At the 14th ASEAN-Japan Summit held in Bali, Indonesia, on November 18, 2011, the leaders of Japan and the 10 ASEAN countries signed the Joint Declaration for Enhancing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together. Also known as the Bali Declaration, this document outlined the areas in which cooperative relations were to be intensified. The rationale for this is ostensibly to assist in the community-building process of ASEAN and, consequently, in further East Asian regionalism.

This chapter examines the degree to which ASEAN-Japan cooperation has progressed in the areas of nontraditional security. Nontraditional security is an area of interest for ASEAN and is specifically mentioned in the context of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). Issues associated with it are seen as vital to the building of the national and regional resilience that are central to a cohesive, peaceful, and durable ASEAN. As such, nontraditional security has also been identified as a key concern of ASEAN-Japan cooperation.

In exploring ASEAN-Japan cooperation in issue areas associated with nontraditional security, this chapter explores where such cooperation has actually progressed in terms of actual programs and projects, where common interests have been expressed, and where more attention might be required. It will use as a baseline the APSC provisions on nontraditional security as a way of determining developments. This study, however, will limit its scope to programs and projects that are identified as falling within the ambit of ASEAN-Japan cooperation, and purely bilateral cooperation between Japan and individual ASEAN states will not be included.
Nontraditional Security in ASEAN and ASEAN-Japan Cooperation

Given the increasing importance of ASEAN-Japan cooperation to the security of Southeast Asia and its surrounding domains, one of the leading scholars in the region has argued that the “Japan-ASEAN strategic partnership must take into consideration the need to address nontraditional security especially maritime security, terrorism, environmental security, energy security, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peace building.”1 This statement indicates the significance of these issues to the region but it does not illustrate the scope of the problem.

The Centre for Non-traditional Security Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies offers the following definition of nontraditional security:

Non-traditional security issues are challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise from non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime.

These dangers are transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive—political, economic and social—responses, as well as the humanitarian use of military force.2

The key terms here are “transnational in scope and in remedies,” and “requiring comprehensive responses.” This is in clear juxtaposition to what would be considered traditional security concerns—i.e., issues that involve the protection of territory and the people that reside within that territory from external aggression and internal subversion, and the defense of sovereignty. The principal issue that emanates from this is that these matters tend to be addressed through self-help mechanisms and may invite suspicion and even conflict. On the other hand, nontraditional security, due to its predominantly transnational nature, requires cooperative arrangements—often of a multilateral nature. Some areas of cooperation between ASEAN and Japan may tread the grey area between traditional and nontraditional security and may in fact have sensitive implications for regional security, but for the purposes of this chapter, only the latter will be discussed.

The APSC Blueprint was accepted by the ASEAN leaders on March 1, 2009. It gives expression to the broad political aspirations of ASEAN and fundamentally seeks to establish
• a rules-based community of shared values and norms;
• a cohesive, peaceful, stable, and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; and
• a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world.³

The APSC Blueprint emphasizes the idea that ASEAN must strive toward a regional environment of justice, democracy, and harmony. The APSC is intended to be the means by which greater cooperation between the member countries of ASEAN can be achieved in order to attain higher levels of political development. To this end, its envisaged idea of a security community very clearly goes beyond the traditional understanding of security. In this context, the provisions in the APSC Blueprint that refer to nontraditional security are covered in the sections under the shaping and sharing of norms and shared responsibility for comprehensive security.

In the context of ASEAN-Japan relations, this commitment to ensuring nontraditional security as a key component of the community-building process in ASEAN is buttressed by a similar set of commitments in the Bali Declaration of 2011. This document set the stage for a five-pronged approach to the strengthening of cooperation between ASEAN and Japan, as follows:

**Strategy 1:** strengthening political-security cooperation in the region;
**Strategy 2:** intensifying cooperation toward ASEAN community building;
**Strategy 3:** enhancing ASEAN-Japan connectivity for consolidating ties between ASEAN and Japan;
**Strategy 4:** creating together a more disaster-resilient society; and
**Strategy 5:** addressing together common regional and global challenges.⁴

