The Challenges of Managing U.S.-Japan Security Relations
after the Cold War

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The United States and Japan have closed the first decade of the post–cold war era by reaffirming their mutual security relationship and expanding defense cooperation in areas ranging from theater missile defense (TMD) to regional contingency planning and intelligence sharing. There is no question that the alliance continues to serve the fundamental interests of both parties. For the United States, it provides critical forward basing in East Asia and political partnership with the world’s second largest economy. For Japan, it provides regional stability, a nuclear umbrella, and alignment with the world’s largest economic and political power. Support for the alliance is broader than ever. There are fewer opponents to the alliance among the political elite in Tokyo and Washington than at any point since the first bilateral security treaty went into effect in 1952. Public support for the security relationship also remains high in both countries.

In spite of the reinvigoration of the alliance, however, the recent past has also seen repeated instances of tension and lingering mistrust between the two allies. Support for the alliance may be broad, but there are still questions about its depth. For example:

- U.S. bases in Okinawa Prefecture came under intense political pressure after three U.S. servicemen raped an Okinawan girl in September 1995.
- President Bill Clinton’s criticism of Japanese economic policy during a June 1998 trip to China sparked charges of “Japan passing” (that is, passing Japan by) from Japanese journalists and fears of a long-term U.S. tilt toward Beijing from officials in Tokyo.
- North Korea’s August 1998 launch of a Taepodong three-stage ballistic missile over Japan led to mutual recriminations by senior U.S. and Japanese officials as the two nations made divergent responses (Japan more bellicose and the United States more subdued).
- The Japanese government’s subsequent decision to develop an indigenous spy satellite
caused concern in Washington about Japan’s commitment to the alliance.

- The bombing of Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) caused unease in Tokyo about the U.S. commitment to the United Nations (U.N.) and fears of U.S. unilateralism.
- Underlying these specific points of tension and mistrust are questions in Washington about the long-term future of Japanese power after eight years of economic stagnation and questions in Tokyo about U.S. inattention to areas of political and security importance to Japan in East Asia.

Forged by former adversaries and asymmetrical in design, the U.S.-Japan alliance has never been free of headaches. But are the recent patterns of disagreement more of the same or a trend that will intensify with time? Are the sources of tension significant enough to warrant fundamental restructuring of the alliance—for example, reducing U.S. troop levels or encouraging an overseas combat role for Japanese forces (that is, making Japanese military roles more symmetrical with those of the United States)? Or are these areas of tension more of an alliance management problem that can be corrected with better coordination and communication?

This essay attempts to answer these questions by isolating five areas of alliance cooperation for further examination. These are military cooperation, U.S. military bases in Japan, policy toward China, policy toward the Korean peninsula, and multilateral security cooperation. In each area we consider the underlying sources of bilateral convergence and divergence in recent years, the advantages and disadvantages created by the current structure of the alliance, and the effectiveness of current alliance-management practices.

The chapter concludes that there is a growing realism in Japanese security thinking and fluidity in Japanese politics that will increasingly lead Japan to take independent steps to guarantee its own security when the U.S. level of commitment or attention is in doubt. At the same time, however, the United States and Japan continue to share broad strategic objectives, and for the foreseeable future neither is likely to develop a better security policy option than the alliance to safeguard its interests in the region. Moreover, in spite of a new strategic realism in Japan’s security policy debate, the undertow of pacifism remains strong. Significant restructuring
of the alliance faces political constraints in Japan and would be more likely to undermine regional stability than enhance security. Nevertheless, the alliance does require further attention, strengthening, and integration to remain credible. This emerges clearly in each of the areas of alliance cooperation reviewed below.

**MILITARY COOPERATION**

Since Thucydides, international-relations theorists have noted that small states allied with large states face a dilemma between entrapment and abandonment. If the small state aligns too closely with the large state, it risks losing control of its own interests and military assets to the large state. If, on the other hand, the small state seeks autonomy, it risks abandonment by the large state. This dilemma is particularly acute for Japan, which has codified its political/military asymmetries with the United States in the Constitution of Japan and related pacifist norms and institutions. These include cabinet decisions such as the three nonnuclear principles (*hikaku san gensoku*) and the three principles of arms exports (*buki yushutsu san gensoku*).\(^1\) as well as broad political norms against the use of force in international relations (Berger 1993; Katzenstein 1996). The most significant of these constraints from the perspective of alliance relations is probably the Japanese government’s decision not to exercise the right of collective defense (*shudanteki jieiken*), the right to come to the defense of an ally even when Japan is not under direct attack.

If these institutional and normative constraints have increased the asymmetries vis-à-vis the United States, however, they have also served to insulate Japan against incorporation into U.S. defense planning for East Asia. Japan has no joint and combined command relationship with the United States comparable to the U.S.–South Korea or NATO command arrangements. As a result, U.S. forces have no command authority over Japanese forces or civilian authorities of any kind in any circumstances. U.S. forces in Japan have access to about three dozen bases and facilities for the defense of Japan and the security of the Far East, according to Article 6 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Seven of the largest of these bases can be automatically utilized in the event of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, according to the U.N. Status of Forces Agreement, which dates to the end of the Korean War (Giarra 1999, 125). Japan, meanwhile,
maintains plausible deniability and limited liability for regional military actions by the United States even from bases in Japan.

During the cold war, this insulated strategic relationship with U.S. forces was a convenient construct for Japan, enabling it to retain a U.S. defense commitment without taking on regional security obligations that might jeopardize its own economic and political relations in East Asia or the domestic political consensus of the ruling conservatives. With time, however, the construct proved difficult to sustain. Japan moved gradually toward closer and more explicit security cooperation with the United States as the Vietnam War appeared to drain the U.S. commitment to East Asia and later as new threats emerged in the region.

