In its efforts to build a regional community based on three pillars (political-security, economic, and socio-cultural), ASEAN requires the support and cooperation of its dialogue partners. This is especially critical at this historical juncture where the global economy is experiencing unprecedented stress and the regional and global geostrategic environment is going through tectonic shifts. These developments have created new forms of uncertainty and complex dynamics. Globalization in various guises has effectively broken down whatever illusions states and individuals might have to shield or insulate them from developments taking place in distant physical locations. This makes cooperation among friends as well as like-minded partners an imperative for our time.

It is in this context that strengthening bilateral cooperation among like-minded partners needs to be undertaken with utmost seriousness. Japan and ASEAN are well-advised in their efforts to strengthen their decades-long partnership, including in support of building the ASEAN Community.

Usually seen as a residual category or even an afterthought among the pillars of the ASEAN Community, the socio-cultural pillar ought to be at its center. After all, the preamble of the ASEAN Charter resolves “to place the well-being, livelihood and welfare of the peoples at the centre of the ASEAN community building process,”1 while the blueprint for the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASCC Blueprint) clearly states that “the primary goal of the ASCC” is “to contribute to realizing an ASEAN Community that is people-centered and socially responsible.”2 Moreover, a commonsense view would argue that any community needs people, whose wellbeing must be its top priority.

Adopted as part of the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015 at the ASEAN Summit in Cha-am, Thailand, on March 1, 2009, the ASCC
Blueprint seeks to realize a people-centered ASEAN Community through various activities grouped according to 340 action lines that are intended to achieve the six characteristics of the ASCC Blueprint. As the scope of the socio-cultural pillar is broad, the study group on the ASCC of this joint project, otherwise called the Yamamoto Project, selected areas that are not only central to the achievement of a people-centered ASEAN Community but also those already identified by ASEAN and Japan as critical to their strategic partnership.

Thus, the study group focused on ASEAN-Japan cooperation through their Plan of Action 2011–2015 for the implementation of their Joint Declaration for Enhancing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together (POA) adopted on November 18, 2011, in Bali, Indonesia, in regard to the socio-cultural pillar of the ASEAN Community. The study group members put the peoples of ASEAN at the center of their analysis on how ASEAN-Japan strategic partnership could be strengthened through cooperation in contributing to the realization of the socio-cultural pillar of the ASEAN Community. This necessitated a bottom-up approach in each of their background papers.

**Assumptions**

Three interrelated assumptions guided the study group’s work. The first is that ASEAN integration and community building that is people-centered is critical to ASEAN’s role as a civilian power in East and Southeast Asia. A civilian power is one that does not rely on military might or armaments to achieve its foreign policy goals.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that ASEAN has never aspired to become anything other than a group of states whose influence in external relations would depend on what today we generally call “soft power.” Soft power consists of values such as peaceful settlement of disputes, equality among states, respect for national sovereignty among states, non-aggression, and even non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. In fact, ASEAN’s definition of “security” as comprehensive is radically distinct from the traditional view of security as military defense from external aggression in an effort to dispel the mistaken notion on the part of outsiders—especially the superpowers (the United States and the former Soviet Union) during the Cold War—that the original ASEAN member states were forming a military alliance. In this regard, ASEAN shares with Japan a conception of security as comprehensive in character rather than constituting merely military capacity for external defense. ASEAN and Japan might have had
two different rationales for framing security differently from the West, but it is a conception they have shared since the early 1970s and most certainly since before the end of the Cold War. Notions like “redefining security” only became current outside East Asia after the Cold War ended.6

The second assumption is that the ASEAN Community can only be fully realized through an ASCC whose referent object or target population is the peoples of Southeast Asia.7 Thus their development and security are critical to a people-centered ASEAN Community.8 As already stated, people are at the core of community building and a people-centered community is an idea that ASEAN has consistently emphasized in its vision documents and is supported by ASEAN’s dialogue partners, including Japan. Japan as a single actor in international relations has taken the most prominent role in supporting the people-centered importance of community building. This view is evidenced by the inclusion of human security in Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter in 2003 and its support for the Commission on Human Security in 2000–2003.