In implementing these strategies, ASEAN and Japan adopted four areas of cooperation that roughly corresponded to the pillars of the ASEAN Community—political-security cooperation, economic cooperation, sociocultural cooperation, and regional and international cooperation. Within those four areas were commitments to nontraditional security. More importantly, ASEAN and Japan promised to fund and implement specific projects and programs in order to achieve the goals of the declaration.⁵
Across the region, there is a general consensus on the need for enhanced cooperation (even at the operational level) on nontraditional security issues. This is perhaps not too surprising because ASEAN has always favored a functional approach to operational cooperation. While functionalist and neofunctionalist theory in international relations would argue that this will eventually contribute to the community-building process, the ASEAN ideal of community building has never been based on the consequences of the neofunctionalist concept of a “spillover.”

Of greater significance to the acceptability of enhancing cooperation on issues involving nontraditional security are the clear overlaps that this has with the comprehensive approach ASEAN takes regarding security. This is explicitly mentioned in the second general aspiration of the APSC Blueprint to establish “a cohesive, peaceful, and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security.” It is in this aspect of the APSC that nontraditional security and the variety of issues associated with it are made part of the ASEAN Community–building process. In fact, it is a “key purpose of ASEAN . . . to respond effectively and in a timely manner, in accordance with the principles of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and transboundary challenges.”

Comparatively speaking, Japan’s interest in nontraditional security was clearly expressed in the report that Japan submitted for the annual ARF Security Outlook in 2012. There was a heavy emphasis on the increasing need for and occurrence of collaborative efforts to address issues “especially in non-traditional security fields.” Those observations have been followed up on by the increasing focus of government-related policy research organizations on these fields. For instance, the Japan Institute for International Affairs website notes the need to conduct research and analyze the nature of the “rising influence of non-state actors posing non-traditional security challenges.”

In this context, the interests of ASEAN and Japan appear to have converged on a number of nontraditional security issues that are serving as the focal point for their cooperative efforts. The following sections highlight four of these areas: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, transnational crime, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

ASEAN and Japan have a mutual interest in intensifying cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The APSC Blueprint itself has 12 action areas that are related to strengthening intra-ASEAN cooperation in this area.\(^9\) Most of these are also covered in the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER),\(^{10}\) through which ASEAN-Japan cooperation is being enhanced in the areas of emergency preparedness, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. This includes the strengthening of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). Extensive sharing of experiences and lessons learned, implementation of training and capacity building, and the establishment of a comprehensive information-sharing system will be established between ASEAN and Japan through the Japan-initiated Disaster Management Network for the ASEAN Region.\(^{11}\) In 2012, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda reiterated Japan’s commitment to keeping the promotion of disaster-management cooperation as a priority for Japan-ASEAN partnership.\(^{12}\) The ASEAN regional emergency stockpile and logistics system in Subang received generous support from Japan, totaling more than US$11 million in 2012. Prime Minister Noda promised to maintain Japan’s assistance, including the provision of information and communications technology (ICT) equipment and experts to the AHA Centre in addition to its contributions to the stockpile of emergency supplies. In May 2013, the government of Japan approved the release of nearly US$5 million to support this endeavor. Close consultation and cooperation have been initiated between the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) in Japan and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) in Thailand, indicating the prospect of increased direct institution-to-institution cooperation. Efforts to sustain and expand the Disaster Relief Exercises (DiREx) under the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which were initiated by the United States and the Philippines in 2008, have also been successful with Japan’s participation and support.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is an area where operational cooperation between and among the ASEAN states and Japan has been progressing slowly but steadily. Efforts to strengthen AADMER, the AHA Centre, the ASEAN Disaster Management Network, and the ARF DiREx have been bearing fruit. There are still a number of areas, however, where this cooperation can be intensified in the context of the APSC Blueprint, particularly in terms of the soft side of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. There are nonetheless gaps that need to be plugged, especially those laid out in the APSC Blueprint in such areas as the provision
of basic services or assistance to bring relief to victims; the promotion of cooperation for orderly repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and resettlement of internally displaced persons; the promotion of the safety of humanitarian relief assistance workers; the development of common operating procedures for the provision of humanitarian assistance in the event of conflict; the intensification of cooperation with the United Nations and the promotion of the role and contributions of relevant international organizations on humanitarian assistance; the promotion of civil-military dialogue and coordination in humanitarian assistance; and the expansion of the role and contribution of women in field-based humanitarian operations.\textsuperscript{13}

