In an article on the goals and prospects of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations over the next 25 years, Noordin Sopiee, one of the most internationally renowned strategists in Southeast Asia, states that ASEAN should aspire to be “what can be called the ASEAN Community” to achieve “sub-regional and regional resilience” (Sopiee 1992, 18). Resilience is a term often used by Southeast Asian leaders, particularly in reference to nations’ ability to withstand communist threats. The concept of regional resilience, a natural and logical extension of the national version, requires ASEAN members to “cooperate with each other in every possible way in order to promote their strength as a region based on the principles of self-confidence, self-help, mutual respect, mutual cooperation, and solidarity, which are the foundations for a solidified and viable community of Southeast Asian nations, in their pursuit of regional prosperity and security” (Tamaki 1995, 217). Whatever its specific objectives may be, a regional group of countries, such as ASEAN, is certain to be most effective in attaining its goals and strongest against aggression when it reaches the level of a transnational community. As his first proposal for a full-fledged ASEAN community, Sopiee suggests that members should “generate a higher level of sense of community, cohesion and commitment to ASEAN” (1992, 17).

What then are the requirements for a transnational community? It should be underpinned by a formal political framework, such as a treaty and a treaty organization. If, however, this is the sole foundation of the group’s solidarity, it is liable to disintegrate should the treaty be abrogated. Most of today’s regional and subregional groupings are economically motivated, based on the prospects of mutual benefits resulting from a high degree of economic interdependence. Excessive interdependence, however, can be anticommunal, as frequently exemplified by the economic
frictions between the United States and Japan. “It can be argued that mere economic interaction and linkages are not sufficient as a basis for a regional community. In fact, these could turn out to be a source of acrimonious economic tensions and conflicts among the nations of the region” (Yamamoto 1995, 3).

It obviously takes something more to upgrade a group of nations to a regional community. Yamamoto Tadashi notes, “It is hard to establish a community without some viable shared visions or interests and greater stability in the human and institutional interactions among the nations within the region” (1995, 3). Numerous other writings on the process of building an Asia Pacific community testify to the same needs. Robert Manning and Paula Stern, for example, agree that “even now, as the Asia-Pacific’s regional institutions are embryonic, a host of economic, political, military, and psychological trends suggest that the cherished aspiration—a common psychology of belonging, reflecting shared interests, responsibilities, values, and mutual respect—may prove to be a chimera” (1994, 80). They go on to declare that “trade, investment, and a Pacific coastline do not necessarily make for a broader sense of community” (80).

Yasui Sankichi offers additional insight into this matter. Although he admits that moves to create an Asia Pacific regional community are motivated by the desire “to strengthen and further intensify the region’s economic dynamism and mutual interdependence,” he also observes that “many have pointed out the indispensability of the establishment and intensification of some sorts of interactions in the cultural sphere in order for the Asia Pacific to realize genuine regional integration” (1994, 67). He goes on to quote several experts, including Watanabe Akio, of Aoyama Gakuin University, who emphasizes the importance of cultural exchange, including student exchange programs, to nurture the “shared human sympathy” that is essential for sustained economic cooperation among nations; Aoki Tamotsu, of Osaka University, who stresses the importance of building a “common Asian home” or Asian community; Funabashi Yoichi, of the Asahi Shimbun, who claims that, to stabilize and institutionalize the Asia Pacific community, it will have to nurture a spiritual community for coprosperity; and former U.S.
Secretary of State James Baker, who underscores the need for “a strong sense of community based on prosperity and common values” (Yasui 1994, 71). All of these comments point to a common understanding that a transnational regional grouping requires some shared sense of community.

Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has said that although ASEAN is one of the smallest blocs in the United Nations, on many issues it has been the second most effective bloc (Sopiee 1992). If governmental agreements and business transactions are not enough, what has been the source of this third, and perhaps most crucial, requirement for the formation of a regional community capable of winning Kirkpatrick’s admiration? My hypothesis is that this critical requirement has been supplied by so-called nonstate actors—that is, “civil society” organizations, particularly policy research institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—and that this will continue to be the case for the ASEAN-10.

It has been some time since the role of nonstate actors in international relations first attracted intellectual attention. In a famous Foreign Affairs article, Jessica Mathews stated:

The end of the Cold War has brought no mere adjustment among states but a novel redistribution of power among states, markets, and civil society. National governments are not simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. They are sharing powers—including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while.” (1997, 50)

A few years earlier, Jusuf Wanandi, the dean of Southeast Asia’s international relations experts and a staunch advocate of the Asia Pacific community, asserted that “international relations, which have been based on relations among sovereign states as laid down by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, are now undergoing a fundamental change because relations among groups
of people and even among individuals have also become an essential part of international relations” (1992, 7). These “relations among groups of people and even among individuals” seem to be a perfect vehicle for building a sense of community across national boundaries.

Indeed, the contribution of nonstate actors to the consolidation of an international community has a precedent in one of the most successful and effective regional communities, namely, that linking the United States and Europe across the Atlantic.

THE ROLE OF NONSTATE ACTORS IN POSTWAR TRANSatlANTIC RELATIONS

Pre–World War II

U.S.-European relations in the post–World War II era are commonly referred to as “special” or “unique.” They have been tested by a number of grave challenges but have survived and persisted, serving as the basis for the world’s most successful regional community, particularly during the height of the cold war. Transatlantic relations are regarded as unique not only because of the degree of integration among the parties involved but also because of the active participation of informal, nongovernmental institutions in dialogues on managing the relationship and keeping it healthy. The contributions of these nonstate actors to the close relationship among policy leaders and thinkers across the ocean have been remarkable, and they are something any other aspiring international community would like to emulate.