The third assumption is that the promotion of human security in Southeast Asia is influenced and shaped by global megatrends that present both challenges and opportunities to ASEAN member states and their dialogue partners, especially Japan. In this present age of globalization where national borders are increasingly being eroded by giant leaps made possible by the technological revolution especially in information, communication, and transportation, societies have become increasingly sensitive and vulnerable to developments that take place in distant locations. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 clearly demonstrated to East Asians that they could no longer remain impervious to developments external to their countries. In this context, it is crucially important to consider the global trends most likely to affect and influence or even shape the wellbeing of people, including those of East and Southeast Asia.

Global Trends Challenging East Asia

In determining the global trends that present challenges to East Asia, the most relevant to the aspects of the socio-cultural pillar addressed by the study group’s background papers are selected for analysis. The ASCC Blueprint has six goals: (1) human development, (2) social welfare and protection, (3) social justice and rights, (4) environmental sustainability, (5) building of an ASEAN identity, and (6) narrowing of the development gap. These goals are to be met through the implementation of activities along 340 action lines before the ASEAN Community is realized in 2015.
The background papers focus on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) unanimously adopted by the UN in 2000; protection of vulnerable people, including migrant workers; building of the ASEAN identity including through culture and community engagement and narrowing of the development gap; and natural disaster response and management to realize disaster-resilient nations and safer communities in the region. The MDGs and the ASEAN Community share the same year—2015—for completion. The MDGs set 8 goals and 21 targets to eradicate poverty worldwide by 2015. These goals have become “milestone indicators in a country’s struggle to improve the condition and welfare of their people,” especially among the marginalized and vulnerable sectors.

The MDGs are among the actions set in the ASCC Blueprint under the goal regarding social welfare and protection, while the protection of the rights of migrant workers is among the actions to be undertaken to advance social justice and rights. The importance of culture and community engagement is emphasized in the goal of building an ASEAN identity, while a more economically cohesive (or a less economically uneven or inequitable) region is sought in the goal to narrow the development gap. The role of education, youth, and the media is recognized in the ASCC Blueprint as a cross-cutting issue. Hence, action lines in this regard are found in all six goals of the ASCC.

As a result of the frequency and fatality of natural disasters, which are related to environmental risks such as global warming and climate change, improving the region’s capacity for humanitarian response to and management of natural disasters is an urgent task. However, there is also a need to effectively address complex disasters, such as the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster that occurred in Japan, in a region as prone to natural disasters as East Asia. This reality is compounded by the fact that the region’s leaders seek alternative sources of energy, including nuclear. Saving lives from natural and complex disasters is indeed a priority recognized by the social welfare and protection goal and one that takes many forms, such as building disaster-resilient nations and safer communities.

That these issues will be affected by global trends is made clear in the background papers. In varying ways and forms, the authors integrate into their analysis the most relevant global trends and how they are likely to impact the respective aspect of the ASCC they chose to address. These global trends include economic development and inequities; climate change and increased intensity of natural disasters; demographic change, especially aging societies; natural resource scarcities, especially food, water, and energy; and human rights.
Economic development and inequities have created social and economic gaps within and across countries in the world in general and in East Asia in particular. This global trend is likely to persist into the future. The background papers on the ASCC touch on this, especially those on migration and narrowing the development gap. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), for example, points out that the trend toward increasing inequalities within Asian societies has the potential to undermine social cohesion and stability and increase income disparities across countries; these could destabilize the region. Moreover, while the Gini coefficient in the developing parts of Asia (ranging from 28 to 51) is still lower than in Sub-Saharan Africa (ranging from 30 to 66) and Latin America and the Caribbean (ranging from 45 to 60), nevertheless, developing Asia compares poorly with other regions in regard to changes in inequality during the last decade. Here, the Gini coefficient worsened in 11 Asian countries, representing some 82 percent of the region’s population.