In 1969, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku was pressed to agree in a joint communiqué with President Richard Nixon that Japan and the United States shared interests in stability on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. That explicit alignment with U.S. regional security policy was extracted from Sato in the context of the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and was therefore an anomaly. As one senior Defense Agency official later confessed, once Okinawa was returned, he and his colleagues spent the next two decades burying any possible commitment to regional security that might be read into Sato’s statement. The next test of Sato’s statement came in 1976, when fears of abandonment after the end of the Vietnam War led Tokyo to negotiate the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the first explicit government approval for joint bilateral military planning. U.S. officials attempted to focus on contingencies in Taiwan and on the Korean peninsula, but the Japanese side limited the final 1978 agreement to the defense of Japan against direct attack. The Japanese government’s steady retreat from the Sato statement of 1969 was frustrating for U.S. planners, but de facto regional defense planning became a possibility after the direct Soviet threat to East Asia increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By accident of geography, Japan’s enhanced ability to cooperate with U.S. forces in the defense of the home islands effectively “bottled up” the Soviets’ new ballistic missile submarine fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk and new Backfire bomber squadrons in the Maritime provinces. Without changing its exclusively defensive focus, the Japanese side became a player in regional U.S. military strategy. And this closer security relationship sat well with a Japanese body politic waking up to the Soviet threat around Japan.
Through the 1980s, Japanese defense budgets increased by an average of 6 percent and U.S. and Japanese forces beefed up joint training and exercises under a division of roles and missions in which U.S. forces were the “spear” and Japanese forces the “shield.” But the value of Japan’s exclusively defensive capabilities to global U.S. strategy was only as real as the threat of the Soviet forces in the Far East. With the end of the cold war, many in Japan expected to earn alliance partnership through international economic contributions, but the 1990–1991 Gulf War demonstrated that the United States and the world still measured security in the traditional currency of military force. The response in Japan was to push through controversial legislation allowing the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to participate in limited peacekeeping operations under the United Nations. This empowered and internationalized the SDF, but it proved relatively ineffective as a tool when a new crisis hit in Japan’s backyard in the spring of 1994. In that year, North Korean intransigence over a suspected nuclear weapons program led the United States to prepare for economic embargo, blockade, and possibly war with the North. When U.S. forces and the U.S. government approached Japan about joining this effort, the Japanese government was unable to commit any forces or participate in any significant planning at all. The new peacekeeping mission for the SDF did not apply to cases where hostilities were imminent, and the bilateral mine sweeping and sea-lane defense cooperation of the 1980s were not permissible outside the parameters of the defense of Japan. The North Korean nuclear crisis was defused without conflict, but the lessons for future bilateral defense relations were clear to the Pentagon and like-minded officials in the Defense Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan had to be planned in to regional security policy (Oberdorfer 1998, 305–336).

The result was the revision of the 1978 Defense Guidelines to cover regional contingencies. The process began with the revision of the Japanese National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which had already been under way since 1993. In the new NDPO, the Defense Agency shifted the focus of Japan’s basic defense concept from defense against “small-scale limited invasion” to response to “situations in the area surrounding Japan that have a direct impact on the security of Japan.” The new NDPO was approved by the cabinet in November 1995, and in the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security issued by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in April 1996 the two nations agreed to review the Defense Guidelines along the same lines.
After several years of bilateral negotiations and political debate, the Japanese government approved the new guidelines in September 1997, and the National Diet approved legislation implementing them in June 1999.

This brings us back to the bilateral command arrangements and the dilemma of entrapment versus abandonment. The new Defense Guidelines outline functional areas of cooperation in the event of a regional crisis that has a direct effect on Japanese security. These functional areas include rear-area logistical support for U.S. forces, sea-lane patrol, intelligence sharing, noncombatant evacuation operations, and other missions that would not put Japanese forces into forward combat roles in third countries but would prove critical to facilitating successful resolution of conflicts (Giarra and Nagashima 1999, 96). The new guidelines have the potential to give the U.S. and Japanese governments far greater flexibility to respond to crises, but that flexibility also implies a greater integration of planning and decision making—precisely the sort of integration that the Japanese side has resisted through most of the alliance.

Recognizing this new level of integrated planning, critics of the guidelines in the Japanese Communist Party and the press have attacked the guidelines as an “automatic war machine” (*jido sansen sochi*). It is wrong, however, to assume that the guidelines will work like a vending machine, the United States dropping in a coin and receiving whatever Japanese base or hospital or destroyer is required to carry out operations. Joint defense planning is not the same as a treaty; there are no obligations under international law. The joint plan merely provides a menu or blueprint for implementing bilateral operations if the civilian authorities in Japan make a decision to act. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that even this level of integration appears to many to threaten Japan’s traditional insulation against “entrapment” in U.S. strategy. It also places Japan in a potentially more influential role in U.S. security policy for the region. The Defense Guidelines are therefore likely to shape the agenda for U.S.-Japan security cooperation in at least six ways.

First, the Japanese government will be under domestic political pressure to define new checks against any direct U.S. control of Japanese military forces or civilian assets. The Diet’s passage of the implementing legislation for the guidelines was delayed for several months because the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) insisted on prior Diet approval before
the government could implement any element of joint plans with the United States in a crisis. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) eventually negotiated this down to a system in which either chamber of the Diet had the option of rejecting SDF participation in operations prior to initiation of joint plans with the United States but the government could act first in an emergency and seek approval afterward. This arrangement parallels the existing rules for SDF combat operations in the defense of Japan, but it creates an uncertainty in bilateral planning that does not exist in other U.S. alliance relationships.

Second, the United States and Japan will continue struggling to find surrogates for the kind of joint and combined command relationship that exists in other “real” alliances (NATO, U.S.–South Korea). In place of a joint and combined command, the Defense Guidelines establish a “comprehensive mechanism” for Japanese interagency participation in the planning process with the United States and a “bilateral coordination mechanism” to “harmonize respective activities” in a crisis. These arrangements are certainly an improvement over the ad hoc and informal planning that U.S. and Japanese officials used to conduct in anticipation of regional contingencies. These narrow bureaucratic conduits are essentially expanded versions of the traditional cold war–era staffs that managed the cabinet-level Security Consultative Committee, however. This allows the Japanese government to maintain tight control of coordination between the U.S. military and its uniformed and civilian counterparts in Japan and avoids difficult constitutional issues related to collective defense, but it is a far cry from the broadly integrated joint secretariat that real military alliances maintain to allow maximum flexibility and coordination in a crisis.

Third, effective implementation and decision making in a crisis will now require Japan to strengthen the authority of the prime minister in times of emergency. This controversial emergency legislation (yuji hosei) has already won broad support within the LDP and the Liberal Party and was anticipated in Prime Minister Hashimoto’s 1998 administrative-reform proposals and in the 1999 draft interim report of the LDP Crisis Management Project Team (Liberal Democratic Party 1999). Legislation granting emergency powers to the prime minister will not pass easily, but through small changes, such as the creation of a streamlined emergency decision-making group in the cabinet (Kinkyu Jitai Kaisho Kaigi) and the establishment of a crisis-
management center in the prime minister’s official residence, the government is taking preliminary steps to allow centralized decision making in times of crisis. This centralization is being paralleled by steps among the three branches of the SDF (ground, air, and maritime) to improve jointness, including the first-ever joint exercise on Iwojima in 1998. For the United States, this in turn creates a dilemma. Greater integration and centralization of national command authority in Japan is a prerequisite for smoother bilateral planning and crisis coordination—but it also removes the impediments to independent Japanese action.