The involvement of nongovernmental institutions actually predates World War II. Two of the most influential research institutions in international relations, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (established in 1919) and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London (1920), were founded on the basis of a nongovernmental agreement between people in the United Kingdom and the United States that independent institutions for public enlightenment should be established to facilitate discussions and dialogues on issues facing the two countries and the entire world among leaders of the private sector as well as political leaders, a precursor of today’s track
two diplomacy. At the base of this agreement was a keen common awareness across the Atlantic that international relations were too important to be left solely to governments, which had, after all, failed to contain World War I. The same awareness led to the establishment of a series of like-minded institutions, including the Foreign Policy Association (1918), the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (1919), the Century Foundation (1919; formerly the Twentieth Century Foundation), the National Bureau of Economic Research (1920), the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (1922), the Brookings Institution (1927), the National Planning Association (1934), and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (1943) in the United States and the Graduate Institute of International Affairs (1927) and the Institute of Policy (1932) in the United Kingdom.

These and other independent U.S. institutions actively opposed the isolationist policy of the U.S. government and contributed to the expansion of the U.S. role in prewar international affairs. U.S. interest in the League of Nations was encouraged by the activities of these groups, leading to the U.S. commitment to the foundation of the United Nations after the war. The Council on Foreign Relations, in particular, promoted the public movement to demand that the U.S. government assist the British and French governments in response to the rise of Nazi power. Its Research Project on War and Peace, which aimed to explore America’s political, economic, and strategic goals after the war, is considered to have made a great contribution to the establishment of the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

Most of the large-scale philanthropic foundations in the United States, which have assisted these nongovernmental activities financially, were also established in this period, including the Carnegie Corporation in 1911; the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913; the Ford, Lilly, Kettering, Sloan, and Kellogg foundations in the 1920s and 1930s; and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 1940.

Post–World War II to the Mid-1960s
The period immediately following World War II through the mid-1960s is regarded as that of reconstruction of the transatlantic relationship after the devastation during the war. In light of the simultaneous challenges of defense against the Soviet Union and the reconstruction of war-devastated Europe, political leaders and policy planners on both sides decided that transatlantic relations were the cornerstones of security and economic development. From this conviction, a layer of Atlanticists emerged among policy elites in Europe and the United States. As governments faced mountains of tasks that they obviously could not handle alone, nongovernmental institutions played an important role in sponsoring a variety of forums for policy consultations among political and intellectual leaders, immensely contributing to mutual confidence among leaders. This eventually led to the evolution of new economic and political institutions within Europe and across the Atlantic, thus supporting both the transatlantic alliance and European integration.

The most outstanding example of these activities was indisputably the Bilderberg Conference inaugurated in May 1954 at the Bilderberg Hotel in the Dutch city of Rotterdam. This annual, nongovernmental conference on important transatlantic issues is still attended by presidents, prime ministers, and key cabinet members from participating countries as well as leading private citizens. In the 1950s and 1960s, the regular participants in this conference were referred to as the Atlanticists, and their major concerns were how to resolve issues and problems that could damage U.S.-European relations. Aside from the policy impact of these discussions, the true contribution of the Bilderberg Conference is said to lie in the personal relationships conference participants cultivate with their counterparts. A founding U.S. participant testifies that by the time he became a key member of the U.S. State Department, he had come to know almost all of Europe’s political leaders on a personal level (Yamamoto 1988). With these kinds of personal relationships, potential problems, bilateral or regional, can be dealt with, even by a few phone calls, before they become politicized, a situation that does not exist in the case of the U.S.-Japan relationship despite an equal, if not higher, degree of economic interdependence.
U.S. nongovernmental initiatives led to the establishment of a few institutions for research and policy dialogue, including the American Council on German Affairs (1946) to promote bilateral relations and mutual understanding, the Salzburg Seminar (1947) to promote mutual understanding between Europe and the United States, and the Atlantic Council of the United States (1961) to promote the Atlantic community, as well as more general international relations institutions such as the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, and the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. Most of these institutions initially focused on transatlantic relations. U.S. philanthropic foundations also helped establish a number of research institutions and organizations for policy consultation in Europe in the absence of assistance from European governments, which were preoccupied with the more urgent reconstruction requirements.

On the other side of the Atlantic, too, partly supported by U.S. foundations, a few important nongovernmental institutions were established, including the Koenigswinter Konferenz (Anglo-German Conference), established in 1950 to democratize Germany and strengthen Anglo-German relations; the Wilton Park Conference, started in 1946 to discuss political, economic, and social issues common to the Atlantic countries; Atlantik Brucke (Bridge over the Atlantic), established in 1951; the Ditchley Foundation, established in 1958 to promote understanding on issues of common concern between the United Kingdom and the United States; and the Atlantic Institute, which promoted dialogue and cooperation among members of the Atlantic alliance.

Though embryonic, U.S.-European relations in those days, before the great schism caused by U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam, are often referred to as the golden age of transatlantic diplomacy. Nongovernmental initiatives were the driving force behind that golden age.

**The Mid-1960s to the Late 1970s**

The ten-odd years from the mid-1960s through the late 1970s were the low tide of the postwar U.S.-European relationship. Disagreements over the Vietnam War and policies toward the Soviet Union as well as increased economic competition forced leaders on both sides to review the
viability of the relationship and its underlying foundations. The emergence of new actors on the international stage, particularly Japan and China, also complicated the picture. Although a number of leading nongovernmental institutions and forums tried to respond by adopting Asia Pacific–related and/or Japan-related agendas or inviting participants from Asia, efforts were also made to rejuvenate transatlantic relations by reestablishing the channels of dialogue between future leaders of the two continents, including the Anglo-American Conference for the Successor Generation, which was cosponsored by the Royal Institute of International Relations and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 1985, as well as similar programs by the Ditchley Foundation, the Atlantic Council, the Anglo-German Association, and Atlantik Brucke.

**Since the Late 1970s**

From the late 1970s, stress has accumulated between the United States and Europe. Discord across the Atlantic became all too obvious, particularly with the heightening of East-West tensions resulting, for example, from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis in Poland. Disagreements between the two sides became significant on a range of issues from arms control to Middle East policy, and some scholars started referring to structural problems and fundamental perception gaps in transatlantic relations. During this period, the United States became heavily preoccupied with its own problems, whereas Europe, too, was more concerned with common problems on the continent and the prospects for a European community. Europeans were also concerned about what appeared to be an Asian shift by the United States. The Atlantic was described as having widened and some observers spoke of a crisis in U.S.-European relations.