Urbanization will continue to rise. The global urban population will grow from the present 50 percent (3.5 billion of the world’s 7.1 billion people) to 60 percent (4.9 billion of the projected 8.3 billion people) in 2030. Moreover, urbanization will occur in both the developed and developing worlds. In the developed world, the urban population is projected to rise by 5.7 percentage points to 81 percent, while that in the developing world is expected to rise by 9.9 percentage points to 55 percent. The urban-rural divide and other gaps across and within countries are likely to exacerbate existing inequities unless they are strategically addressed. They will remain drivers of migration both within and across countries, processes that feed into a cycle of development gaps, inequities, migration flows, and the attendant multiple challenges they create for peoples and their governments. An understanding of these interconnected processes is seen in ASEAN’s emphasis on narrowing the development gap, even in its present limited application to only the economic dimensions of development.

Similarly, climate change and the increased intensity of natural disasters are likely to have severe consequences for peoples. Global warming has been linked to the increasing intensity of tropical storms and is projected to lead to an increase in the maximum wind speed by 0.5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale by 2050. Since the 1970s, major tropical storms in both the Atlantic and Pacific regions have already increased in duration and intensity by 50 percent. Climate change has also raised the sea surface temperature by 0.5 percent, thereby increasing the number of major storms. By 2030, the average global temperature is expected to rise between 0.5 and 1.5 degrees Celsius, and developing societies are likely to suffer more than developed ones due to the fact that the former have
fewer social, technical, and financial resources to adapt to climate change than the latter and also because they are more dependent on agriculture than are developed societies.¹⁵

Indeed, if one looks at the occurrence of great natural disasters between 1950 and 2006 in Asia Pacific, there has been an increase since the mid-1980s. Particularly exposed to natural disasters, this region contributed 82 percent of human fatalities from disasters between 1970 and 2011 and 80 percent (or US$294 billion) of the total annual global economic losses due to disasters. Amidst the increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of natural disasters, the number of human fatalities in some subregions of Asia Pacific has declined mainly due to better disaster risk management, including early warning systems, disaster preparedness, and social safety nets.¹⁶ Surely, the lessons learned from the region’s major disasters such as Cyclone Nargis and Fukushima, discussed in Moe Thuzar’s paper, are of utmost value to ASEAN-Japan cooperation.

Demographic change is another global trend relevant to this study group. Population growth has accelerated in recent decades, growing from 5.3 billion in 1990 to 6.9 billion in 2011 and to a projected 8.3 billion in 2030. By 2030, the developing world is expected to post a growth of 24 percent of its 2011 population of 5.7 billion, increasing to 7.0 billion people. This translates into greater challenges to developing societies than to those in the developed world, where its 1.2 billion population in 2011 is projected to grow to 1.3 billion people by 2030.¹⁷ No doubt, the achievement of many MDG targets on health and education in the developing world, including within ASEAN as demonstrated by Risako Ishii, is a key driver of this population growth.

Other dimensions of demographic change include the dramatic 50 percent drop in the world’s one billion people living in extreme poverty by 2030, an expansion of the world’s middle class, the shrinking demographic arc of instability (where the 80 countries in 2012 whose median age was 25 years or less will shrink to 50 countries by 2030),¹⁸ and the rise in the number of people in urban areas already noted.

Among these dimensions, the study group focused on aging societies whose speedy rise is seen as a more defining challenge to East and Southeast Asia in the near future than to other parts of the world. A study states that unprecedented and widespread aging throughout the world, including Asia’s rich and developing societies, will result in acute labor shortages and precipitate mass global migration.¹⁹ That the phenomenon of population aging is already upon us cannot be ignored. The median age is projected to increase by five years (to age 34) globally, by 4.4 years (to age 44) in developed societies, and by 5.5 years (to 32 years) in developing societies by 2030.²⁰
More telling and compelling in its conclusions, an ADB study warns of the consequences of an aging population for society. Recognized for its economic dynamism, fast growth, and development, the shrinking share of the youth in Asia’s population will deprive the region of one of the main drivers of its past economic success and turn the region’s demographic dividend into a demographic tax.\textsuperscript{21} Even as there will be varying scenarios of this transition across Asia’s diverse economies—where the demographic dividend will continue until 2030 for societies that experienced their demographic transitions later, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines—the dividend will decline in 2021–2030 relative to 2011–2020.\textsuperscript{22} As the economic burden shifts to the younger population in aging Asia, there is an urgent need to address the welfare and future of the youth sector.