**Transnational Crime**

One area that generates no disagreement in ASEAN-Japan cooperation is the need to combat transnational crime. In the APSC Blueprint, there are 18 action lines related to this issue, covering a variety of concerns including trafficking in drugs, persons, and small arms and light weapons, and there is a need for a common legal framework to be able to do this. While there is very little disagreement about the commitment made by the different ASEAN countries to address this issue, the existing national infrastructure needs to be overhauled in order to create some degree of coherence among the various legal systems and traditions and to overcome the non-convergent (even competing) interests and wide gaps in national capabilities among the countries in Southeast Asia. The 18 action lines on transnational crime in the APSC direct the ASEAN member states to implement existing work programs and plans, ratify the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, explore cooperation on the issue of extradition, strengthen criminal justice capacity and response against transnational crimes, and enhance border management cooperation, among a number of other general commitments.\textsuperscript{14}

The Bali Declaration explicitly shows that there is interest in promoting ASEAN-Japan cooperation to address these issues. It mentions enhancing cooperation to prevent and combat “non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes through the existing ASEAN-initiated mechanisms,”\textsuperscript{15} as well as “cooperat[ing] in combating illegal transfer and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.”\textsuperscript{16} The ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action 2011–2015 identifies three action lines that correspond to these commitments:
1. Enhance cooperation in combating transnational crimes through existing cooperation mechanisms, such as ASEAN Senior Officials on Transnational Crime Plus Japan, ASEAN Senior Officials on Transnational Crime Plus Three, and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus Three;

2. Strengthen cooperation to combat transnational crimes especially illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, arms smuggling, sea piracy, armed robbery against ships, cyber crimes, economic crimes and money laundering within the frameworks of the ASEAN-Japan dialogue partnership cooperation, ARF, APT, EAS, the United Nations, and authorities concerned, through among others, capacity building, technical cooperation, developing more effective information sharing arrangements for and among relevant law enforcement agencies and to carry out cooperation to address their root causes;

3. Enhance the development of human and institutional capacities in the ASEAN Member States through training, joint exercise and exchanges of lessons-learned and best practices by utilizing existing centers in ASEAN.¹⁷

The fact that both the APSC Blueprint and the ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action have clear agendas on fighting transnational crime demonstrates that there is a strong commitment in principle, but the vagueness of the language in those documents shows a low level of engagement at the operational level. Particularly when compared with the approaches being taken on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the institutional arrangements for coordinating cooperative activities on transnational crime appear largely underdeveloped. An even more serious gap exists between rhetoric and action. The action lines have not been translated into viable coordination and cooperation at the policy level within ASEAN.¹⁸ In the meantime, the problems continue to grow. For example, reports show that the number of trafficking syndicates, and particularly those involved in human trafficking, has been growing.¹⁹ Most of the ASEAN member states are categorized under Tier 2 in the US State Department’s “Trafficking in Persons Report 2012.”²⁰ This means that the governments in the region have been undertaking measures to address the issue but that despite these measures the problem remains widespread. Similar concerns were expressed at a meeting of officials involved in fighting drug trafficking, especially with the prospect of drug syndicates taking advantage of the drive to open up the region for greater ASEAN connectivity in 2015.²¹ Until the issue of collective action in ASEAN is resolved, levels of ASEAN-Japan cooperation will not really be making any great strides in contributing to community building.
Counterterrorism

The fight against terrorism has been a continuing area of concern for ASEAN-Japan cooperation. These efforts correspond with ASEAN’s commitment to intensified counterterrorism initiatives. The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT) came into force with the submission by Brunei of its instruments of ratification. On January 11, 2013, Malaysia became the 10th and final ASEAN country to ratify the convention. With the ACCT now in full force across the region, its effective implementation becomes the key concern of ASEAN. While it has completed the first action line of the APSC Blueprint, three lines remain:

1. Endeavour to accede to and ratify the relevant international instruments on counterterrorism;
2. Promote effective implementation of the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism; and
3. Cooperate to support development initiatives aimed at addressing the root causes of terrorism and conditions conducive to terrorism.\(^{22}\)

The commitment to these efforts is reflected in the ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action 2011–2015’s stated commitment to

- intensify cooperation on counterterrorism including in the field of technical cooperation and exchange and sharing of information;
- promote cooperation to support the early accession, ratification, and acceptance of all of the internationally agreed counterterrorism conventions and protocols by ASEAN member states; and
- continue to convene the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue, and to provide capacity building and technical cooperation in order to enhance counterterrorism capabilities and to implement identified projects on countering terrorism as well as to support the implementation of the ACCT.\(^{23}\)

On July 24–26, 2012, the Sixth ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue was held in Cebu, Philippines. The parties agreed to focus their ongoing cooperation on countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism as well as cyberterrorism. Other priority areas include transport security, border control and immigration, law enforcement, maritime security, and capacity building.\(^{24}\) The weakness of institutionalized regional cooperative mechanisms is to a certain extent mitigated by an increasingly positive environment that has reduced the space within which terrorist cells can operate in the region.\(^{25}\) Of particular importance here is
the recent progress in peace talks between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Cybersecurity

On September 13, 2013, Japan hosted the ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Policy Meeting on Cybersecurity Cooperation in Tokyo. It was a milestone meeting in an area that received little mention in the Bali Declaration. Interestingly, this is likewise an area that has received very little attention in ASEAN. As one analyst critically noted,

National and regional efforts to adopt comprehensive cyber security strategies have been somewhat slow and fragmented. Similarly, ASEAN Member States’ efforts to adopt a regional comprehensive framework for cyber security are so far piecemeal and fragmented (as are national level efforts). An ASEAN-wide comprehensive cyber security framework has not yet been developed, official public documents are vague, the 2013 schedule for official meetings does not include cyber security, and the precise extent of discussions and proposed initiatives is difficult to fully ascertain, and lacks full transparency.

It is not a question of ASEAN not recognizing the vulnerability caused by increasing dependence on computer networks, and cyber connectivity of basic state functions has been noted. Malaysian Defense Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi called for the development of an “ASEAN Master Plan for Security Connectivity” at the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore on June 3, 2012, in recognition of this concern. The Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity adopted by ASEAN on October 28, 2010, called for (among other things) the introduction of an enhanced ICT infrastructure in ASEAN.

ASEAN telecommunications and IT ministers have been holding meetings to discuss the coordination of efforts toward making ASEAN more competitive by taking advantage of technological advancements and promoting intra-ASEAN interoperability, interconnectivity, security, and integrity. The ASEAN+3 process has likewise pushed the development of deeper cyber linkages and capacities within and between the ASEAN states, and between ASEAN and China, Japan, and South Korea. As noted above, the problem lies not in the aspirational context of ensuring cybersecurity in ASEAN but in agreeing on and putting common standards and policies in place. All these again show the gap between ASEAN aspirations and efforts at achieving those aspirations.

The recent ASEAN-Japan joint statement on cybersecurity focused on three areas of cooperation: (1) creating a secure business environment,
(2) building a secure information and communication network, and (3) enhancing capacity for cybersecurity. The third area is arguably of the most immediate concern, as further development on the first two is dependent upon it. The story, however, remains the same as on other issues: How can Japan help promote and facilitate operational cooperation among the member states of ASEAN?