But again, with the help of layers of dialogue networks across the Atlantic, U.S.-European relations restrengthened by the mid-1980s. Michael Armacost, a veteran diplomat, once described Atlantic relations as underpinned by informal connections among leaders on every level and the ability to appeal directly to the public opinion of the other side. Particularly noteworthy contributions in this context were provided by the so-called Four Directors Report of 1981 by
heads of the leading international relations institutions in the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom on Western security, which aimed to revitalize policy consultation and coordination across the Atlantic on all security-related issues; a multiyear Europe-America Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, launched in 1983 to clarify the differences in interests in and perceptions of several key issues between the two regions and to promote mutual understanding across the Atlantic; a joint research project, “A New Approach to Nonproliferation” (1982–1985), by the European Policy Research Centre and the Council on Foreign Relations; a series of nongovernmental conferences with the participation of scholars as well as high-ranking foreign and defense officials on issues too delicate to be addressed via official channels; and the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ efforts to focus on the dialogue between the successor generations across the Atlantic, including the European Policy Group, which provided a forum for exchange of views on short- and long-term problems in U.S.-European relations.

An applicant to the British foreign service, asked in a finalist interview what was most important to him, responded, “love and the relations with the U.S.” (quoted in Rosenthal 1998). Throughout a half-century of ups and downs, transatlantic relations have remained intact and are still regarded as the most important thing in a British youth’s life. One can witness here the resilience of a regional community. This special relationship across national borders and an ocean has survived, persisted, and even advanced further because there was something more than political and economic interdependence. The relationship has found its expression in the form of a sense of community among intellectuals and policy elites based on mutual confidence.

This brief review of postwar transatlantic relations shows that nongovernmental actors and initiatives, in the form of independent research institutions and private policy dialogues, have played an indispensable role in consolidating the Atlantic community. Their most outstanding achievement has been the creation of a sense of community among policy elites and intellectual leaders across the ocean.
For ASEAN to be as successful a regional community as the transatlantic community, it must possess similar nongovernmental initiatives to promote a sense of community among the policy elites and intellectual leaders of the member countries. The verification of a similar trend in ASEAN, however, alone does not prove that ASEAN is endowed with sufficient infrastructure for regional community building. After all, the ASEAN members are at different stages of national integration. The impact of nongovernmental initiatives will not be the same for the people of Southeast Asia as is the case in the more mature and more highly integrated societies of Europe and the United States. In developing societies, activities that involve a grass-roots approach should also be examined.

**NGOs in Developing Countries**

**An Associational Revolution**

With the overall progress of globalization, through which problems and issues are interrelated across national boundaries, the sovereign power of national governments has become increasingly limited. Furthermore, it has become obvious that they now have to share power with various nonstate actors, most notably with NGOs.

William van Dusen Wishard thus writes, “As a consequence of this globalization, every nation’s control over its economic future is diminishing. Well over 50 percent of the variables affecting the United States economy are outside the control of policy makers in Washington. The Chinese government recently estimated that Beijing can control only about half of the factors affecting China’s economy” (1994, 65). Wishard goes on to quote U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: “It is undeniable that the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands” (65–66).

Mathews recalls that the prevalence of nonstate actors is not unprecedented, citing the example of the East India Company and some other centuries-old intergovernmental institutions, but she admits that “both in numbers and in impact, nonstate actors have never before
approached their current strength” (1997, 52). Timothy M. Shaw notes the same phenomenon: “The international community has had to come to accept the legitimacy and activity of several types of influential nonstate actors. These have historically included multinational corporations (MNCs) and major religions, but they now extend to international and local non-governmental organizations (INGOS and NGOs) such as ethnic, environmental, indigenous peoples’, women’s and youth groups” (1994, 140).

The prevalence of NGOs in the developing world makes it virtually impossible to provide a reliable quantitative measurement of their impact. Mathews (1997, 52–53) estimates that 35,000 NGOs are active in developing countries, although she also reports that in South Asia alone there are more than 12,000 NGOs active specifically in the field of irrigation. Julie Fisher of Yale University endorses an estimate of 30,000 to 35,000 “active grassroots support organizations in the Third World” (1996, 7). In another work, she mentions that as early as 1985, “the Club of Rome estimated that ‘Southern’ NGOs may involve as many as 60 million people in Asia, 25 million in Latin America, and 12 million in Africa” (1993, 8). These trends and the similar spread of NGOs in the industrialized world are collectively referred to as an “associational revolution” by Lester Salamon in a 1994 *Foreign Affairs* article in which he declares that, based on comparative studies among 14 countries, “this associational revolution may well give a tremendous impact on the world of the late 20th century similar to the impact of the rise of the nation-state on the late 19th century world” (109).

**NGOs and Community Building**

NGOs, typically composed of dedicated individuals with professional knowledge and expertise in their various fields, can be versatile and capable of delivering almost anything governments normally deliver. In fact, Mathews suggests, “Internationally, in both the poorest and richest countries, NGOs, when adequately funded, can outperform government in the delivery of many public services” (1997, 63). In the context of this chapter, however, the focus is on NGOs’ ability to help nurture a sense of community across national boundaries.
NGOs are not confined by national boundaries. In line with their characteristics, activities, modes of conduct, and missions, they are capable of nurturing a sense of community across national boundaries in a variety of ways:

**Issue Orientation**

NGOs are naturally issue-oriented or even issue-specific. The international implications of this inclination should be obvious, given the cross-border and regional expansion of issues. These organizations can easily promote a sense of shared destiny and common interests among countries within a region that together confront the same issues. Environmental problems seem to be the best example of such issues, but Mathews (1997) introduces an example of solidarity among NGOs in the United States, Canada, and Mexico that took clear shape when they collaborated in demanding that the U.S. and Mexican governments disclose the draft of a bilateral trade agreement, particularly the articles on health-care and safety, cross-border environmental pollution, consumer protection, migration, fluidity of labor, child labor, sustainable agriculture, social contracts, and debt relief.