Fourth, the Japanese side is looking for a hedge against entrapment in the U.S. strategic decision-making process. Japan and the United States have enhanced intelligence sharing since 1994, and Japan’s new Defense Intelligence Headquarters (established in 1996) relies on U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency analysis to enhance its own limited collection capabilities. After the tepid U.S. response to the North Korean Taepodong launch in August 1998, however, the Japanese cabinet moved to develop an indigenous satellite capability, including two optical and two radar satellites to be launched by 2002 and associated ground stations (Wanner 1999, 5). By the spring of 1999, it was clear that Japanese industry did not have the capabilities to meet this goal and that the satellite system would be highly redundant and costly, given assets already available from the United States and on the commercial market (“Japan Finds” 1999). Nevertheless, the project retained broad political support in Japan, both as a measure to support the flagging Japanese aerospace industry and as a gesture of independent capacity to analyze and anticipate crises without having to rely entirely on the United States. The satellite project is a psychological and symbolic hedge rather than a substantive capability to replace the United States, but it does reveal a continuing unease in Japan with total reliance on the United States for security.

Fifth, the U.S. side is also hedging. Japanese missions under the Defense Guidelines are still redundant with planned U.S. capabilities. The U.S. military will not give up its worst-case-planning scenario, and thus the Pentagon continues planning for the possibility that Japanese forces or civilian assets may not be available in a regional crisis. The Defense Guidelines allow bilateral planning for Japanese missions that will significantly enhance the U.S. military’s ability to win a victory at less cost in treasure and lives. However, Pentagon planners are not yet ready
to replace U.S. rear-area support units on standby for a contingency in East Asia with Japanese units. That will require years of planning, exercises, and above all trust. The U.S. military may not have the luxury to wait much longer, however. As Operation Allied Force demonstrated in Kosovo, the logistical challenges of sustaining the “two major theater war” strategy are stretching U.S. capabilities very thin indeed. Maintaining the combat capabilities of a U.S. forward presence in the future may require turning more rear-area logistical roles over to Japan. That, in turn, will require a greater dependence on Japan and presumably a greater Japanese influence on U.S. regional security strategy.

Finally, technology is forcing the integration of bilateral decision making faster than the Japanese or U.S. governments’ ability to anticipate or respond. The “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) concept suggests that the United States will pull ahead of all other states in its ability to design and deploy a “system of systems.” U.S. carriers, jet fighters, and ground forces will dominate the information dimension of the battlefield and will be linked through advances in information technology that no rival or ally can match. U.S.-Japan cooperation in TMD gives one example of what this will mean. The two nations agreed to cooperate on research on high-altitude navy theaterwide systems in October 1998. Assuming that these systems are jointly developed and deployed in Japan, the two nations will face a virtually integrated command and control unlike anything experienced in the previous five decades of the alliance. U.S. satellites will give warnings of enemy missile launches to U.S. and Japanese air defense commanders and cue antimissile batteries, all in a matter of minutes. There will be no time for cabinet meetings or independent confirmation through Japanese satellites. The same pattern will hold for intelligence, antisubmarine warfare, and a variety of other missions in the alliance. As the United States pulls ahead in its capabilities to integrate military systems, allies like Japan will have to either plug in to the “system of systems” or lose the advantages of interoperability. The United States, in turn, may be tempted to weaken coordination with Japan as capabilities for unilateral action increase. Technology is exacerbating Japan’s dilemma between entrapment and abandonment.

Taken together, these six areas do not suggest that the United States and Japan are developing different national security interests. Instead, the two nations are confronting decisions
on integration, interoperability, and jointness that most other alliances resolved decades ago. These growing pains are complicated by changing political cultures, however. The Japanese political elite is gradually embracing the trappings of a “normal” national security apparatus—one that is more centralized and capable of independent action. It is this trend that allowed the Defense Guidelines review in the first place. Some on the U.S. side remain wary of the increased internal cohesion of Japanese security institutions, a sense of mistrust that is reinforced by Japanese hedging strategies such as the independent satellite program. On the whole, however, the changes in Japan’s strategic culture represent far more of an opportunity for alliance solidarity than a threat to bilateral cooperation.

The systemic problems in U.S.-Japan military cooperation could be quickly fixed by changes in Japan’s Constitution either recognizing the exercise of the right of collective defense or eliminating Article 9 altogether. While there is growing political momentum for reexamining the Constitution, however, these changes are unlikely to occur in the near future. The Japanese public still desires a constitutional check on the role of the SDF, and Japan’s neighbors would view significant changes in the constraints on the nation’s military role with alarm. The “comprehensive mechanism” and “bilateral coordination mechanism” established by the Defense Guidelines are an incomplete substitute for joint and combined command, but they suffice, given the political realities. Other complementary structures are probably necessary to join the political and operational fibers of the alliance and fill in the gaps that are created by separate command structures. At the political level, the alliance would do well to establish a bilateral parliamentary organization comparable in form (if not authority) to the North Atlantic Assembly, which provides political oversight to NATO. At the operational level, the U.S. and Japanese militaries could create virtual combined commands for humanitarian relief operations or peacekeeping—areas in which Japan’s ban on collective defense would not be an impediment and quick joint reaction would be useful. To deal with new technological developments, the United States and Japan would do well to establish a bilateral interagency commission on long-term defense requirements and the impact of the RMA on interoperability.
When three U.S. servicemen raping an Okinawan girl in September 1995 and protests erupted throughout Japan, officials in Washington and Tokyo, as well as governments throughout Asia, watched with deep concern. The roughly forty-seven thousand U.S. troops based in Japan are seen by many in the region as the touchstone for stability in the U.S.-Japan alliance and East Asia as a whole. As an increasingly affluent Japanese public grows uneasy with the presence of U.S. military bases established during the Allied occupation after World War II, the base issue appears ripe for bilateral friction and divergence.