Natural resource scarcities (especially food, water, and energy) that trigger cross-border conflicts are also expected to increase. By 2030, half of the global population is projected to live in areas of great water stress. The total demand of developed countries for water will increase by 40 percent, even as their share of global demand will decrease from 27 percent to 24 percent, while the water withdrawal of developing countries is expected to increase by 58 percent, with agriculture accounting for the biggest share at 82 percent. Meanwhile, the world’s energy consumption is predicted to rise by 26 percentage points, with the demand from developed countries increasing only slightly (2.6 percent) and their share of global energy consumption projected to fall to 35 percent. Much of the increased demand for energy is to come from the developing world, whose energy consumption is expected to grow by 45 percent and its share of global energy consumption is expected to rise to 64 percent.\textsuperscript{23} Both energy and water consumption relate to food availability, affordability, and accessibility to a global population that is projected to grow dramatically, as discussed above.

In addition, there are 14 critical raw materials required for manufacturing consumer goods as well as for other purposes, such as physical infrastructure and military goods. The dependence of developed countries on imported raw materials from the developing world is expected to increase by 2030 and create risks of interstate conflict, transferring wealth from import-dependent countries to commodity suppliers as the price of metals skyrockets. Inequitable access to critical raw materials can also cause concerns especially in the high technology sector, where new technologies are hugely dependent on both minor as well as specialty metals.\textsuperscript{24}

The implications for migration of the above global trends make the urgent establishment of a credible and effective migration regime critical. Meanwhile, attention to human rights has also been on the rise. Not only has there been a shift in the development paradigm of donor countries to
a rights-based approach as shown by Amara Pongsapitch, but the sphere of human rights has also expanded to include nonstate actors, such as liberation movements within states and business actors. The arrival of human security on the global agenda since the mid-1990s no doubt helped the cause of human rights to rise in prominence globally. Since human security is seen as constituting two groups of freedom—freedom from fear and freedom from want—the conceptual connection between human security and international human rights principles is inevitable. Freedom from want can be generally linked to the wide scope of economic freedoms already recognized in international human rights instruments, primarily the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), while freedom from fear can be linked to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The accountability of nonstate actors for human rights observance has been recognized in the 1986 Limburg Principles on the implementation of the ICESCR; the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on violations of economic, social, and cultural rights; and more recently in the adoption by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) of the study led by Prof. John G. Ruggie on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, which proposed guiding principles based on his “protect-respect-remedy” framework. This was subsequently reflected in the adoption by the UN General Assembly of “business and human rights” as one of the UN’s activities.

Main Findings

While high-level commitment and political will exist behind the ASEAN Community blueprints and the ASEAN-Japan POA 2011–2015, there has not been enough specific and sustained activity to implement priorities in those instances when priorities were set. Most of the projects have started and stopped at workshops, with little impact on the lives of the people for whom they are intended.

For instance, the ASCC Blueprint and the POA are mainly aspirational statements. They need to be transformed into more implementable agendas, specific targets, and actionable plans. Moreover, while overlaps in the ASCC Blueprint (and among the ASEAN Community blueprints, for that matter) are unavoidable, they create confusion in implementation, dysfunctional turf wars, and inefficiencies. To be fully integrated, the ASCC priorities need to be linked to, and complement, the work carried out in the other community pillars. This becomes even more important
with the ever-increasing movement of people, culture, and information within and across countries.