**Community among Professionals**

Participants in NGO activities with professional skills and knowledge may well develop a sense of community with professionals from other countries in the same region who deal with the same issues. What Mathews writes about intellectual and technical elites can be applied to some NGO participants (who may, of course, themselves be members of such elites), namely, that “those elites…are also citizens groups with transnational interests and identities that frequently have more in common with counterparts in other countries, whether industrialized or developing, than with countrymen” (1997, 52). Wishard backs up this point, observing, “We see the proliferation of countless non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating on a transborder basis, technological alliances crossing national boundaries” (1994, 67).

**Sense of Community at the Grass-roots Level**
Fisher reports, “In Asia, Latin America, and, more recently, in Africa, this organizational explosion is creating a partnership between some of the best- and least-educated people in each society as intellectuals and technically trained professionals seek out and work with grassroots village and neighborhood groups” (1993, 5). This partnership should help promote a sense of community with neighboring countries on a grass-roots level. And Isagani Serrano states, “Democratization from below has crossed local and national frontiers and spread throughout Asia-Pacific. Peoples’ movements and other voluntary organizations are now linked regionally by structures and processes they have created over the years” (1994, 301).

Cross-national Networking Based on Electronic Communications

NGOs, not having access to traditional means of cross-border transmission, such as the diplomatic pouch, rely on communication through networks. The very nonnational nature of computer-based communication is bound also to help promote a sense of community among members of these organizations, who are geographically scattered but likely to be living in neighboring countries.

As Fisher explains, “South-South networks of NGOs [networks of NGOs among developing countries] have proliferated rapidly since the early 1960s within each region of the Third World” (1996, 15). She attributes this phenomenon to (a) the proliferation of indigenous NGOs in the Third World; (b) international or Northern support, both official and voluntary; (c) the rise of computer and communications technology; and (d) the process of NGO networking surrounding major U.N. conferences. Yamamoto (1995), who conducted a 15-country survey on the emergence of civil society in Asia Pacific, analyzes the general pattern of international NGO networking as beginning with groups of like-minded NGOs within a country, which in turn collaborate with similar groups in neighboring countries, eventually forming an issue-oriented regional network of NGOs. He goes on to underscore the positive effects of such networking on the sense of community within the region.
NGO activities, particularly their networking across national boundaries, have a great potential in cultivating and nurturing the kind of sense of community that seems to be required for a regional group of countries, such as ASEAN, to become a community.

**FORCES FOR COMMUNITY BUILDING**

In the previous sections, an attempt was made to anatomize the two paths through which a regional grouping of countries might become an effective regional community: a sense of community through activities that will enhance mutual confidence among policy elites and intellectual leaders and, in light of the shallowness of national integration and political coherence in developing countries, a sense of shared destiny, interests, and goals that are promoted by numerous NGO activities that are, in actuality, changing the basic structure of international relations. Are these two paths present and effectively functioning in ASEAN?

**Track Two Activities**

The term *track two* (or track two diplomacy) is commonly used by international experts in reference to relations in ASEAN and East Asia. The term usually refers to international conferences, symposia, workshops, and seminars on policy-oriented topics on East Asian international relations and economic relations. Paul Evans has monitored these track two activities, particularly in the field of regional security in Asia, since 1993. He refers to a “dialogue enterprise” and says that “by 1993 the dialogue business had become a growth industry. It is now difficult to even list the various track two channels. The number of meetings listed in a recent compilation for 1993 averaged about four per month” (1993, 23) (tables 1 and 2).
Table 1. Track One and Track Two Dialogues in East Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Duration</th>
<th>Track One</th>
<th>Track Two</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995 (Jan.-June)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995 (July-Dec.)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996 (Jan.-June)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 (July)-1997 (June)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 (July-Dec.)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 (Jan.-Mar.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 2. Track Two Dialogues Related to ASEAN (July 1996-December 1997)

The New Geopolitical Order in Southeast Asia and Europe-Asia Relations
Working Group on Maritime Security in East Asia
South-East Asian Security: Coping With Rising Tensions (Wilton Park Conference 473)
Peace and Cooperation: Different Approaches to the Maintenance of Peace in Southeast Asia, Asia and Europe
International Conference on Navigational Safety and Control of Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:
   Modalities of International Cooperation
ASEAN-Taiwan Dialogue
One Southeast Asia in a New Regional and International Setting (CSIS 25th Anniversary International Seminar)
Workshop on ASEAN Maritime Security
ASEAN Young Leaders Forum: External Influences on Foreign Policy
5th Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures
Asia-Europe: Strengthening the Informal Dialogue: First Plenary Meeting of the Council for Asia-Europe
   Cooperation (CAEC)
ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Support Group Meeting on Preventive Diplomacy
2nd Workshop on Security and Stability in Southeast Asia
3rd Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
3rd Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security
Seminar on Nuclear Non-Proliferation
ASEAN in Transition: Implications for Australia
Data Sharing and Maritime Security
2nd Asia-Pacific Agenda Forum
Defense Asia Forum 1997
ASEAN-India Dialogue
2nd Meeting of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group
4th ASEAN Colloquium on Human Rights
1st Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Transnational Crime
6th Southeast Asia Roundtable on Economic Development: Building the Ground Work for a Strong Southeast Asian Economy
2nd ASEAN Congress
ASEAN Regional Forum Track II Conference on Preventive Diplomacy
39th Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies
CSCAP Comprehensive and Cooperative Security Working Group Meeting
2nd Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Transnational Crime
International Conference on Promoting Trust and Confidence in Southeast Asia: Cooperation and Conflict Avoidance
ASEAN Young Leaders Forum
7th CSCAP CSMB Working Group Meeting
Asia-Pacific Security for the 21st Century
Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1998
SEAPOL’s System Compliance Project Workshop
3rd CSCAP North Pacific Working Group Meeting
Asia Pacific Agenda Project Yokohama Forum
8th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting
CSCAP-Japan Open Symposium
5th ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights
Cambodia’s Future in ASEAN: Dynamo or Dynamite?
8th Southeast Asia Forum
8th CSCAP CSBM Working Group
12th Asia Pacific Roundtable
2nd Asia-Pacific Regional Security Workshop

Source: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies (1997; 1998).

