already make significant contributions of personnel to UN peacekeeping efforts. As of June 2012, Indonesia was ranked 15th in the world out of 120 countries contributing military and police personnel to current UN peacekeeping operations. Indonesia had 1,997 personnel deployed, placing it just ahead of China. Two other ASEAN members that placed relatively high in the rankings were Malaysia at 18th and the Philippines at 29th.¹²

The limits for ASEAN in this area relate more to questions of political will and agreed modes of cooperation outside of the UN. It is notable, for example, that most UN peacekeeping operations and other international efforts to assist peace processes in Southeast Asia have been headed by countries outside the grouping.

The exception has been in the case of the various UN missions to Timor-Leste.¹³ Although the initial UN operations in that country were Australian-led, a Thai military officer, Lieutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit, took charge as the Peacekeeping Force Commander for over a year, with his command ending in August 2001. In addition to Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore contributed personnel. Notably, Japan was also a major supporter of the UN missions to Timor-Leste, deploying some 690 SDF personnel to the country in 2002, the largest single Japanese contribution to a peacekeeping operation to date.¹⁴

Looking ahead, ASEAN members have committed to playing a greater role in ensuring the Asian region's peace and security as part of the APSC. Under the APSC Blueprint, ASEAN members have agreed to promote peacekeeping capabilities within the grouping. Five ASEAN member states have already established national peacekeeping centers for training purposes—Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

In May 2011, at the 5th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in Jakarta, ASEAN members agreed to tie their national centers into an ASEAN-wide network of peacekeeping centers under a plan spearheaded by Indonesia and Thailand. According to the joint declaration issued at the end of the 5th ADMM, the establishment of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network “seeks to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping among all ASEAN Member States including cooperation to facilitate and utilize existing national peacekeeping centres to conduct planning, training, and exchange of experiences for peacekeeping operations with a view to developing a regional arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability in ASEAN Member States.”¹⁵

In addition to joint training and information sharing, the Peacekeeping Centres Network aims to help the five ASEAN member states that do not currently have their own peacekeeping centers establish such capabilities. However, the initiative is still in its early stages, with the 1st ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network Meeting only having taken place in September 2012. Defense officials have also highlighted the practical challenges ASEAN faces in setting up peacekeeping centers, for instance a shortage of physical infrastructure to train troops in peacekeeping operations, limited resources, a lack of common language skills, and inexperience in interoperability among ASEAN forces.¹⁶

Despite the challenges, proponents of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force see the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres as a stepping stone toward their final goal. Indonesia has been supporting the creation of such a force in conjunction with the ASEAN Community since 2002 and has most recently called for the creation of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force by 2015–2020. The Philippines has reacted favorably to Indonesia’s suggestion of creating a formal peacekeeping force, but other ASEAN states have clearly stated their reservations.

In 2004, Singaporean Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Jayakumar said ASEAN is the “wrong entity to play a peacekeeping role,” emphasizing that ASEAN is not a security and defense organization. Then Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien agreed it was “too early” to establish an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, and the creation of one would be difficult as “each country has its own policy about politics and the military.” And that same year, Thailand’s Foreign Affairs Minister Surakiart Sathirathai was quoted as saying, “There is no conflict in the region which would need the mobilization of such a force.”¹⁷

While attitudes may not be stagnant, there are some underlying signs that still point to a reluctance on the part of some ASEAN members to fully accept the proposal. Indeed, the reluctance of ASEAN countries to consider more formal regional cooperation on peacekeeping is not surprising, given ASEAN’s adherence to the principles of noninterference and respect for state sovereignty—principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter.

There are a number of instances that demonstrate the possible sensitivities, especially several ongoing conflicts within ASEAN. For example, in the long-running problems in Thailand’s southern provinces and northern Myanmar, where government forces continue to clash with rebels, there have been no serious suggestions of international involvement at the ASEAN or UN levels in the conflicts. Smaller steps in the realm of high diplomacy have instead been preferred.

For instance, in 2009 Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak paid a visit to Thailand’s southern provinces alongside Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. Thailand’s southern provinces are along the border with Malaysia, and the insurgency there involves an ethnic group that claims religious and kinship ties with the Malays in Malaysia. However, Mr. Najib repeatedly stressed that the conflict was a domestic issue for Thailand and that any Malaysian efforts to resolve the conflict would only be carried out in cooperation with the Thai government. To date, Malaysian involvement has been purely diplomatic, for instance in encouraging peace talks between insurgents and Thai authorities, and in campaigning on Thailand’s behalf

to dissuade other Organization of the Islamic Conference members from censuring Thailand.