The implementation of the ASCC Blueprint and the POA has been found to be insufficient thus far. This insufficiency is primarily because most of the priorities are largely the responsibility of national governments. The diverse levels of development in each country also hamper concerted regional action. Thus, ASEAN’s value has been more as a convener that facilitates further focused action at bilateral or subregional levels than as an implementing body.

Many good mechanisms exist, or are emerging, in areas like disaster resilience, including the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance as well as the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response; and people-to-people exchanges in the education, culture, and youth spheres, including the ASEAN University Network and the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Programme. However, more work is needed to assess regional readiness for ASEAN’s future role in disaster management and humanitarian action, achieve the MDGs, prepare to achieve the post-MDG agenda, effectively respond to the movement of peoples (especially migrant and unskilled workers), build an ASEAN identity and culture, and sustain people-to-people connectivity especially in education (formal, informal, etc.), youth, media (mainstream and social), and Internet use.

In the global community of nations, the ASEAN-Japan partnership can facilitate the further development of these activities as discussed in the study group’s background papers and outlined in the recommendations below.

Recommendations

The main findings made by the study group point to a number of recommendations. The priority is on those that must be achieved by 2015 as a matter of great urgency.

The bottom-up approach of the ASCC also demands an inclusive and participatory process particularly because the ASCC responsibilities are far too important to be left to governments alone. Thus, civil society participation is crucial, but it must begin with the formulation and design of projects undertaken by ASEAN singly or in partnership with others like Japan. Moreover, building a sense of identity—the achievement of a “we feeling” among ASEAN’s peoples—cannot be realized if the security of the state sought by the security pillar or the economic prosperity sought by the economic pillar are not felt by the people on the ground. Hence, the
wellbeing of ASEAN peoples that the ASCC targets is both foundational and essential.

Building an ASEAN identity and culture urgently needs some deliberate advocacy in support of the concept of “ASEAN identity,” without which there can be no genuine ASEAN community. ASEAN’s diverse culture requires a coexistence of diverse forms of cultural relations, including local heritage, cosmopolitanism, fusion culture, and cultural pluralism. To achieve this, the ASEAN-Japan partnership must take the following steps:

- Design and adopt an ASEAN Identity Project that celebrates ASEAN cultural diversity.
- Support the ASEAN Identity Project by encouraging civil society organizations (CSOs) to perform political and cultural functions for cultural groups, especially the marginalized among them who need support for social services and socio-cultural activities.
- Promote ASEAN awareness and strengthen ASEAN cultural identity through the following:
  1. Support for programs identified in the POA such as media partnerships, exchanges, and other person-to-person activities
  2. Support for capacity building in new media technology together with the development of new content
  3. Support for collaboration between Japan’s public broadcasting network, NHK, and the other ASEAN broadcast networks at the regional and bilateral levels.
- Promote cultural creativity and industry by establishing a low-interest rate small and medium-sized cultural enterprises (SMCE) program loan to encourage ASEAN entrepreneurs who wish to venture into the new cultural market.
- Encourage local governments to develop and promote innovative people-to-people exchanges such as the following:
  1. community-to-community exchanges
  2. sister-city networks, including among ASEAN countries
  3. community-based food and crafts enterprises (like Japan’s isson ippin “one community one product” model)
  4. grassroots networks.
- Promote ASEAN consciousness and sense of community through preservation and promotion of ASEAN cultural heritage, highlighting the region’s unique cultural diversity.
- Promote cultural creativity and industry by supporting local craftsmanship, SMCEs, and other innovative projects as activities to
generate income and to strengthen an ASEAN sense of ownership and identity through, for example, grants and loans to governments and the private sector.

- Preserve and promote ASEAN cultural heritage through the following activities:
  1. Supporting the revitalization of local culture, indigenous culture and knowledge, and cultural heritage as an alternative cultural process to counter globalism. This process should help resist the spread of mass culture in manipulating the marginalized and the powerless
  2. Supporting the concepts of cultural diversity, local cultures, and community identity by establishing a Cultural Heritage and Local Wisdom Fund.