Desmond Ball notes that “there has been a burgeoning of nongovernmental activities and institutional linkages, now generally referred to as the ‘second track’ process” (1993, 42).
Carolina Hernandez defines track two diplomacy as “the generation and conduct of foreign policy by nonstate actors, including government officials in their private capacity” (1994, 6).

Hernandez says that such diplomacy “includes the participation of scholars, analysts, media, business, people’s sector representatives, and other opinion makers who shape and influence foreign policy and/or actually facilitate the conduct of foreign policy by government officials through various consultations and cooperative activities, networking and policy advocacy” (6). The South China Sea Informal Working Group contends that “track-two diplomacy . . . has no official standing, and participants, even though they may be government officials, do not represent the state or government, and therefore the conclusions of the meeting, if any, are not in any way binding upon governments, and nor are the proceedings of the meeting declamatory of the position of any state. . . . This gives participants an unusual degree of freedom to speak and express their views, and to debate topics which, in ordinary circumstances, would be either taboo, or of such sensitivity that the approach to discussions is necessarily cautious” (Townsend-Gault 1998, 1). These track two measures mirror the nongovernmental policy-oriented initiatives of the postwar transatlantic community.

Hernandez further states that “track two diplomacy became possible because of growing interdependencies such that relevant actors in the multiple channels of integration are no longer confined to states. The function of diplomacy has been increasingly shared by nonstate and nongovernmental actors” (1994, 15). Such diplomacy reflects the structural changes in overall international relations—the power shift, or associational revolution.

**ASEAN-ISIS and ARF/CSCAP**

Why is there such a heavy concentration of track two activities in East Asia, particularly in and around the ASEAN countries? One contributing factor is the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and its member institutions. Many of the regional track two activities have been related to the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). And a single institution—ASEAN-ISIS—is at the core of most CSCAP-related programs.
ASEAN-ISIS is involved in many other regional dialogue programs as well. Ball asserts that “the ASEAN-ISIS association is central to much of the networking and discourse with respect to security cooperation in the region” (1993, 42). In recent years, topics of ASEAN-ISIS–initiated regional dialogues have expanded beyond security-related issues to include economic and so-called new security issues.

ASEAN-ISIS was “formalized as a regional non-governmental organization with the signing of its charter on June 28, 1988,” but it was preceded by “a number of informal regional meetings . . . beginning in the early to mid-1980s amongst heads and experts from these groups upon the initiative of Mr. Jusuf Wanandi of the CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta)” (Institute of Strategic and International Studies [ISIS] 1993, 1). Its genesis was a group of regular Southeast Asian participants at international conferences who had built up professional and personal relationships through these encounters in the international arena. The group was formed because “the need for more regional meetings of experts and scholars in the region was established in the face of politico-security and economic issues and problems affecting ASEAN” (Hernandez 1993, 1). Originally, the group consisted of five institutions from the ASEAN-5: the CSIS in Indonesia, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia, the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies in the Philippines, the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, and the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand. Subsequent participants included the Institute for International Relations of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1996, and the Laotian and Myanmar Institutes of Strategic and International Studies from 1997. Brunei has not established an independent counterpart institution. All ASEAN-ISIS functions are attended by the region’s foreign ministry officials in a private capacity. The group acknowledges that “initiating policy dialogues with each other, with ASEAN partners and other states in the region through non-official channels was an important step towards reducing tension and building confidence in the region” (Hernandez 1993, 1).
As an institution with the purpose of enhancing confidence in the ASEAN region, ASEAN-ISIS has coordinated numerous conferences and research projects to promote policy-oriented intellectual dialogue. Hernandez describes the role of ASEAN-ISIS in its support of ASEAN as follows:

- a major source of policy inputs for consideration of the respective governments and decision-makers in ASEAN countries;
- a significant venue for experts and scholars in strategic studies to exchange information and analysis of issues and concerns common to ASEAN and its major partners;
- a laboratory and nursery of tentative, perhaps even volatile, ideas [on the conviction that] the cutting edge of regionalism is the ability to go through a process of discussion of various issues, rather than simply the act of agreeing on specific ideas;
- the “comfort zone” in ASEAN which enables governments to adopt ideas safely and with legitimacy;
- something like an ozone layer (which) help[s] filter, screen, and modulate potentially “harmful rays” or ideas;
- a pathfinder, carving out options and approaches for the main party; [and]
- the task for ASEAN-ISIS is to think ahead to prevent disunity and crisis (ISIS 1994, 9).

Through the personal prestige of participating members, and the relevance and timeliness of its activities, ASEAN-ISIS was quickly recognized by ASEAN governments as an important actor in the region. ASEAN-ISIS attained international recognition in 1992 when ASEAN officially announced the launching of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the first official institution for consultation on security affairs in the Asia Pacific region.
The establishment of ARF was truly a historical event. Nishihara Masashi, writing on the participation of 17 countries and one international organization (the European Union) at ARF’s first conference, said, “It is a historic event that all the countries in the region which were divided into two blocs during the Cold War get together” (1994, 60). The ARF’s historical significance lies primarily in its ability to generate a sense of mutual confidence between former opposing blocs through “mutual reassurance measures,” as then Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei characterized it (68).