The circumstantial evidence for growing tensions over the bases appears great. To defuse the crisis caused by the 1995 rape, the U.S. government agreed in April 1996 to return the Marine Corps air station at Futenma, one of the most controversial bases in Okinawa. Three years later, Futenma was still crowded with Marine Corps helicopters (though the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa [SACO] has had success with smaller base consolidations). Frustration over U.S. bases led the DPJ to float a proposal for establishing a “no-base alliance” (kichi naki anpo) (Democratic Party of Japan 1998a, 1998b). Eventually the party dropped the idea, which was ill formed and futuristic, but the spectacle of Japan’s largest opposition party considering a proposal that would eliminate U.S. bases was disconcerting to alliance managers, to say the least.

Frustrated with the DPJ’s moderation, former prime minister Hosokawa Morihiro went ahead and published a proposal for eliminating all U.S. bases in two years in an article in Foreign Affairs in 1998, in which he cited a poll indicating that 67 percent of the Japanese public wanted fewer U.S. bases—a warning that the issue would not go away (Hosokawa 1998, 2). On closer examination, however, it is clear that support for the bases is not dissolving as quickly as suggested by Hosokawa. It is often pointed out, for example, that 89 percent of Okinawan voters supported a 1996 referendum “against” U.S. bases. But that referendum only asked, “Do you agree that the number of U.S. military bases in Okinawa should be reduced?”—something the U.S. and Japanese governments had already agreed to do. Moreover, when former governor Ota Masahide refused in March 1997 to extend leases on U.S. bases that were expiring, the Diet...
passed by 80 percent special legislation overriding the prefectural government’s decision. Many of the DPJ politicians who were considering the “no-base alliance” concept voted to maintain the U.S. bases. (Ota was later defeated in a gubernatorial election by the LDP candidate.) In the end, the polling behind Hosokawa’s article, the referendum in Okinawa, and even the DPJ’s short-lived “no-base alliance” proposal reflected an expectation that U.S. bases would gradually be consolidated, but not broad-based grass-roots opposition to the bases. The growing security problems caused by North Korea and China have seen to it that politicians are aware of the continuing need for a forward U.S. presence in Japan.

It is therefore premature for the United States and Japan to embark on dramatic restructuring of U.S. bases in Japan. Some U.S. experts have advocated cutting the number of Marines in Okinawa, but the costs in terms of capabilities and strategic signaling would more than likely outweigh any political goodwill bought in Japan (O'Hanlon 1997, 147–178). Over the long term, changes in technology—greater strategic airlift capabilities or simulated exercises, for example—will alter the shape of U.S. force structure in Japan. Changes in the strategic environment—unification on the Korean peninsula or resolution of the Taiwan Strait problem, for example—will also have an impact on the size and function of U.S. forces in Japan. For the foreseeable future, however, the costs of major restructuring will outweigh the benefits.

That having been said, the recent contretemps over U.S. bases also suggests that the status quo may not be sustainable without changes in alliance management. A U.S. presence remains as important as ever for Japanese security interests, but the modus operandi of base issues will have to change to converge with an increasingly fluid Japanese political scene and growing Japanese aspirations for control of the modalities of the alliance. Three examples illustrate this point.

First, the United States will have to consult more thoroughly with Japan on the disposition and purposes of U.S. forces in Japan. During the Okinawa crisis, some in the Japanese Foreign Ministry quietly pressed for establishment of a joint consultative mechanism on force structure. The idea was shot down by both governments because such a mechanism would have created dangerous expectations of reductions in U.S. forces, but the essence of the idea remains important.

Second, the SDF face deteriorating facilities as U.S. facilities paid for by Japanese taxpayers
continue to improve (Japanese financial support for U.S. forces tops US$5 billion a year). This could easily create tensions between the two militaries. The solution is not to cut back host nation support (HNS) for U.S. forces (though some political decline is inevitable) but to demonstrate greater flexibility, as through greater integration and joint use of SDF and U.S. bases.

Third, the Okinawa crisis revealed that relations between U.S. base commanders and local communities vary widely depending on the discretion of the base commander himself. There is a clear need for systematic improvement of base-community relations, building on the successful examples that now exist around certain facilities. Other steps are also necessary, including completion of the commitments undertaken in SACO.

**RELATIONS WITH CHINA**

Developments in Northeast Asia since the cold war have raised the value of the U.S.-Japan alliance to both parties. Uncertainties about China’s future role, coupled with new reminders about the North Korean threat to regional stability, have resulted in a common strategic context for long-term alliance cooperation even after the demise of the Soviet Union.

Both the United States and Japan want the same things in relations with China: integration into the global economy and international organizations, the establishment of consistent rule of law, peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait problem, and reassurance that China will not use force to resolve territorial disputes. Cooperation in achieving these common objectives has been impeded, however, by the increased fluidity in great-power relations in Northeast Asia since the end of the cold war. Japan is taking a far more realistic view of regional security threats than in the past, often responding with assertive unilateral diplomacy that defies U.S. expectations that Japanese diplomacy will continue to be passive or reactive. As a result, shared long-term objectives have sometimes been lost in the bilateral confusion over short-term priorities.

In the case of China, the United States and Japan are adjusting to a complex trilateral relationship. It would be a mistake to label this a “strategic triangle,” since the U.S.-Japan leg of the triangle is closely aligned and neither Japan nor the United States is likely to shift toward China any time soon. Nevertheless, it is clear that the actions between two poles of the trilateral
relationship are having more of an impact on the third pole than ever before. Few U.S. officials anticipated the negative reactions caused in China by the reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan alliance in 1996, for example, or in Japan after the Clinton administration highlighted its “strategic partnership” with China in 1998.

During the cold war, the U.S.-Japan alliance faced a simpler equation in relations with China. With the exception of the Taiwan clause in the 1969 Sato-Nixon communiqué, the Japanese side maintained a loose “conscientious objector” status in the first decades of post–World War II Sino-U.S. confrontation. The architect of postwar Japanese diplomacy, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, assumed that with time China would be weaned from the Soviet bloc. Japan withheld normalization until the United States surprised the world by opening dialogue with Beijing in 1972, but through the so-called L-T trade Japan had maintained informal economic relations with the mainland, and after the U.S. opening Japan rushed to normalize relations with Beijing. In turn, China tolerated U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation after the Sino-Soviet split because it served both to complicate Soviet planning and to contain Japanese independent rearmament. Trilateral relations also helped to stabilize U.S.-China relations after the Tiananmen Square Incident soured them in 1989, with Japan playing a bridging role between the other two nations.