Regarding the MDGs and post-MDG issues, ASEAN countries must achieve the following by 2015:

- Attend to gaps in MDG implementation within countries, while priority is given to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV).
- Encourage intrasectoral coordination of initiatives of the different ASCC sectoral bodies, such as issue-based working groups. These groups could prioritize cooperation needs on a specific issue and harmonize cooperation and other activities undertaken in the region.
- Utilize regional cooperation resources by enhancing the coordination of South-South cooperation, the donor countries of which should align their cooperation with the ASCC’s regional priorities.

Similarly, ASEAN countries and Japan should accomplish the following by 2015:

- Analyze development gaps in MDG-related areas across and within countries to prioritize the ASCC’s cooperation needs.
- Identify potential social and human development issues that may become common regional problems, to be addressed in the post-MDGs era (e.g., social welfare in aging societies and falling birth rates, etc.). In this regard, Japanese experiences may be relevant and should be shared by having Japan’s CSOs play a more active role, working closely with CSOs in ASEAN countries.
- Ensure that projects funded by Japanese ODA are aligned with the ASCC’s regional priorities.
- Promote knowledge and information sharing on regional best practices and support experts in each policy area through a knowledge databank as proposed in the ASEAN MDGs Roadmap. This may be supported by the Japan ASEAN Integration Fund, or through regionwide projects.
based on the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)–ASEAN cooperation agreement.

- On its own, Japan should consider a multilateral cooperation scheme that would not be limited to the present Third Country Training Program. Joint projects should be initiated with donors to ASEAN's South-South cooperation activities through greater flexibility in Japan's ODA schemes.

The ASEAN-Japan partnership should take several steps to promote and protect human rights and welfare, especially of the most vulnerable populations:

- Support activities that prevent the negative impacts of development on vulnerable peoples, including women, children and youth, the elderly, people with disabilities, indigenous peoples, and migrant workers. An ASEAN Code of Conduct for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) should be developed to prevent negative social impacts on vulnerable groups and undesirable exploitation of natural resources.
- Support CSR and business and human rights activities of Japanese and ASEAN multinational firms, such as by establishing an award scheme honoring multinational firms with best practices in CSR and business and human rights programs.
- Support social safety net programs for humanitarian assistance and human rights protection schemes for vulnerable groups.
- Strengthen the functioning of the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children.

Since migrant workers are a huge sector in East Asia, the promotion and protection of rights of migrant workers is a priority. By 2015, the ASEAN-Japan partnership should have achieved the following measures:

- Support regional and bilateral programs at the national level to promote and protect the rights of migrant workers.
- Establish an independent body for promoting migrant workers’ rights (not intergovernmental or beholden to any governments) by 2015.
- Support CSOs working on migrant workers’ rights through financial, programmatic, and other means.
- Take the following steps to effectively implement the POA:
  1. Double their efforts to establish updated, reliable, and systematic datasets and information on migration
  2. Conduct mapping exercises to identify the target groups, actors, and entry points for policy intervention
  3. Develop a policy matrix for implementation by focusing on different programs to protect the rights and welfare of migrant workers.
To improve disaster management networks and humanitarian action, ASEAN-Japan cooperation should do the following:

- Support relevant priorities of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration such as rural infrastructure development, particularly in the CLMV countries, focusing on disaster-resilient structures in rural coastal communities exposed to natural disasters and other hazards.
- Strengthen existing capacities in ASEAN member countries and Japan for evaluating disaster risks and vulnerabilities, disaster preparedness, and resilience, especially in responding to complex disasters (such as Fukushima) requiring massive humanitarian operations.
- Undertake national and regional studies that assess national disaster inventory, system capacities, and needs, and further assist those that need to be developed and strengthened.
- Strengthen disaster awareness education in the communities most exposed and vulnerable to natural hazards.
- Promote greater public dialogue and discussion on disaster preparedness, including government-NGO consultations.
- Develop and conduct sector-specific capacity-building programs for government officials and CSOs to effectively manage disaster relief and emergency responses.
- Strengthen institutions and human capacities, (including local CSOs) to respond to disasters and emergencies.