ASEAN-ISIS perceived, articulated, tested, and formally proposed ARF. An ASEAN-ISIS report, “A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit,” introduced the concept, which later became the basis for ARF. Hernandez notes “that the specifics of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) reflect the main arguments of the ASEAN-ISIS proposal for this initiative” (1994 18).

ASEAN-ISIS also contributed to the further institutionalization of ASEAN when it proposed what later was adopted as the senior officials’ meeting. According to Ball, “It has been recognized that the PMC [Post Ministerial Conference] process must be supported by the development of some institutionalized infrastructure at both the official and non-governmental level. In June 1991, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies proposed that a ‘senior officials meeting’ (SOM) made up of senior officials of the ASEANs and the dialogue partners be instituted to support the ASEAN PMC process” (1993, 41). The establishment of ARF was announced at an ASEAN-SOM in May 1993. Referring to the deliberations at ASEAN-ISIS, Evans reports that “[this SOM] meeting borrowed concepts and took advantage of a climate of opinion that have been generated through track two activities over the past two years” (1993, 33).

In an effort to strengthen ASEAN horizontally, ASEAN-ISIS officially proposed inviting Vietnam as ASEAN’s seventh member. ASEAN-ISIS submitted a memorandum to ASEAN on this subject in late 1993, and this proposal “found its way into the July 1994 decision to invite
Vietnam as a full member after certain formalities are met” (Hernandez 1993, 24). Meanwhile, a number of study missions composed of ASEAN-ISIS members and associates visited Vietnam to prepare the necessary groundwork.

ASEAN-ISIS has demonstrated that a nonstate actor can make a difference in regional relations. Its initiative to establish ARF, the first security community in the region, cannot be overemphasized. But, perhaps more important, ASEAN-ISIS has contributed to a sense of community and shared interests among foreign policy planners and other intellectuals across the region through its open and active agenda.

One of ASEAN-ISIS’s most significant contributions in community building was CSCAP, which was formally launched in June 1993. ASEAN-ISIS developed CSCAP together with the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, and the Pacific Forum/CSIS in Honolulu, Hawaii. Participants later included the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australia National University, and the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies in Canada. CSCAP has stretched its track two diplomacy more extensively than ASEAN-ISIS, and is underpinned by a Pacific Economic Cooperation Council–style national committee in each member country that is tripartite in composition, with scholars/academics, businesspeople, and government officials.

Ball views “the establishment of CSCAP [as] one of the most important milestones in the development of institutionalized dialogue, consultation and cooperation concerning security matters in the Asia Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. It is designed not only to link and focus the research activities of non-governmental organizations devoted to work on security matters across the whole of the Asia Pacific region, but also to provide a mechanism for linkage and mutual support between the second track and official regional security cooperation process” (1993, 50). Hernandez adds that “the usefulness of CSCAP’s track two diplomacy” is cherished “as a source of intellectual strength and expertise whose findings can be made available to the ARF and other official regional security fora” (1994, 31).
The impact of these track two institutions on mutual confidence among countries in the Asia Pacific region is remarkable after decades of mutual suspicion and acrimony. One security flashpoint in the post–cold war Asia Pacific region remains the South China Sea. Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, a project supported by the Canadian International Development Agency, concluded “that confidence building measures are a non-negotiable requirement for any form of cooperation in the South China Sea” (Townsend-Gault 1998). The architects of CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS clearly had these insights in mind when they perceived this framework.

**ASEAN-ISIS and the ASEAN-10 Community**

From the viewpoint of enlarging the ASEAN community, ASEAN-ISIS plays an important role in the informal socialization, or indoctrination, of new members in ASEAN.

Sopiee, writing on the future of ASEAN in 1992, was somewhat ambivalent about the expansion of ASEAN. Although he admits that “our basic instinct in favour of a cohesive Southeast Asian organization of more than six and preferably 10 is sound,” he also introduces a school of thought, which was popular in Southeast Asia at the time, that argued “that increased membership will excessively slow down or even break down, the present process and momentum of ASEAN. . . . An expanded ASEAN would result in the excessive heterogenization of ASEAN in terms of strategic and policy concerns and perspectives, procedures and activities and grossly complicate the already laborious process of consensus formation, which is the basis of ASEAN decision-making” (1992, 20). One can sense the hesitation of a founding member of ASEAN, albeit on the private side. ASEAN has obtained international respect but expansion brings about the entry of newer, unsophisticated members. The ASEAN-5 are, at least on the institutional level, democratic in that they have general elections and their results are more or less respected. But the prospective new members all have been, from a Western perspective, shameless violators of democratic rules and human rights principles. Entry of these countries will surely lead to friction within the international community.
Also looking ahead to ASEAN’s future, Jusuf Wanandi, the de facto dean of ASEAN-ISIS, reached a more proactive conclusion. Admitting that “among the many new issues in international relations, two stand out, namely human rights and the environment” (1992, 7), he contends that the positions of the new members should not hamper the new members within the ASEAN community. Wanandi believes that “self-righteous means and ‘preachings’ by the Western countries (many of which were colonialists during the period of imperialism) towards the developing countries will not be effective and are often counter-productive,” and asserts that “the best approach is when the one party could give advice as a friend to another country” (1992, 10). The ASEAN-5 also went through a period of staunch criticism from the West not that long ago. Track two institutions are well positioned to ease this transition. Wanandi, therefore, concludes that “such cooperation should not be confined to governments but should also be developed among NGOs” (1992, 7). ASEAN-ISIS can offer friendly advice on these matters to the policy elites and intellectual leaders of Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. This socialization function by ASEAN-ISIS is crucial not only from the viewpoint of preparing the Indochinese countries for full-fledged membership in the ASEAN community but also for these countries to be accepted as legitimate members of the international community.

However, ASEAN-ISIS does not monopolize this role. Organizations with similar activities include a Thai educational institution that provides midcareer Vietnamese officials with training in planning in English; another Thai research institution, with the financial help of a U.S. foundation, that helped the Vietnamese government draft its first commercial and business laws; and a Singaporean educational institution that trains midcareer Vietnamese economic bureaucrats in planning and improving their English-language skills, which has long been the weak link of Vietnam’s otherwise promising capability. Such activities contribute to a sense of community among participants and their host institutions.

The Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (MISIS) admits looking forward to participating in the various track two functions of ASEAN-ISIS, which it has just joined,
because it will provide Myanmar’s intellectuals with opportunities to explain their positions and exchange views with their U.S. and European counterparts—not otherwise an outlet available to them. In fact, the existence of a counterpart research institution to ASEAN-ISIS seems to be a prerequisite for membership in ASEAN. MISIS, however, exists in name only, and its leadership is seeking guidance from more experienced institutions on how to establish a full-fledged institution.

Thus, phenomena similar to postwar transatlantic relations exist in ASEAN. Nongovernmental activities contribute to the formation of a sense of community among policy elites and intellectual leaders throughout the region which, in turn, contributes to the overall confidence building in the region. In this important endeavor, ASEAN-ISIS, in particular, has played a role comparable to that of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London combined. T. G. McGee must have had ASEAN-ISIS in mind when he wrote, “While the degree of commitment to facilitate economic interaction between these new subglobal regions (including ASEAN) varies widely, they are all characterized by networks of collaborative institutions that act as the foundation for their regional cooperation” (1997, 12).

NGO Networks

The activities of ASEAN-ISIS have contributed significantly to the formation of a sense of community among the policy elites and intellectual leaders in the region by establishing reliable channels of communication and, thus, enhancing mutual confidence. The organization has worked to socialize new members toward eventual participation in the ASEAN-10. At least one condition for an effective regional community seems to be fulfilled.

For countries in the South, including the ASEAN members, however, a sense of community among the elites in the different countries does not guarantee cohesion of the group. In developing countries, where the gaps between the elites and the masses are wide, a regional community also requires grass-roots interactions. The networking capability of NGOs has been extremely
effective in promoting a more grass-roots sense of community, especially among the developing countries. Therefore, it is relevant to examine whether NGOs actually help to underpin a regional community on the grass-roots level in ASEAN.

Because of a focus on issues that is more East Asian or Asian as opposed to Southeast Asian, the scope of NGO networks and collaborations among NGOs has been more Asia-wide or, sometimes, Asia Pacific–wide. Yamamoto, in his integrative 15-country study *Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Regional Community*, writes that “there clearly has been an emergence of a number of associations, networks, and other forms of interactions among NGOs in Asia Pacific in recent years” (1995, 19). NGOs in various ASEAN members report a similar trend. The Singaporean report, for example, observes that “the increasing trends towards economic regionalization in Asia Pacific . . . have led to the necessity of NGOs working at the regional level in order to effectively address these [environmental and social problems that are transnational in nature] problems” (219). Likewise, the Philippines report states that “global issues such as human rights, the environment, women, migration and refugees, the spread of AIDS, and population growth all pose major challenges to the Asia Pacific region. Widespread concern has induced the formation of linkages of like-minded NGOs across national boundaries in Asia Pacific” (202). And the Thai report concludes that “nongovernmental organizations in Asia . . . have joined hands to work together” and that “the role of NGOs in countries in Asia and the Pacific cannot be denied. Networks of NGOs have been established across national borders” (261, 268).

Some of the more outstanding NGOs involved in regional networking include the following:²

- People’s Plan for the 21st Century was established in 1988 to “counterpose a people-based, people-centered vision of an alternative Asian future to regional economic, political, and cultural integration” by linking the largely autonomous activities of grass-roots and citizens’ movements throughout the Asia Pacific region.
• CODE-NGO is the largest coalition of major-development NGO networks in the Philippines, forging linkages with development NGOs in other developing countries in Asia and in sub-Saharan Africa.

• The Centre for the Development of Human Resources and Rural Asia (CENDHRRA) was established in 1974 to develop linkages and networks among NGOs in Asia. The organization gave birth to the South East Asia Development of Human Resources and Rural Areas Forum (SEADHRRA), a solid regional network among national chapters of CENDHRRA in East Asian countries (Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand).

• The Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC) was founded in 1979 as a regional association of 23 development NGOs and NGO networks from eight countries: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The coalition facilitates people-centered development in the region by promoting South-South and North-South dialogue through training and research programs.

• The Asian Alliance of Appropriate Technology Practitioners, Inc. (APPROTECH ASIA), is a network committed to the development of appropriate technology and its promotion for grass-roots communities. Member organizations come from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Sri Lanka.

• The Southeast Asian NGO Consortium for Sustainable Development (SEACON) was founded in 1989 to promote regionwide people’s participation and social reform in ensuring sustainable development approaches. The consortium includes regional networks and representatives of NGOs from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

• The Asia Pacific People’s Environment Network, founded in 1983, holds regional seminars on the environment and development for NGOs throughout Asia.

• The Asian-South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education (ASPBAE) was founded in 1964 in Sydney to promote people empowerment through education with the membership of more
than 15 national associations and institutions and individuals representing more than 35 countries.

- The South-North Project for Sustainable Development in Asia was founded in 1990 by six Asian organizations—AWARE of India, Project for Ecological Recovery of Thailand, PRRM of the Philippines, PROSHIKA of Bangladesh, SAM of Malaysia, WALHI of Indonesia, and NOVIB of the Netherlands—to research and lobby around the themes of agriculture, forestry, and micro-ecosystems.

- The Asian Cultural Forum on Development (ACFOD) was founded by an international group of Asian intellectuals in 1976 with the purpose of “bringing the grass roots to the international level.” “Fishermen from Thailand, for example, were sent to Malaysia to learn about cockle cultivation from Malaysian fishermen. ACFOD has helped fishermen from seven countries organize an international network” (Fisher 1996, 36). Member countries include Bangladesh, India, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

- The Asian Council for People’s Culture sponsors regional meetings, workshops, cultural festivals, slides, posters, and training in building networks.

- Action for Rational Drugs in Asia (ARDA) promotes essential drugs and education about harmful ones.