The context of the trilateral relationship began changing in the mid-1990s, however. Growing Chinese economic power and assertiveness in regional diplomacy set the context. Elite ties between Beijing and Tokyo also frayed as the architects of normalization in the 1970s in both countries were replaced by a new generation of more nationalistic political leaders. When China conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1995 before joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s efforts to protect foreign aid to China failed as antinuclear activists on the left and anticommunists on the right forced the government to take the unprecedented step of suspending grant aid to Beijing. Beijing’s March 1996 missile tests around Taiwan further deepened suspicion of China among Japan’s political elite (some missiles landed within 100 kilometers of Okinawa). When the United States and Japan issued the Joint Declaration on Security and announced the review of the Defense Guidelines, the Chinese in turn attacked Japanese militarism and efforts to “contain” China. Sino-Japanese relations took a
further dive as the two nations confronted each other on the question of sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in 1997. Their foreign ministries attempted to stabilize relations on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the normalization of relations, declaring 1997 the “year of China” in Japanese diplomacy, but that celebration did not last beyond a disastrous summit between President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo in November 1998. At that summit, the Chinese insisted on a formal Japanese expression of apology (owabi) and remorse (hansei), the same formula Obuchi had given to visiting South Korean President Kim Dae Jung the month before. Unlike Kim, however, the Chinese leader was not willing to accept the apology as the final word, insisting on apologies in all future bilateral sessions, as well. As a result, the Chinese received only an expression of remorse. Tellingly, Obuchi received broad support within the Japanese political world and mainstream press. Even the Japan-China Economic Council, guardian of Japan’s more than US$3 billion annual investment in China, stood by the prime minister’s hard line. In the space of a few years, Japan’s view of China had shifted from a faith in economic interdependence to a reluctant realism.

Sino-American relations entered a similarly turbulent era in the mid-1990s. Clinton came into office in 1993 after attacking the George Bush administration for coddling the “butchers of Beijing.” The Clinton administration then spent the next eight years trying to achieve its own political equilibrium on China policy. Human rights dominated the agenda at first. Then after the administration allowed Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University in 1995, Beijing’s displeasure with U.S. policy on Taiwan caused a new round of crises, most notably the Chinese missile tests of March 1996. Two U.S. aircraft carriers (one, the U.S.S. Independence, homeported in Japan) were dispatched to the area of Taiwan in response, to signal U.S. concerns about the Chinese tests. The Clinton administration attempted to recast the domestic U.S. political debate over relations with China in 1997 and 1998 by arguing against a strategy of “containment” (a straw man, since no mainstream politician was calling for that anyway) and trumpeting the objective of establishing a “strategic partnership” with Beijing. The administration had the backing of the U.S. business community, and it had some success during the president’s summit in China in June 1998, but the theme of “strategic partnership” obviously oversold the degree of convergent interests in Sino-American relations and dramatically
understated the areas of disagreement. Predictably, the administration’s China bubble burst, first with the Cox report on Chinese nuclear espionage in the spring of 1999 and then with the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo campaign of the same year.

U.S.-Japan alliance coordination has not always kept up as each partner has struggled to find its footing in relations with China. Neither side is eager to give credence to the Chinese charges of containment by openly coordinating China policy, nor is either bureaucracy ready to complicate its own policy-making process by further integrating approaches to Beijing behind the scenes. As a result, miscues and collisions continue to undermine each side’s China policy. Following are four examples.

In 1997, the U.S. Department of State announced that it had no position on the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. This neutrality was consistent with U.S. policy on third-country territorial disputes. In its efforts to diffuse the situation, however, the State Department went further, declaring that U.S. obligations to defend Japan under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty did not apply to the Senkakus, a factual error, since technically the islands were under the administration of Japan. Rather than let this technical mistake pass (after all, China was unlikely to use force in the dispute), the Japanese government pressed for a clarification, fearing that the U.S. position would undermine Japan’s test of wills with China or encourage nationalists in Japan. The State Department, uneasy about China’s reaction, did not budge. Eventually the issue was resolved by a statement by Secretary of Defense William Perry that the treaty did, in fact, apply to the Senkakus.

In the summer of 1997, the Japanese Ministry of Finance proposed a separate Asian Monetary Fund to supplement the International Monetary Fund in responding to future financial crises in Asia. Confident that Asian nations would support the idea and nervous that the United States would not, the Finance Ministry chose to coordinate the proposal with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) but not Washington. When the proposal was unveiled at a meeting of finance officials in Hong Kong in July, the U.S. Department of the Treasury predictably lobbied against the idea, but with an unexpected ally—China. Subsequent Japanese diplomatic initiatives that have not been coordinated in advance with Washington have
also gone down to defeat, owing to combined Chinese and U.S. opposition. Japan’s attempts to demonstrate independent foreign policy proposals are not always matched by a corresponding effort to win U.S. support in the conceptual phase. Washington often fails to see the consequences of playing into China’s strategy of keeping Japan’s diplomatic profile low.

Surprised that efforts at transparency have not fully reassured China about the nonthreatening nature of the revised Defense Guidelines, Japanese politicians have also stumbled in their efforts to reassure Beijing independently. From the beginning, the Chinese claimed that the revised guidelines must apply to Taiwan, since Taiwan is included in the traditional Japanese definition of the geographic scope of Article 6 of the Security Treaty. The U.S. and Japanese governments coordinated their response to China’s complaints. The guidelines, they stated, were mission outlines, not scenario-specific agreements. This explanation was accurate enough, since the United States has no clear defense commitment to Taiwan and therefore no political mandate to include Japan in formal planning for the defense of the island. The Chinese, however, saw little advantage in conceding the point. Eager to demonstrate his understanding of China and his difference from conservative rivals, LDP Secretary-General Kato Koichi yielded to Chinese pressure and announced in Beijing in August 1997 that the new guidelines would not include Taiwan. This move prompted Kato’s rival Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku to announce the next day in Tokyo that Taiwan could not be ruled out, since a contingency there could affect Japan’s security. The Chinese government seized on that statement as evidence that the U.S.-Japan alliance was now a threat to China’s Taiwan policy, significantly complicating U.S. and Japanese defense diplomacy with Beijing (“China Won’t Accept” 1997). Needless to say, the Kato and Kajiyama statements strayed from the original talking points of the governments.