Some Observations and Recommendations

This initial listing of where ASEAN-Japan cooperation is coming from on nontraditional security and what is being accomplished seems to show a disturbing pattern of low-level operational involvement, with the possible exception of cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. (This exception, however, is only remarkable when compared with the low levels of cooperation seen in the other areas of ASEAN-Japan cooperation on nontraditional security.) There is still much to be done in the categories discussed above. Japan has been very generous in establishing the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund to endeavor to strengthen existing cooperative efforts. These endeavors, however, should try to avoid the ASEAN disease of mistaking rhetoric for action, and counting declarations as the culmination of cooperative efforts. The issues have begun to be identified. There have been some cooperative efforts that have been sustained over time. The next step that needs to be taken is to introduce clearer action lines with clearer goals and timelines that emphasize specific cooperative activities and outcomes rather than just the promotion of cooperation. The difficulty, however, of relying on this formula is that changing geopolitical conditions have made it less credible in the eyes of a number of observers.30

The grey area between traditional and nontraditional security that inhabits the maritime domain of regional security creates, understandably, great wariness with regard to enhancing the operational level of maritime cooperation among countries in the region, especially with non–Southeast Asian powers. The consequences of this enhanced cooperation will inevitably find expression in operations in the region, which might be of concern to neighboring countries. Increasing tensions over the South China Sea make for a suspicious regional environment. It also reinforces the wisdom of using nontraditional security as the initial basis of security cooperation in the region.

These geopolitical problems notwithstanding, ASEAN’s efforts at addressing issues emanating from nontraditional security concerns suffer from
a number of basic issues. As indicated by the discussion in the previous section, the most glaring of these has to do with the unevenness of national capacities. This is perhaps an area to which ASEAN-Japan cooperation should be directed as a matter of principle.

Overall, however, a number of initial steps can and should be undertaken collaboratively by Japan and ASEAN in order to address nontraditional security issues around Southeast Asia, as outlined below.

In the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the following recommendations are proposed:

• Continued support should be provided for the operations of the AHA Centre, which has been a core element of cooperation between ASEAN and Japan. The ability of the AHA Centre to perform its mandated efforts in a timely fashion is dependent upon its capacity to quickly mobilize resources and expertise for deployment in disaster-stricken areas.

• Closer cooperation should be encouraged between the AHA Centre and the Disaster Management Network for the ASEAN Region in the implementation of the comprehensive disaster management cooperation plan developed by Japan. Special attention should be given to the proposal to use satellites for disaster management to develop early warning systems for remote, poor areas across the region.

• The ASEAN states should continue to work out technical preparations and operational guidance relating to disaster preparedness and response as stipulated in the AADMER. Again, a key factor here would be the coordination between the AHA Centre and the Disaster Management Network in compiling baseline standards that the member states should adhere to.

• The AHA Centre should look to develop protocols for the provision of basic services and assistance to bring relief to victims of conflicts; for cooperation on the orderly repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and resettlement of internally displaced persons; and for ensuring the safety of humanitarian relief assistance workers.

• The AHA Centre and the Disaster Management Network should develop common operating procedures for the provision of humanitarian assistance in the event of conflict.

• Guidelines should be developed by ASEAN and Japan on cooperation with the United Nations and the promotion of the role and contributions of relevant international organizations on humanitarian assistance.

• ASEAN, through the AHA Centre, should organize multi-stakeholder working group meetings that would develop a mechanism for civil-military dialogue and coordination in humanitarian assistance.
• The AHA Centre and the Disaster Management Network should explore the expansion of the role and contribution of women in field-based humanitarian operations.

In combating transnational crime, the proposed areas of cooperation between Japan and ASEAN are much more basic in nature. These must include the following:

• An ASEAN Coordinating Center on Combating Transnational Crime should be established as a monitoring office for compliance by the ASEAN states with specific ASEAN-related commitments on transnational crime issues.
• On combating drug trafficking, this center should work with the Japanese government to assess the results of the mid-term review of the ASEAN Work Plan on Combating Illicit Drug Production, Trafficking and Use (2009–2015) and identify gaps that need to be addressed.
• The assessment of such gaps should be based on clearly established and measurable indicators that would be the basis for identifying what needs to be done in order to achieve a Drug-Free ASEAN by 2015, as called for by the ASEAN leaders at the 20th ASEAN Summit in 2012.
• Similarly, this center should monitor efforts toward the implementation of an ASEAN common course of action against trafficking in persons. The APSC Blueprint commits ASEAN to the establishment and implementation of an ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP). Debates about how this might infringe on existing national laws, however, have slowed progress and attention has turned instead to the adoption of a less binding “plan of action.” Needless to say, a binding convention would be much more effective than a “plan of action,” and Japan should encourage ASEAN leaders to adopt a more institutionalized commitment to ACTIP. Whatever the mechanism might be, however, Japan must encourage and assist ASEAN and the requisite sectoral bodies to move quickly on this issue and operationalize the commitments that are made under it.
• ASEAN and Japan should jointly adopt the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) recommendations on combating trafficking in persons.
• ASEAN states must further discussions that will operationalize cooperation on combating trafficking on small arms and light weapons. The failure to include clear outputs on this issue when identifying annual targets for ASEAN Community building indicates a clear gap that needs to be addressed.
Cooperation on counterterrorism was given a great boost with the entry into force of the ACCT. More importantly, Malaysia’s ratification ensures the participation and commitment of all the member states of ASEAN in the ACCT. Consequently, ASEAN and Japan should consider the following recommendations that go beyond what is addressed in the Bali Declaration:

- As with the issue of transnational crime, the weakness of ASEAN’s counterterrorism efforts has to do with the inadequacy of institutional mechanisms that enforce implementation and compliance. Consequently, counter-terrorism remains largely dependent on national-level responses. It is in this context that Japanese assistance to enhancing national-level capabilities, especially on information processing and real-time response to tactical intelligence, becomes important.

- Japan should encourage and assist ASEAN in strengthening institutional cooperation.

- Increasingly, however, institutional cooperation should emphasize counter-ideological operations, even as law enforcement and effective police work remain mainstays of counterterrorism efforts in the region. Japan and ASEAN should jointly create programs within the context of the ACCT that will be directed at countering extremist teachings and weaning away young people from the influence of extremist ideologies.

As noted earlier, the issue of cybersecurity did not receive a significant degree of attention in the Bali Declaration. The discussion of the issue presented above, however, shows that this is an area that needs to be addressed through ASEAN and Japan cooperation. The following general areas of concern need to be examined:

- Japan and the ASEAN member states should take the initiative in enhancing mechanisms for sharing information about cyber threats.

- Recognizing that the proposed ASEAN Master Plan for Security Connectivity is still very much a sensitive issue, there is nonetheless a need to put together a document that outlines ASEAN concerns, goals, and strategies on cybersecurity. This would provide the basis for collective action and cooperation with Japan on this issue.

- The absence of such a master plan or strategy paper notwithstanding, Japan should assist ASEAN in the implementation of capacity-building and technical-assistance measures.

- As ASEAN moves toward greater harmonization of laws among member countries to combat cybercrimes, Japanese laws and experience could be important in helping shape those laws and the legal standards that would be the basis of such efforts.
Notes


3. ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint (submitted to and signed by the ASEAN leaders at Hua-hin, Thailand, on March 1, 2009), http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf.


8. See the website of the Japan Institute for International Affairs, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/topics_security.php.

9. Ibid., sections B.3.1 and B.5.

10. This was enacted on July 26, 2005, and came into force on December 24, 2009.

11. See Bali Declaration, 6.


14. APSC Blueprint, section B.4.1.

15. See Bali Declaration, section I.8.

16. Ibid., section I.7.

17. ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action, sections 1.3.1–1.3.3.


20. Except for Myanmar (identified in the report as Burma), Malaysia, and Thailand (which are given a lower rating of Tier 2 Watch List), all the other ASEAN member states are rated as Tier 2. See US Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report 2012,” http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012.

22. APSC Blueprint, section B.4.2.

23. ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action, sections 1.3.4–1.3.6.


29. Ibid.

30. The other side of it is that hard security analysts have been able to argue that attempts to put into place and maintain a rules-based maritime order have not been successful and therefore it requires a response based on strategic balance of power calculations. See, for example, Ken Jimbo, “Japan, and ASEAN’s Maritime Security Infrastructure,” East Asia Forum (June 3, 2012): 1.

31. A number of the recommendations made here are from AKP Mochtan, “Towards a Disaster Resilient ASEAN.”

32. “Salazar: Trafficking Syndicates Growing.”