There have also been cases of governments in ASEAN inviting neighboring countries to oversee ceasefires and implement peace agreements, but these have been largely civilian efforts and done at the express invitation of the national authorities involved. In 2004, the Philippines invited a Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team to oversee the ceasefire between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, with the team including personnel from Brunei, Japan, Libya, and the EU. Malaysia has also been actively engaged as the broker and host of peace talks between the Philippine authorities and the MILF, resulting in the framework agreement currently being negotiated in 2013 that is expected to lead to a final peace deal. In 2005, five ASEAN members—Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—also participated in an EU-led civilian mission to Aceh, assisting in implementing the Memorandum of Understanding between the government of Indonesia and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or the Free Aceh Movement).

Other recent events have also demonstrated how concerns over sovereignty remain an issue for peaceful resolution of conflicts between ASEAN members. In July 2011, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued provisional measures on the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand—a dispute between two sovereign states rather than a civil conflict as the one described above. Both sides were ordered to withdraw troops from the area surrounding the historic Preah Vihear temple and to establish a demilitarized zone. Notably, the ICJ also ordered both states to allow observers from ASEAN into the demilitarized zone to monitor the ceasefire. However, the case also highlights the sensitivities and difficulties that occur in such situations.

The prospect of sending neutral observers to the area had already been suggested earlier in 2011 by Indonesia, then the chair of ASEAN. Before the ICJ ruling, Cambodia had agreed to allow unarmed Indonesian observers, signing terms of reference in May 2011, ahead of the ASEAN Summit in Jakarta. But Thailand had expressed reservations over the plan despite Indonesia's careful insistence that the team would be merely observers and not peacekeepers.

With the ICJ's ruling, Thailand agreed to abide by the court's decision. But implementation of the ICJ's orders has been slow, and to date there has been no deployment of the promised observers, who would be Indonesian personnel under the auspices of ASEAN. This is largely due to reservations on the part of the Thai military and authorities about the characterization of the observer team, its diplomatic status, and whether the team would include

uniformed soldiers, which would be viewed as posing a challenge to Thai sovereignty. Fortunately, tensions have calmed since mid-2011, with both Thailand and Cambodia keen to avoid a breakdown in relations. However, with an ICJ verdict on the case due by October 2013, the territorial dispute remains a political issue for both countries.

PEACEBUILDING AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

As the above examples demonstrate, the challenge to peacekeeping arrangements in ASEAN may not be a lack of ability or resources, but rather a question of norms and political will. ASEAN traditionally adheres to the norm of noninterference in a country's internal affairs as part of the ASEAN way.¹⁸ Yet new challenges and ambitions—especially the drive to create an APSC—require a commitment to wider principles of peace and security.

For instance, the APSC calls on ASEAN to increase its efforts to support post-conflict reconciliation and humanitarian assistance.¹⁹ This echoes the UN concept of peacebuilding in calling for the international community to take action in solidifying peace beyond the mere absence of fighting. Such assistance would go beyond ensuring basic safety and security in a country, to supporting political processes and even efforts to revitalize a country's economy.²⁰ For both ASEAN and Japan, the wider definition of peacebuilding (as compared with the relatively narrow definition of UN peacekeeping) offers opportunities for states to contribute humanitarian assistance, undertaking actions that would not be considered political or military involvement or interference in another state's internal affairs.

Timor-Leste is one example of where ASEAN members and other Asian states such as Japan have taken the initiative to offer assistance beyond the remit of UN peacekeeping operations. Since Timor-Leste gained independence from Indonesia and was formally established as a sovereign state in May 2002, neighboring Asian countries—including ASEAN members and Japan—have contributed to the country's development. Asian states have contributed military and police forces to the UN missions to Timor-Leste, but there has also been considerable support from governments for critical infrastructure projects in Timor-Leste, such as Japanese grants for water and irrigation projects. ASEAN states and Japan have also made human resource capacity and institution building a priority, helping to create strong legal systems and providing training in areas such as financial administration, health, and agriculture.

Another potential area of action for ASEAN and Japan is preventive diplomacy within Asia Pacific.²¹ Preventive diplomacy refers to action taken at

the earliest possible stage to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. In 2005, UN member states at the World Summit committed to building a culture of prevention. Subsequently, in 2011, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a report on preventive diplomacy in which it was acknowledged that although proactive efforts to prevent conflict are not easy, prevention is cheaper than the cure. The significant political effort and the economic costs of prevention are far outweighed by the economic impact and the lives lost from war. For that reason, building up capacity in this area is “without doubt, one of the smartest investments we can make.” The report further argues that regional organizations are critical to successful preventive diplomacy, as they have unique influence on, leverage over, and access to crisis situations in their region.