Chinese dissatisfaction with the U.S.-Japan alliance has also focused on TMD. Beijing argues that TMD undermines China’s limited deterrent and increases the prospect that Japan will develop nuclear weapons, shielding itself with TMD to maintain parity with China (Green 1998, 116–117). More substantively, Beijing worries that TMD will lead to further integration of the U.S.-Japan alliance command structure and possibly extend missile defense cooperation to Taiwan. Beijing’s resistance has complicated Japanese participation in TMD, but after the
Taepodong missile launch in August 1998 Tokyo found itself ready to agree to joint research with the United States based on the immediate threat presented by North Korean missiles. Years of U.S. prodding and a growing recognition of the missile threat in Japan finally paid off. When TMD cooperation became a pawn in Sino-American negotiations shortly afterward, however, it put that progress at risk. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, following a line established by lower-level officials in the administration, told the Chinese leadership in March 1999 that Japan had not yet made a final decision on TMD and that Chinese efforts to be transparent about its own missile program and to constrain North Korea might yet shape Japan’s decision. For opponents of missile defense in the administration, this was a reasonable ploy, but it contradicted years of U.S. (and, increasingly, Japanese) arguments that TMD was a critical mission for the alliance regardless of Beijing’s political intentions. Worse, it suggested that critical functions of the U.S.-Japan alliance were open for China to shape, as if there really were an equilateral “strategic triangle” linking Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington. It is difficult to imagine that U.S. officials would describe the missile defense efforts of NATO allies in the same manner.

These four examples do not suggest that U.S. and Japanese interests regarding China are divergent; nor do they suggest that restructuring of the alliance is necessary to manage China policy. Indeed, the delicacy of managing U.S.-Japan alliance relations vis-à-vis Beijing is one argument against restructuring the alliance. Significant reductions in U.S. force structure would signal weaker alliance resolve, with a broader impact on U.S. and Japanese diplomacy toward Beijing. Dramatically expanding Japanese offensive military missions or demanding collective defense could have the opposite effect of provoking Chinese efforts at bandwagoning against Japan with other concerned states in the region. As an alliance management problem, however, China policy is colossal. While U.S. and Japanese interests are not diverging on China, they are not so convergent that coordination comes naturally. The Japanese side will have to measure more carefully the effectiveness of “independent” diplomatic proposals that lead to joint Sino-American opposition. Coordination with Washington may lead to defeat for some ideas, but it will strengthen others. Ultimately, Japanese diplomacy toward China will be more effective if the United States, South Korea, and other like-minded nations are supportive from the beginning. For its part, Washington must consider carefully the consequences of discouraging Japanese
diplomatic initiatives that parallel U.S. efforts to integrate China into the global economy. While fundamental U.S. and Japanese interests in China are largely congruent, containing Japanese leadership aspirations will lead in time to divergent strategies.

**THE KOREAN PENINSULA**

Long-term U.S. and Japanese objectives regarding the Korean peninsula also tend to converge. These objectives include stability, denuclearization, reduction of the North Korean military threat, and gradual North Korean regime transformation and reconciliation with the South. During the cold war, however, Japanese security relations with the peninsula were largely divorced from the reality of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As Victor Cha has argued, Japan and South Korea were somehow “aligned but not allied” (Cha 1998). Although U.S. bases in Japan had an obvious supporting role in the defense of South Korea, Tokyo spent the decade after the 1969 Sato-Nixon communiqué denying any role or interests in the security of the Korean peninsula. Throughout the 1970s, the Japanese government denied that there was even a North Korean threat to Japan (Murata 1997, 12). This diplomatic “free riding” on U.S.–South Korea deterrence produced deep suspicion in Seoul that Japan was pursuing a separate link with the North to impede unification. In fact, opinion polls suggest that most Japanese are not opposed to unification, and Japan’s ties with the North have always been more problematic than those ties with the South.12 Nevertheless, Japanese overtures to North Korea, such as the 1990 summit between LDP kingpin Kanemaru Shin and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, only reinforced South Korean suspicions.

Since the mid-1990s, however, Japan’s recognition of the North Korean threat and Japanese security interests on the peninsula have grown dramatically. North Korea’s 1993 test launch of the Rodong missile (with a range enabling it to hit Osaka) made a strong impression in Tokyo. With the nuclear crisis of 1994, the prospect of Japan’s entanglement in a peninsular conflict was reinforced. The nuclear crisis led to unprecedented trilateral diplomatic coordination among Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, and in 1995 Japan signaled its readiness to play a role in multilateral security on the peninsula by joining the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which was created to provide light water reactors (LWR) to the North

Over the same period, in contrast, U.S. and South Korean engagement of the North gradually expanded. In the Four-Party Talks involving the United States, the two Koreas, and China and in associated bilateral negotiations, the Clinton administration began a diplomatic process it hoped would expand with time. In 1998, newly elected South Korean President Kim Dae Jung reversed decades of confrontational policy toward the North by pushing for a broader process of engagement known as the “Sunshine Policy.” Japan, the United States, and South Korea began to reverse roles. From the U.S. and South Korean perspective, it now appeared that Japan’s hard line toward Pyongyang was “free riding” on U.S. and South Korean engagement with the North. Washington and Seoul pressed Tokyo to contribute food aid to the North, to maintain its commitment to KEDO, and to move forward with normalization talks with Pyongyang. Japan’s KEDO commitment became a particular concern after the Obuchi administration unilaterally suspended its participation in the LWR funding talks in the immediate wake of the Taepodong launch. Meanwhile, the Japanese side grew distressed at Washington’s and Seoul’s apparent disregard of the North Korean missile threat, particularly after the U.S. government negotiated an “acceleration” of the schedule for the LWR the week after the missile launch.