To better connect people through education, youth activities, and the media, there is an urgent need to undertake measures leading up to 2015 to
promote awareness and knowledge about each other beyond the modalities of traditional education and media, as well as to strengthen existing connectivity among youth in ASEAN countries and Japan. In this regard, ASEAN and Japan should do the following:

- Strengthen at the tertiary level multidisciplinary ASEAN studies including language education.
- Strengthen existing programs involving the youth in ASEAN and Japan.
- Sustain the new Japan–East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths Programme.

To narrow the development gap, there is an urgent need to broaden the concept of development beyond economic growth. The ASEAN-Japan partnership should work with diverse groups of people to identify gaps in development within and between ASEAN countries. The partnership should take the following steps:

- Adopt multidirectional funding mechanisms for bridging inequalities within ASEAN.
- Develop partnerships among government, private, and community-based organizations to improve the delivery of social services and narrow gaps and inequalities.
- Support social safety net programs for the needy CLMV countries.
- Support gender empowerment programs for all ASEAN countries.

**Recommendations for Actions Beyond 2015**

- ASEAN countries should work continuously to identify development gaps within the ASCC. Cities and communities can be supported or subsidized to keep the momentum for adequate human-centered development strong, similar to the Structural Funds of the European Union.
- ASEAN countries need to consider post-MDG issues within the ASCC framework. Working groups for MDG-related issues could be developed as discussion arenas for emerging human-centered development issues. The databank is also a potential tool for sharing information and knowledge among the ASEAN countries and with external regional partners including Japan.
- Both ASEAN countries and Japan should work together as partners for social development in prioritized cities and communities since many of the ASEAN countries will have graduated from Japanese ODA and will be likely to share common social problems with Japan.
- Japan should pursue qualitative goals for development with ASEAN countries (e.g., beyond quantitative discussions of ODA). By this time, Japan can provide new shared goals for development regarding quality of life, such as food safety, risk management, rule of law, and good governance.
- Japan should further reconsider its ODA schemes—especially multilateral ones—to enhance its flexibility to nurture its partnership with ASEAN. For example, the ODA scheme could open up its bidding system to contractors or experts from all countries in the region.

Without doubt, the challenges facing ASEAN and Japan in their quest to strengthen their strategic partnership in the context of building the social pillar of the ASEAN Community are enormous. Not only is the scope of the ASCC Blueprint extremely broad, but most of the measures that are needed to realize it lie also at the national level. ASEAN countries are hugely diverse across many dimensions and the social impact that globalization has on them is also diverse. Their readiness to meet the demands of the blueprints for the ASEAN Community touch on national sovereignty, and their diverse capacities need to be relatively on par with one another. Thus, the notion of narrowing the development gap must be understood beyond its current narrow conception.

Needless to say, there are antecedent measures that must be considered seriously by ASEAN member states if their organization is to succeed in realizing a people-centered ASEAN Community. Among these is a genuine rethinking of its operational norms that can begin with its charter. If ASEAN becomes more effective in undertaking these challenges, it will overcome a major hurdle toward creating a more effective partnership with Japan and other nations.

Notes

2. Section II Characteristics and Elements, paragraph 4 of the ASCC Blueprint; emphasis by the authors.
3. This project is the ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in Southeast Asia funded by the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) and jointly convened by the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS Jakarta) and the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE).
4. The short name of the joint project is in honor of the late Tadashi Yamamoto, founder and life-long president of the Japan Center for International Exchange; preeminent track two pioneer in many fields in his native Japan, the broader Asia Pacific region, and beyond; as well as an outstanding human being.

5. Since Joseph Nye coined this term in the late 1980s, it has been widely used by political leaders and scholars in the context that soft power lies in the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas, and policies, while hard power lies in the ability to coerce others. Joseph Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).


16. The data on Asia Pacific are from the Asia Pacific Disaster Report, *Reducing Vulnerability and Exposure to Disaster* (2012).


19. Ibid.


22. Ibid., 17.


24. Ibid.