ASEAN’s APSC Blueprint emphasizes the need to further develop conflict prevention and confidence-building measures, such as the existing ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM+8), both of which are regional processes involving the 10 ASEAN countries as well as Japan. ASEAN has long been committed to the pacific settlement of disputes, but the APSC Blueprint suggests that ASEAN could establish stronger dispute settlement mechanisms or further strengthen existing modes of dispute settlement.²²

Proponents of preventive diplomacy recognize that it is difficult for outsiders to persuade parties to seek peace. Moreover, especially in civil conflicts, parties are often concerned about sovereignty and resistant to outside interference in internal affairs. This is precisely why a delicate approach involving regional organizations is called for, such as encouraging parties to engage in dialogue and mediation outside the international spotlight, or sending civilian-led missions to the area.²³ The secretary-general’s report specifically cites ASEAN as a potential partner for the UN in this regard.

The concept of preventive diplomacy is in line with the political culture of ASEAN, as well as Japan’s own norms and principles. Some discussion has taken place at the Track 1 and Track 2 levels on the possibility of the ARF in promoting prevention. The ARF is an international security forum hosted by ASEAN, involving the 10 ASEAN members as well as dialogue partners (including Japan), observers, and other parties, for a total of some 27 participants. Thus far the ARF has focused on confidence-building measures in the region, but a preventive diplomacy role would be a logical evolution of the forum’s existing activities.²⁴

However, progress on preventive diplomacy as applied via the ARF has been slow due to several concerns. Some practices of preventive diplomacy, such as the use of fact-finding missions and the offer of good offices, may

be interpreted by some to amount to interference in the internal affairs of a state, which may contradict the ASEAN norm of noninterference in the internal affairs of countries. In addition, the practice of preventive diplomacy may require a greater degree of institutionalization for the ARF, and the ARF parties have traditionally been wary of elaborate, fixed institutions and rigid rules-based procedures.

Given the norm of noninterference, the ARF also cannot adopt broader definitions of preventive diplomacy that may encompass the threat of military deployment or sanctions; such coercive measures would not be appropriate given the ARF's remit. However, it is possible that the ARF may come to encompass preventive diplomacy that is clearly limited to its core element of strictly diplomatic measures. The challenge will be to ensure that the ARF is consistent and fair in its application of such measures. Principles that guide any ARF practice of preventive diplomacy will need to be discussed and mutually accepted by ARF members and by ASEAN member states. Thus officials are approaching the prospect of the ARF playing a role in preventive diplomacy cautiously. But while the initial optimism may have waned, it remains an important and even essential step ahead for the region.²⁵



As ASEAN moves toward the formation of an ASEAN Community by 2015, the onus will be on the grouping to demonstrate its commitment to peace and security to its member states, its peoples, the region, and the international community. Similarly, as Japan re-engages with its neighbors under Prime Minister Abe, Japan will need to consider its status and position in Asia, especially in the area of peace and security.

Traditional peacekeeping in the UN model will remain an important touchstone and framework for ASEAN members and Japan. This, however, has to be combined with ASEAN and regional efforts. If there is consensus within the ASEAN grouping, member countries should cooperate to build peacekeeping capacity through efforts such as the initiative to create an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network. If this path is to be undertaken successfully, then non-ASEAN partners will be needed. Given the strong ASEAN-Japan relationship both generally and in this area, Japan will be an important partner for ASEAN.

Taking advantage of the capacity and expertise of the SDF and other Japanese authorities, Japan can assist ASEAN security forces in developing these capabilities. Moreover, by anchoring these efforts within a framework set by ASEAN collectively and within principles of peace and cooperation,

ASEAN and Japan can together ensure that any efforts to expand security capabilities are perceived to be directed toward peace, avoiding perceptions of militarization and aggression.

There is considerable potential for countries to invest more in peacebuilding initiatives, providing not merely troops or police officers, but also sharing technology and training to help create the conditions for long-term stability. Given their wealth of experience, ASEAN and Japan are well placed to help countries or territories in the region create civic institutions, construct key physical infrastructure, and build their human resources.

It is equally important that countries consider building greater capacity for preventive diplomacy, be it at the bilateral, multilateral, or regional level. In addition to hosting forums like the ARF and potentially providing a platform for such diplomacy, there is also a need for the foreign ministries of Asian countries to train and equip diplomats to play the role of envoys and mediators.²⁶

Ultimately, it is in the interest of Asian states to lead efforts to avoid conflict in the region before international military intervention or a peacekeeping operation becomes necessary. Both ASEAN and Japan are currently seeking to play a greater role in regional security. However, military involvement, even peacekeeping, poses a difficult question for ASEAN members and Japan due to their mutual and strong adherence to the norm of noninterference in another sovereign state's internal affairs. Civilian-led peacebuilding initiatives and diplomatic efforts are promising avenues for states to avoid compromising their principles, while still playing a proactive role in ensuring the region's peace and security.