The diverging U.S., Japanese, and South Korean priorities on missiles, proliferation, and engagement of the North threatened to undermine all three nations’ diplomacy vis-à-vis the peninsula. It was clear to South Korean President Kim that Japan had an important security role to play on the peninsula through KEDO and could be obstructionist if not fully consulted. He took dramatic steps to improve relations with Japan, culminating in a summit meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi in October 1998 that produced a joint declaration titled “A New Japan–Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century.” Among other things, the declaration resolved long-standing fisheries disputes, presented a formula whereby Japan expressed and South Korea accepted apology and remorse for the past, and proposed future
mechanisms for closer security consultations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998). This in turn eased the prospects for trilateral security consultations and coordination with the United States. When former Secretary of Defense William Perry was appointed by the Clinton administration to review U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula in the fall of 1998, he used his position to schedule regular trilateral consultations with senior representatives from Japan and South Korea. When he traveled to Pyongyang in June 1999, he was able to present messages from Obuchi and Kim to the North, in addition to a comprehensive U.S. package of diplomatic proposals that reflected the integrated U.S.–Japan–South Korea approach. Perry also established an unprecedented standing trilateral committee with Japan and South Korea to facilitate an integrated strategy in future dealings with the North.15

The United States, Japan, and South Korea share broad objectives regarding the peninsula but differ in priorities. Japan will always be more concerned about missiles than the United States or South Korea. The United States is likely to retain the highest vigilance of the three on North Korea’s potential to resume a nuclear weapons program. South Korea, at least under Kim, has embarked on a policy of engagement that moves well beyond what the political constraints in Washington and Tokyo allow. These divergent priorities mean that policy coordination will always be difficult. Nevertheless, divergent domestic political priorities in the three nations will be easier to manage if their governments are working from a common long-term strategy. The trilateral consultative processes started in 1998 are a good start. Are they enough? Given that any formal U.S–Japan–South Korea security pact or institutionalized defense arrangement would provoke a Chinese (and possibly domestic South Korean) backlash, the current arrangements are preferable to a restructuring of the trilateral security relationship. It is noteworthy, however, that the U.S. side only elevated trilateral security cooperation with Japan and South Korea after the Taepodong crisis threatened Japanese support for KEDO. Future inducements for North Korea to abandon missiles, nuclear weapons, or conventional military forces will also require Japanese funding. Tokyo, in other words, has a stake in Korean peninsula policy that Washington cannot ignore. Nevertheless, the historic North-South summit in June 2000 will add a new fluidity and complexity to U.S.-Japan coordination on Korea policy. Tokyo did not greet the summit with the same euphoria as Seoul, but did move forward on normalization talks with the North. Skepticism,
nevertheless, remains deep in Japan because of the issues related to missiles, kidnappings, and nuclear weapons. The North–South process of reconciliation opens up great opportunities for threat reduction on the peninsula—but also new challenges for alliance planning and diplomatic coordination.

MULTILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION

The final area of alliance cooperation this study briefly examines is multilateral security. The April 1996 Joint Declaration on Security highlighted cooperation in regional multilateral security forums as a key theme for the United States and Japan in the next century. In contrast, multilateral security was portrayed by editorials and news analyses in the Asahi Shimbun newspaper at the time as an antidote to too much reliance on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.16 Which is it?

The broader answer, of course, is that multilateral security dialogue in East Asia should not conflict with the security arrangements between the United States and Japan. In fact, the revision of the Defense Guidelines led Washington and Tokyo to expand minilateral defense forums with South Korea and Russia and to provide greater transparency in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and track-two regional security forums, such as the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific.17 Ironically, the need to explain the guidelines strengthened multilateral security dialogue. Moreover, the level of security cooperation in the ARF is still so basic that there is little likelihood it will replace any functions of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The ARF has not moved beyond the baseline of “dialogue” to establish any significant confidence- and security-building measures, let alone a collective security regime that might replace the stabilizing role played by the U.S.-Japan alliance. Both Washington and Tokyo are eager to see the dialogue function of the ARF strengthened, but neither can take the lead without causing suspicion among the ASEAN states that lie at the core of the ARF. The ARF will move at ASEAN’s pace. It serves a useful function by enhancing dialogue among Asia Pacific powers. But at most it will complement rather than replace the U.S.-Japan alliance as the key security institution for Washington and Tokyo in Asia.

The United Nations provides a somewhat different case. The United States and Japan
diverge in U.N. policy in the sense that Japan continues to pay its dues and aspire to a larger role, including permanent membership on the Security Council, while Congressional ambivalence about the world body has prevented the U.S. government from paying its arrears (and thus the United States faced the loss of its vote in the General Assembly in 1999). Capricious U.S. policy toward the U.N. complicates Japanese diplomacy, since the U.N. remains central to Japan’s definition of its world role. Thus, Tokyo expressed “support” for U.S. force against Iraq based on a U.N. mandate in December 1998 but only “understanding” of NATO’s use of force against Kosovo, which was not based on a U.N. mandate. On the whole, however, U.S.-Japanese cooperation at the United Nations is strong. Even in the case of Kosovo, the Obuchi government pledged US$200 million to assist the “front line” states, indirectly supporting U.S. policy even in the absence of a U.N. mandate.

There are limits to how far allies can cooperate in multilateral security forums, particularly in Asia. For one thing, such cooperation can breed mistrust among the other states, jeopardizing the further institutionalization of such forums as the ARF. In addition, it is in the U.S. interest not to undermine Japanese diplomatic influence in the region by “bilateralizing” all Japan’s new multilateral security policies. Many in Japan remain sensitive to the possibility that Washington will try to constrain or control Japan’s peacekeeping role within the alliance, and for that reason the SDF have been reluctant to include peacekeeping as a major area for alliance cooperation. Peacekeeping is a legitimate and important area for independent Japanese contributions to the global community. Nevertheless, Japanese procurement of airlift and sealift for peacekeeping will be closely watched in Washington and throughout the region, and for certain peacekeeping requirements (long-range airlift, for example) there are definite advantages for the SDF in cooperating with U.S. forces.

On the whole, therefore, multilateral security regimes in Asia are still too immature either to cause bilateral divergence or to become a central component of U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Both the United States and Japan have advantages to gain from stronger regional multilateral dialogue, but the difference between Japanese idealism and American skepticism on the subject should not be mistaken for actual differences in interests.
CONCLUSIONS

This essay began by asking whether the tensions in the alliance represent repetitions of past patterns or a trend that will intensify with time and whether the alliance needs restructuring or just better management to cope with these patterns. Some historical comparison is necessary to answer the first question. It would be difficult to argue, for example, that the bilateral disagreements over Japan’s indigenous satellite program in 1999 are worse than the huge 1989 confrontation over Japan’s plan to develop its own jet fighter, the FSX, or that bilateral dissonance over Korean peninsula policy was any louder in 1998 (when Japan was the hawk) than in 1978 (when Japan was the dove). The source of the dissonance is different, however. The growing realism in Japanese security thinking and fluidity in Japanese politics mean that there are now greater consequences when the United States fails to address Japanese concerns about national security. With time, U.S. inattention could establish a dynamic that does harm to the alliance. On the other hand, the growth of Japanese strategic realism presents an opportunity to strengthen and integrate alliance security cooperation.