- The Asia Pacific Desertification and Deforestation Control Network enables forestry organizations to communicate with each other using a computer-based information system.

These groups cover all aspects of people’s lives and social engagement in Asia. Judging from the networks’ focal points, it is not difficult to imagine a villager in, say, the Philippines feeling a shared destiny with villagers in Indonesia on the basis of common agricultural and/or environmental problems that are brought to their attention by a regional NGO network. Meanwhile, leaders of the member NGOs in the same network cultivated a community of professional concerns and interests with each other. In this sense, Asian countries, including the
ASEAN members, are well endowed with the mechanisms through which to generate a grass-roots sense of community.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has examined whether ASEAN has the conditions that seem to be essential for regional community building, on the assumption that whatever goal ASEAN may have is most easily attained if and when it becomes a regional community. The history of postwar transatlantic relations has illustrated the importance of a sense of community among intellectuals and policy elites. The unusual role of NGOs in linking people across national borders, particularly in developing areas, was also analyzed. An attempt was made to verify if these crucial elements are present and functioning in ASEAN.

Despite geographical proximity, the ASEAN members show a great diversity in historical legacy, religion, ethnicity, political system, and stage of economic development, all of which can adversely affect community building. In the past, there were cases of hostility and acrimony between and among members, including historical antagonism on the Indochinese peninsula; territorial disputes among Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and, more recently, Vietnam; and a near state of war between Indonesia and Malaysia during the *konfrontasi* policy days of the former. Economically, there are more elements of competition among members than factors for interdependence or mutual complementarity. In short, ASEAN does not present an easy, natural case for a regional community.

Against these hazards, ASEAN’s track record in terms of its resilience and internal cohesion has been outstanding. The myriad of webs of personal relationship among intellectuals, professionals, and grass-roots-level citizens throughout Southeast Asia could not have emerged without the role of nongovernmental initiatives. NGOs are also destined to play an equally crucial role in ASEAN’s quest for its next challenge: the completion of the ASEAN-10 community.
For these nongovernmental initiatives to be more effective and constructive toward future community building, a few steps must be taken. The genesis of ASEAN-ISIS was the personal friendship among the heads of leading international institutes in the ASEAN members. Although this origin provided an additional, personal factor to the group’s cohesion, it also had the potential to convert this catalytic group into an exclusive and inflexible club. Some argue that the prevalence of ASEAN-ISIS is at least partially attributable to the underdevelopment of formal foreign service bureaucracies among the ASEAN members and that it will therefore lose its current status and utility, from the viewpoint of the political leaders in each country, once national bureaucracies are fully developed. To avoid total annihilation by the national bureaucracy, ASEAN-ISIS should welcome newer institutions with similar orientations and a sense of mission as they emerge in the region. As issues facing each country multiply and the values of citizens diversify within the ASEAN region, there should be more than one institute in each member country that is concerned with regional community development. In this sense, the launching of the ASEAN Economic Forum in November 1997 among some ASEAN-ISIS member institutes and nonmember institutes (University of Asia and Pacific, the Philippines; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore; Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore; and National Institute of Development Administration, Thailand) is a welcome development.

Of course, for more independent institutions to emerge, funding sources must be secured. As in the case of earlier transatlantic relations, U.S. foundations have again played a crucial role not only in the establishment of ASEAN-ISIS but also in the funding of member institutions. Although contributions by these U.S. foundations are admired and appreciated, there must emerge more indigenous funding sources that can offer alternatives with less baggage (e.g., U.S. financial contributions to an Asian institution can label this particular institution as pro-American or pro-Western). As the region’s major economy, Japan shares a large responsibility in this regard.
NGOs share the problem of diversification and vernacularization of funding sources. Serrano laments that “some grassroots movements and development support organizations are totally dependent on foreign funding. Their dependency gives rise to a number of problems, the most important of which is the loss of autonomy of the recipient organizations” (1994, 308). Recent years have seen the emergence of a number of private foundations in Asia. But Fisher notes that “the proliferation of Asian grant making foundations in recent years offers Asian networks a potential source of funding not available to networks in other regions. Yet despite well established NGO networks and rising foundation interest in NGOs, connections between these Asian philanthropists and NGOs appear to be weak” (1996, 23). A Singaporean researcher on NGOs agrees that “first and foremost, grant-making institutions should be sensitive to the needs of NGOs” (Yamamoto 1995, 221).

Although there should be more foundations and other institutions to help finance NGO activities, NGOs must make themselves more eligible for foundation grants. The main method of networking by NGOs has been conferencing and personal relationships. Although the importance of these activities cannot be overemphasized, more substantive activities will be necessary for deeper relations. Aurola Tolentino observes that “there must be efforts to start joint projects and deeper involvements beyond conferencing and exchange of reports and points of view” (Yamamoto 1995, 210), and this requires professionalization on the part of grass-roots NGOs. Particularly in light of the need for more international communication for networking, English-language skills are important. Speaking of Indonesian NGOs, Andra Corrothers stated that “the lack of English language skills put a damper on efforts made by some Indonesian NGOs to communicate broadly among potential partners in the region and beyond,” and concluded that “encouraging donors to include English language training for NGO activists in their programs is one method to increase the efficacy of networking communication” (Yamamoto 1995, 134). Of course, the need for professionalism is not confined to language skills. Overall, the upgrading of NGOs’ capability is required, including organization, project coordination, and general
communication skills. Again, Japanese foundations and NGOs can play a constructive role here. Finally, the availability of information is a crucial factor for effective coordination.

NOTES
1. The author relies heavily for historical facts and quotations in this section on *Firansuropi no yakuwari* (The role of philanthropy), a research report commissioned by the Japan Center for International Exchange for the National Institute for Research Advancement in 1988 (see Yamamoto 1988).
2. This list is primarily extracted from three documents: *Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community* (Yamamoto 1995), *International Networking* (Fisher 1996), and *Civil Society in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Serrano 1994).

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