NOTES

1. Simon S.C. Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) and associate professor of law at the National University of Singapore. Aaron Choo is a researcher at the SIIA.
2. In total, UNTAC involved some 21,000 military and civilian personnel from over 30 countries.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan's Efforts on Peacebuilding: Towards Consolidation of Peace and Nation-Building* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).
4. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution reads, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

5. Prior to the passing of the 1992 PKO Act, an earlier bill in 1990 regarding Japanese involvement in UN peacekeeping operations had been rejected by Japanese lawmakers. See William Heinrich, Akiho Shibata, and Soeya, Yoshihide, *United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: A Guide to Japanese Policies* (New York: United Nations University, 1999).
6. Article 6(7) of the PKO Act reads, “(1) Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflict; (2) Consent for conduct of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as from the parties to armed conflict; (3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, and not favor any of the parties to in the armed conflict; (4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps may suspend International Peace Cooperation Assignments. Unless the requirements are satisfied again quickly, the Government of Japan may terminate the dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignments; (5) The use of weapons shall be within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances.”
7. Frank A. Stengel, “The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Japan’s Ambivalent Stance on UN Peace Operations,” *Japan aktuell: Journal of Current Japanese Affairs* 01/2008: 37–55.
8. The issue was seized upon by the Japanese opposition, but even some LDP members and cabinet ministers would come to question Japan’s involvement in UNTAC. In 1993, following the second death of a Japanese national in Cambodia, Junichiro Koizumi, then minister of posts and telecommunications, argued for the withdrawal of Japanese peacekeepers and volunteers in Cambodia on the basis that the Japanese public had not counted on Japanese personnel being killed and would not accept further deaths. The situation in Cambodia had indeed become more complex, with the Khmer Rouge effectively withdrawing from the peace process despite their initial agreement. See Rinn-Sup Shinn and Lois B McHugh, *Japanese Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Washington DC: Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, 1992).
9. Daisuke Akimoto, “The Shift from Negative Pacifism to Positive Pacifism: Japan’s Contribution to Peacekeeping in Cambodia,” *Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 31 (2012): 120–31.
10. Lucy Keller, “UNTAC in Cambodia—From Occupation, Civil War and Genocide to Peace,” in *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* Vol. 9, ed. Von Bogdandy et al. (Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 2005).
11. In 2001, the debate reignited when an anti-terrorism law was passed, allowing Japan to support the US war on terror. Japan would go on to provide logistical support to US operations in Afghanistan, and Japanese personnel were deployed to perform security roles in Iraq.
12. Military and police contributions to UN operations come mostly from large countries in Asia and Africa. Of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, only China and France currently contribute significant numbers of personnel. Among other East Asians, South Korea and Japan also contribute significant numbers of military and police personnel, ranking 32nd and 33rd respectively. United Nations, “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, 30 Jun 2012,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/june12_2.pdf.

13. These missions include the International Force for East Timor, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor, and the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste.
14. Mely Caballero-Anthony and Holly Haywood, "Defining ASEAN's Role in Peace Operations: Helping to Bring Peacebuilding 'Upstream?'" *Civil-Military Working Papers* (Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, Australian Government) 3/2010.
15. "Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Strengthening Defence Cooperation of ASEAN in the Global Community to Face New Challenges," 5th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, May 2011, Jakarta, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/joint-declaration-of-the-asean-defence-ministers-on-strengthening-defence-cooperation-of-asean-in-the-global-community-to-face-new-challenges-jakarta-19-may-2011>.
16. ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, "Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network," 5th ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, Jakarta, Indonesia, May 19, 2011.
17. Adrian Kuah, "The ASEAN Security Community: Struggling with the Details," *IDSS Commentaries* 21/2004.
18. Mely Caballero-Anthony and Amitav Acharya, eds. *UN Peace Operations and Asian Security* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 123–5.
19. ASEAN, *ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint*. (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009).
20. Peacebuilding was first introduced as a formal concept at the UN level in then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*. Currently, the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee defines peacebuilding as "a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development." See United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation* (New York: UN Secretariat, 2010).
21. The concept of preventive diplomacy was first articulated in the 1950s by then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, but the notion has been gaining increasing attention in recent years. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992).
22. Ban Ki-moon, "Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results" (Report of the UN Secretary-General), S/2011/552 (26 August 2011).
23. Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).
24. Simon S.C. Tay, "Preventive Diplomacy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: Principles and Possibilities," in *The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Desmond Ball (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 131) (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1999).
25. Simon S.C. Tay, "Attempts at a Regional Architecture" in *Pacific Asia 2022: Sketching Futures of a Region*, ed. Simon S.C. Tay (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2005), 192–224.
26. Simon S.C. Tay, "Institutions and Processes: Dilemmas and Possibilities," in *Reinventing ASEAN*, ed. Simon S.C. Tay et al. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 243–72.