The second question also requires a mixed answer. It can be argued that the alliance is unprepared to withstand certain shocks without significant and fundamental restructuring. For example, can Japan be relied on to support the United States in a Taiwan Strait crisis without a formal commitment beforehand? Would the burgeoning U.S.–Japan–South Korea coordination prove resilient enough to weather the collapse of North Korea without a larger Japanese military role on the peninsula? Will SACO or other measures to reduce the impact of U.S. bases in Japan insulate the alliance against a major military accident in Okinawa? The United States and Japan could restructure the alliance in anticipation of such crises. For example, the United States could push Japan to accept an explicit role in the defense of Taiwan or to apply the right of collective defense to a frontline combat role on the Korean peninsula. The United States and Japan could also cut U.S. force levels in Japan by half to buy goodwill from the Japanese population in case something went wrong at a U.S. military base.

The problem with each of these structural solutions is that the cost of the insurance policy is too high. An explicit Japanese commitment to assist the United States with the defense of Taiwan could be useful during a Taiwan crisis with China—but it could also provoke one.
Similarly, Japanese acceptance of a combat role on the Korean peninsula would provide extra forces in a crisis, but in the near term it would undermine diplomatic efforts on the Korean peninsula and the progress that has been made in Japan–South Korean ties. Finally, moves to cut back U.S. force levels in Japan might or might not build goodwill in the event of future crises over bases, but it would definitely hinder the U.S. ability to respond to a crisis in the region and would be likely to undermine stability by raising questions throughout the region about U.S. staying power.

Changes in the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance have always been incremental. The current trend toward strategic realism in Japanese security policy creates an opportunity for more changes, but the undertow of pacifism in Japan is strong, and the region’s acceptance of a larger Japanese security role is only just taking root. Strategically, it is difficult to argue that regional stability or U.S. and Japanese interests would be enhanced by changing the configuration of the alliance to give Japan a military role more symmetrical with that of the United States.

At the same time, however, this essay has argued in each case study that incremental changes in the alliance continue to be necessary. Many of these changes should come in the mechanics of alliance management, including the following:

- implementation of crisis-management authority for the Japanese prime minister
- establishment of a bilateral parliamentary assembly to oversee the alliance
- establishment of combined and joint bilateral operational centers for humanitarian operations
- establishment of a bilateral requirements dialogue to assess long-term equipment needs and the impact of the RMA
- greater U.S. attention to base-community relations
- flexibility regarding the amount and use of HNS
- greater integration of U.S. and SDF bases
- greater coordination and planning of each side’s China and Korean peninsula policies
- further institutionalization of the U.S.–Japan–South Korea policy consultation process
- U.S. support for Japanese initiatives in multilateral security

The alliance also requires a better management philosophy. In this area, most of the burden
is on the U.S. government, which has not maintained sufficient high-level coordination with the Japanese side. In the Clinton administration, Japanese security issues were managed primarily by deputy assistant secretaries in Washington, while U.S. security policy issues were managed by vice-ministers and even prime ministers in Tokyo. This particular asymmetry in the bilateral relationship is simply not sustainable. The alliance will become less than the sum of its parts unless strategic direction is consistently set at senior levels of both governments.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is based on broadly shared strategic objectives and a generally complementary division of roles and missions. But these attributes do not guarantee the continued health of bilateral security relations. Like a shark that will drown if it does not move forward, the U.S.-Japan alliance requires constant attention, strengthening, and integration.

Notes

1. The three nonnuclear principles are not to produce, possess, or permit the introduction to Japanese territory of nuclear weapons. The three principles of arms export are not to export weapons to communist countries, countries under U.N.-mandated arms embargoes, or countries currently or likely in the near future to be embroiled in military conflicts.
3. Some analysts see this satellite capability as a potential source of tension in the alliance (Ennis 1999, 10).
5. Article 9, which renounces “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes” and the maintenance of “war potential,” is the basis of the government’s stance that Japan cannot exercise the right of collective defense.
6. The Diet established a research commission on constitutional issues in 1999, and opinion polls as recently as 1998 show that a majority of Japanese now favor revising the Constitution. Only a minority favor eliminating Article 9, however.

7. In fact, the Joint Declaration on Security and the Defense Guidelines review had been planned for the previous fall and were announced after the Taiwan Strait crisis only because President Clinton had postponed his visit to Japan from November 1995 to April 1996.

8. For a detailed account, see “Insaido Ajia tsuka kikin” (1997).

9. These initiatives include Tokyo’s June 1998 proposal of a four-way security summit of the United States, Japan, China, and Russia and its June 1998 proposal of a meeting of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Japan and Germany to address Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.

10. See, for example, comments by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell (Green and Mochizuki 1997, 85).

11. U.S. officials denied a quid pro quo, but Albright stated clearly to Chinese officials that Chinese help to reduce missile threats in Asia would render a TMD system with Japan less necessary (Laris 1999).

12. In 1995, the thirtieth anniversary of the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea, the Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan) and Hangkuk Ilbo (South Korea) newspapers polled Japanese about unification and found that fewer than a fifth thought it would pose a problem for Japan.

13. The Japanese government suspended funding, but some politicians wanted to go further. Some called for cutting off economic ties between Korean residents in Japan and compatriots in Pyongyang; others even called for the unilateral right to retaliate against the North for missile strikes (Chang 1998).

14. The September 5 agreement was announced in a statement by the State Department on September 11, 1998 (U.S.-DPRK Agreement, Department of State, September 10, 1998).

15. The trilateral meetings became a regular feature of U.S., Japanese, and South Korean diplomacy toward the North in 1999, though the future of the trilateral process beyond the
Perry review was not institutionalized (Shin 1999).

16. A typical example is an analytical piece in the *Asahi Shimbun* on September 24, 1997, titled “Shuhenkoku no keikai maneku osore, Bei no domeimo ni keisha Nichi-Bei no shin boei shishin” (Regional powers warn of U.S. alliance net and new guidelines). The analysis, by an *Asahi* editorial writer, calls for Japan to turn to multilateral approaches to security instead of relying on the U.S.-Japan alliance alone.

17. This approach is explained in Office of the Secretary of Defense (1998).

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